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PREFACE

There is a growing band of social scientists who

are examining the ways in which social systems may
be

understood as systems which in some sense "learn.

"

Among

the investigators are political scientists, organization-

al theorists, philosophers, sociologists and economists.

Many of these have created models describing the
"learning" process in the social systems which interest
them.

In this dissertation

will examine four such

I
*

models and try to clarify some of the issues they raise.
Further,

I

will examine the possibility that behind the

diversity of disciplining perspectives, there may be
grounds for searching for a more general, cross-

disciplinary model.

Finally,

I

will enumerate issues

a general model of collective learning would have to

address.
The scope of such an inquiry is so great that

would not dare begin if

I

I

did not believe that the very

scope and centrality of the topic promised some rewards
for understanding.

Perhaps

I

can suggest my sense of

the importance of the topic by describing my experience

as a graduate student, a person, a futurist, an
IV

educator, and an observer of the social sciences.
first, as a graduate student,

I

have come to a

deeper acknowledgment of the extent to which my own

learning is supported by a larger collective learning
process.

I

have come to have an appreciation for the

immense body of knowledge and scholarly tradition that

provide the ground for any new student.

And at a more

personal level,

I

have come to acknowledge my debt to

those with whom

I

have had contact in this endeavor.

This growth in appreciation is,

part of any graduate program.

I

suppose, a necessary

It is reflected in the

fact that the "Acknowledgments" section of a disserta*

tion is often both the most predictable section and the

most poignant.

My case is no different from any other.

My intel-

lectual debts are too numerous to mention, or even reThe thinking of Karl Deutsch, James March,

member.

Johan Olsen, Chris Argyris, Donald Schon, and Jurgen
Habermas have become so much a part of my thinking,

I

cannot tell you where their thinking ends and mine begins.

Bouldry

The same may be said of Edgar Dunn, Kenneth
,

Donald Michael, and Peter Berger.

Conversa-

tions with James Botkin and James Keen are woven into

my thought.

I

am indebted to Howard Peele for helping

to
me start, to Peter Wagschal for letting me explore,

v

Tom Fraser for pointing me to apt anthropological
studies, to David Schuman for raising fundamental issues,

and to Dwight Allen for stimulation and prods to apply

theory to practice.

Thus, no matter how solitary the

process of writing a dissertation, it is also, in many
ways, a collective one.

This dissertation is not the

product of one mind, but of many.

My debt is emotional and practical as well as intellectual.

I

am indebted to Dwight Allen for his care of

my person, as well as my intellect; to David Schuman for
forcing me to finish despite my "best efforts to do
otherwise"; and to Tom Fraser for his quiet support.
It would have been hard to finish the course if some

friends, especially Ed Frey, had not helped unlock some

fetters.

I

am indebted to my family for their support

and patience, and to my daughter Faith who, on typing
the last word of my dissertation, insisted it be fol-

lowed by an exclamation point?

And beyond saying is my

debt to steadfast Jean.
Such acknowledgment of intellectual and emotional

debts is a way of suggesting the importance of collective learning as a field of inquiry.

alone.

No one learns

We learn together.

Not just as a graduate student, but also in my

everyday life do

I

see the pervasiveness of collective
vi

learning.
time

I

From the time the quartz alarm sounds to
the

turn off the eleven o'clock news, my day
is sur-

rounded by the products of collective learning.

The T.V.

is the product of lessons learned by countless
people at

Sony and elsewhere.
self -ref lection.
laws
I

I

The news is a societal process of

The food

follow, the language

eat,

I
I

the tools

I

the

speak, the goals for which

strive are all in many ways the cumulative learned

products of countless learners preceeding me.
I

use,

And what

learned may get used in at least some small measure by

those around me.

I

live at the edge of an endless

tapestry of collective learning, eager to add a few
threads to the wool.

As a futurist,

I

launch this inquiry because

I

am

worried about the capacity of our current social systems
to solve the complex and dangerous problems which con-

front our globe.

We all know the threats

— of

nuclear

holocaust, environmental degradation, population explosion, economic crisis, injustice, social disintegration.

What is not often enough recognized is the extent
to which these threats are problems of collective learn-

ing.

They are the product of prior collective efforts,

and demand collective learning for solution.

For in-

stance, the nuclear peril is partly the result of a

certain success in collective learning.
vii

The learnings of

people like Bell, Einstein, Goddard, as well as the

learnings of countless people at IBM, MSA, DoD, the
U.S. and U.S.S.R.

— have

converged to give us nuclear mis-

siles poised to protect the views of followers of

Jefferson and Marx.

Our predicament is the product of a

vast tapestry of technological, ideological and social
collective learning.

And our task is to learn collec-

tively ways to prevent such missiles' use, to institute
new ways of managing international conflict.
The same analysis can be made of problems we face

in energy, the economy, the environment and whole range
of collective learning tasks.

Behind all specific

social problems, there is a more general problem--how
to improve the collective learning by which problems

are addressed.

Thus, insofar as we can shed light on

the nature of collective learning, to that extent may

we contribute to the solutions of problems we face.

As a futurist,

I

am not only concerned with prob-

lems threatening the human future;

I

am also concerned

with establishing a framework with which to promote
more effective thinking about the future.

The study of

the future demands a theory of social change.

Any at-

a
tempts to predict the human future must rest on

theory of social change.
complete,

I

But no such theory will be

account
will argue, unless it includes an
viii

of the collective learning that permeates our lives and

forms our choices.

And any attempts to form a better

future require strategies which at least tacitly include
a view about how to promote a collective process of

learning new collective ways of doing things.

Thus,

better definition of the dynamics of collective learning

may help the field of "future studies" better assess the
future and more effectively suggest strategies for change.
As an educator,

I

am motivated to launch the in-

quiry by a sense that the pervasiveness of collective
learning and an understanding of what promotes it may
have implications for our definition of purposes and

methods of education.

There may be a tendency in

American culture to focus too much on learning as something happening in individual students, and too little
of the
as something that emerges out of the social life

mind.

incompleteIf, as I will argue, learning is only

collective
ly understood as individual, and if our
of collecsuccess may depend on developing the skills
called for, away
tive learning, then perhaps a shift is
a more collecfrom an individualistic approach toward
tive one
theory,
Finally, as an observer of social

I

sense

model of collective
the time is ripe for a general
accumulated a
The various disciplines have
learning.
IX

great store of concepts, insights, data, conclusions, and
grounded theory that bear on so vast a topic as collective learning.

But their insights have remained depart-

mental ones and few dare to see the subject whole.
Such departmentalization strikes me as an injustice to who we are.

Humans learn, and humans are

social; psychologists study the first fact, social

But too few study the corollary

scientists, the latter.
to those two facts

—a

third, that humans learn together.

The danger is that we might believe the division is
real, that what we do as social creatures is separate

from what we do as individual learners.

But, of

course, no such division really exists.

I

to a culture, and what

I

am socialized

invent may change that culture.

Individuals and social groups form one another.

To

think of learning happening only in individuals is
soil,
like thinking the apple happens without the tree,

rain and sun.

And to think of a disembodied "society

the tree
learning" without individuals is like thinking

can grow without the apple's seed.

process whole.

We need to see the

the
And, with the separate insights of

interest in
different disciplines, with the growth of
life, and with
cognitive components of socio-cultural
will study, I sense
the contribution of the models we

reintegration of a more
that we are ready for the
X

complete understanding of learning.

As a step in that direction,

I

will, in Chapter

II to V, review models of collective
learning developed

in a variety of disciplines.

In Chapter VI,

I

will in-

vestigate whether a general model is possible in principle, and will identify some issues such a general

model must resolve.

xi

ABSTRACT

Towards General Model of Collective Learning:
A
Critique of Existing Models of Specific
Social Systems and a Sketch of a Model
for Social Systems in General

September 1983

John McClellan, B.A., McGill University
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor David

F.

Schuman

This dissertation examines four models of particular

social systems as systems which "learn,” clarifies issues
those models reveal, and uses those clarifications to

suggest a preliminary model of collective learning by
social systems in general.

Models examined are the model

of governmental learning by Karl Deutsch, the model of

organizational learning by James March and Johan Olsen, the
model of organizational learning by Chris Argyris and

Donald Schon, and the model of societal learning by

Jurgen Habermas.

Each is assessed for its contribution and

limits
The dissertation suggests that all social systems

have enough in common to permit, at least in principle, the

development of a general model of collective learning,

discussing issues which any general model will have to

address.

These include questions of how to define collect-

ive learning, how to differentiate it from individual

learning, and how to describe its dynamics.

The disser-

tation suggests its own provisional responses to such
issqes in the form of a preliminary model.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines four existing models of

particular social systems as systems which "learn."

It

clarifies issues those models reveal, and uses those

clarifications to suggest a preliminary model of collective

learning by social systems in general.

Its primary

objective is the clarification of the issues on whose

resolution the construction of an eventual general model
of collective learning must depend.

Use of collective "learning" in the social sciences

There is growing interest in the ways in which social

systems may be understood as systems which in some sense
"learn.

Perhaps one source of this interest has been the
emergence of electronic control systems and computers as
images of systems with the capacity to receive, process,

Concomitant with the emergence of

and produce information.

such machines was the development of the thinking on which

they rested--information theory, cybernetics, and general

systems theory (Wiener, 1965 and 1967; Bertalanffy, 1968;
Ashby, 1954)

.

Another source may have been the articulation
1

2

of a body of theory about learning by modern psychologists
such as Skinner and Piaget.

At the same time there was

growing appreciation for the difficulties of adaptation
faced by social systems in an age of rapid change (Schon
1971; Michael 1968 and 1973; Toffler 1970; Emery and Trist

1972; Vickers 1971 and 1973).

So it should not be surpri-

sing that a growing band of thinkers has turned to the

imagery offered by cybernetics and psychology as a way of

describing the dynamics of adaptation by social systems.
The interest in applying such imagery has extended
to a wide variety of disciplines.

Perhaps the field which

9

has seen the most extensive use of the imagery has been

organizational theory.

Theorists who have in one form or

another used the imagery related to "learning" in their
analysis of organizations include Cadwallader (1959)
and March (1963)* Cangelosi and Dill
1972, 1975), Katz and Kahn

(

(

1965 )# Beer

1966 ), Wilensky

(

(

»

Cyert

1966

,

1967 ).

Litterer (1969)* Churchman (1971). Michael (1973. 1977).
Argyris and Schon (197^. 1978), Hage (197*0, Alderfer and

Brown (1975), March and Olsen (1976), Nolan (1978, 1979).

Duncan and Weiss (1978), Jelinek (1979). Hedberg (1981),
and Shrivastava (1983).
The interest has been seen in other disciplines as
well.

Deutsch

It has been used in the analysis of politics by
(

1963 ), Schon (1971). Steinbruner (197*0, Etheredge

(1983), and Etheredge and Short (1983).

It has been used

3

in analyzing social and cultural change by
Boulding (1964,
1970, 1978). Etzionni (1968), Hughes (1969), Breed
(1971),

Dunn (1971. 1974), Miller (1972. 1978), Inoguchi
(1974),
Conger (1974), Jantsch (1975. 1976), Campbell (1969), Dow
(1976), Crane (1978), and Ionescu Sisesti (1979).

The

imagery is also contained in the works of some social
philosophers and theologians, including Teilhard de Chardin
(1959. 1964), Desan (1972) and Habermas (1971, 1975, 1979).

Among futurists, the image is pursued by Michael (1973),
Wuest (1978), and Botkin et al. (1979).

And the notion

appears in less explicit form elsewhere, as in the

discussion of "learning curves" by economists and
organizational theorists (Abernathy and Wayne, 1974).

It

also appears in the stress on the cognitive, learned,
cumulative quality of culture seen in such anthropologists
as Goodenough (1971). Levi-Strauss (1966), and Geertz (1973).

Opportunity for integration

Every discipline has applied the image of "learning"

in its own special way to its own special object of study.

And within disciplines, each author has his own special
view.

But

I

am intrigued that such a variety of investiga-

tors all find the imagery of "learning" to be suggestive

in their attempts to understand their various social
processes.

Perhaps behind their diversity, they are

4

sensing the presence of a pan-disciplinary principle;
perhaps there is a dynamic common to all social systems,
a dynamic rooted in the way social creatures
learn together.

It is to such speculations that

dissertation.

I

I

am responding in this

sense that an examination of the variety

of perspectives on social systems' learning may reveal

opportunities for insight and integration.

The choice of models for analysis

For this dissertation,
four of the above models.

I

have chosen to examine

They are Karl Deutsch’s

cybernetic model of politics

(

1963 ), March and Olsen’s

model of organizational learning under ambiguity (1976),

Argyris and Schon's model of organizational learning as
a correction of organizational theories-in-use

,

and Jurgen

Habermas’s model of social evolution as homologous to
cognitive development.

I

have chosen these models because

they are among the most extensively developed and

thoroughly articulated models we have.

As such, they offer

the best material with which to understand what problems

remain if we wish to pursue such models further.

I

have

also chosen these models because they represent a variety
of disciplines, social systems, and assumptions, and as
such, may supplement each other and reveal more general

patterns.

5

Issues th at must be addressed
Through a close examination of
each different model’s
assumptions, intentions, scope, concepts,
terms, claims,

and implications,

I

hope to clarify the range of issues

we are likely to confront in trying
to model the dynamics
of social systems in terms of collective
learning.
The

simple analogy that social systems, like
individuals,
learn" is appealing, but before we can use
the analogy
seriously, we must confront a series of questions.

These

will include the following:
.

In what sense does the model claim that the social system
is "learning"?

.

Who learns?

The "system," a "group mind," just the

member learners, or some combination?
.

Is that usage valid?

.

When can the system be said to have learned?

Why?
By what

criteria?
.

How is such learning possible?

What are its sources and

processes?
.

Are varieties of learning distinguished?

On what

measures?
.

Can stages in development of learning capacity be
distinguished?

.

What is the logic of their development?

What factors are seen to help and hinder the social
system's learning?

.

Is the model grounded enough to be of worth in practice?

6

What are the values from which the model grows and to

•

which it aspires?

Are these sufficient?

Does the model leave out elements in the life of a social

.

system that have bearing on its process as a system that
learns?
.

To what extent can the model serve as a guide in the

understanding of other social systems as systems that
learn?
These are difficult and slippery issues, but they are
so fundamental that we must address and resolve them if we

are to proceed with confidence in the construction of any

subsequent model.

Defining "collective learning ”
One of the primary issues will be to clarify the ways

in which investigators speak of collective "learning," to
ask if such usages are valid, and if so why.

For, even

if the analogy between individual learning and collective

dynamics is appealing, we must still decide whether the

analogy is simply a heuristic tool or one which accurately
describes the workings of social systems.

That issue will

be one with which we wrestle throughout the dissertation.
One of the goals of this dissertation is to end with
a clearer definition of "collective learning."

for the reader to understand my intent, however,

In order
I

ought

at the outset give at least some sense of the territory

7

that interests me;

I

ought to offer at least a preliminary

definition of collective learning.
Perhaps the most honest and vivid way to begin
is to
list examples of the kinds of things that
interest me,
.

that seem in some way to involve aspects of collective
learning.
.

I

am interested in;

How a family recognizes that it is having a recurring
problem with finances, and institutes procedures for
averting it

.

How a School of Education moves from a traditional
hierarchy to an experimenting polyarchy

.

How Data General rushes out a new computer (Kidder 1981)
but has trouble maturing in a recession

.

Why Texas Instruments was able in the 1940s and 1950s to
invent and market new products; was able in the 1960s to

recognize that its success brought lack of integration,
and to institutionalize an integrated, corporate-wide

system of planning; but was unable in the late 1970s and

early 1980s to capture markets for watches and computers
(Jelinek 1979)
.

How a scientific discipline adds to its knowledge and
shifts its "paradigm" (Kuhn 1970)

.

How food cooperatives have emerged

.

How the Clean Air Act got passed and enforced

.

Why Japan was quicker than the United States to respond
to the shortages of oil by conserving energy-intensive

8

industries (Yergin 1982)
.

How the United States decided to
go to the moon, and
•how NASA martialled the
resources of thousands

of people

in learning how to get there
*

.

.

How science, technology, capitalism, and
puritanism
advanced in seventeenth century England
(Merton 1970)
How "computerese" and "valley talk" took
form

How speech, print, TV, computers and Atari
games affect
how people think and communicate
r

.

How the Freeze Resolution got passed, and how to
sustain
that movement for the transformation of the way humans

provide security
.

Why the Catholic church was slow to question the war in
Vietnam but has come to challenge the nuclear arms race

.

Why the ancient Greeks shifted from a herding culture
to an agricultural one, and then,

to one based on olive

oil and trade, but were unable to invent ways of

adjudicating conflict between sovereign city states,

bleeding themselves white in the end
.

How the League of Nations and United Nations emerged,
and how humanity might institutionalize effective modes
of averting international conflict before, rather than

after the next war
If the examples above help suggest the sorts of

processes

I

consider to involve aspects of collective

9

learning, they do not define it.
let me say that

I

As a start at definition,

have in mind something like the process

of change in a social system's culture.

I

am interested

in how intelligent members go about changing
their shared
views of the world and their shared ways of doing
things.

I

am interested in how they together invent new tools,

structures of social interaction, imagine

"their

new worldviews, expand their knowledge, mature their
purposes, enrich their language, and elevate their
discourse.

I

would like to know more about the process

by which social systems adapt to changing realities, and

how they expand the range in space and time in which they
are able to comprehend their world and cope with it.

am

I

interested in how people share what they know and how they
achieve something like a growth of collective wisdom.

I

want to know how the lessons of individuals get combined
and raised to the level of a lesson incorporated in the
social system's culture.

I

want to know how the threads

of individual learning are woven into the cloth of a

collective apprehension of the world.
This list of interests and examples suggests that
the term "learning" might be applied in a variety of ways
to a variety of social processes.

That in fact is what

has happened; different investigators use the term to mean

different things.

As we shall see, Karl Deutsch uses the

10

term to refer to governmental information
processing

leading to decisions to dissociate and recombine
resources
to meet existing goals or to forge new ones.
March and
Olsen use the term to describe the process in organizations
by which changes in individuals' beliefs about
environmental

responses get incorporated into organizational action.

For

Argyris and Schon, organizational learning is joint
inquiry to detect and correct errors in organizational
theories of action.

And Habermas uses the term to refer

to societal institutionalization of higher forms of

individual cognition and reason.
One of the purposes of this dissertation will be to

see whether there might be a common pattern behind all such

processes.

In chapter VI,

I

will examine whether

social

systems of all kinds and sizes share common features

which might serve as the base for a model of collective

learning by social systems in general.
In brief,

I

will use the terms that grow out of that

discussion to define collective learning as a change in a
social system's collective lesson set.

A simple form of

this is the addition of someone's new lesson to the

aggregate lesson set accessible by others in the social
system.

A more difficult form is the collective alteration

of the "co-ordering lesson set" shared by members of a

social system and governing their interactions.

11

The collective learning process in this view
is a

continual dialectical interplay between individual
learners
and their more-than-individual collective lesson
set.
The

collective lesson set shapes individuals and their
learning;
individuals* learnings are the material for change in
the

collective lesson set.

The process is not random or

mindless; it is the product of intelligent member learners
who recognize problems in the collective lesson set and

who enter into a collective dialogue to improve it.

Col-

lective learning arises from the desires of learners for
a more satisfying and harmonizing order.

Because every

learner's experience of "reality" is different, the social
dialogue is a prod to a broader understanding of reality
and to a more inclusive social order.

The result is an

understanding not achievable by learners in isolation.
is more than individual learning;

It

it changes the more-than-

individual collective lesson set.
But,

I

get ahead of myself.

This gives some sense

of my meaning and intention in the dissertation.

The hard

work remains--to scrutinize with care the major models so
far offered, to explicate the issues the models reveal, and
to build on the insights, terms, and concepts they provide.

My goal is more than exigesis; my central objective in this

dissertation is to clarify the issues and terms on which

an adequate general model of collective learning depends.

12

Before we go on to the examination of the
major
models, we should consider briefly the
uses and limits of
model-building as a process of inquiry.

Model Building as a Method of
Promoting Understanding

The term "mode^." is used in a variety of ways.

Some-

times it is used to refer to one physical system meant to

depict another, as in a model airplane or molecular model.
That will not be my usage here.

equivalent to "analogy."

Another usage is

Thought about social systems has

often advanced by the use of analogy.
The Republic

.

For instance, in

Plato saw similarities between qualities of

the individual and the state.

In the same way, any discus-

sion of "learning by a social system" begins with an

analogy between an individual process and a social one.
Biological analogies have also been important in social
thought, as in Oswald Spengler's view that every culture is
born, matures, and must die (1918).

More recently, James

Miller (1978) has used analogy between all levels of living
systems, from the cell to the individual to the international system, to develop a general theory of living systems.

An analogy from cybernetics is the basis of much of the
work of Karl Deutsch, one of the first and most thoroughgoing theoreticians of social learning systems.
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Science can hardly proceed without
such analogies.
They provide the images and mental
material which scientists
can manipulate in their attempt to comprehend
reality

(Kaplan 1964; Nisbet 1969 ).

It would be difficult to

formulate theory without analogies and they remain

embedded as an essential part of the theory's way of
understanding reality.

They cannot be discarded once

formulation is complete.
The term "model" often refers to a specific kind of

analogy

— one

that can be depicted in a diagram, flow chart

or other form of pictorial representation.

These can be

very helpful in identifying elements and their relationship.

Argyris and Schon (1978) for example, use flow charts

to represent the recurrent feedback loops typical of two

different styles of organizational learning.
pictorial representation

(

Karl Deutsch's

1963 ) of the inputs, outputs,

processing and feedback loops between elements of a governmental system helps draw together in a single view all the
key elements and their complex relationships.

Such pictorial representations and analogies may be

seen as subsets of a more general usage of the term "model."
In this usage, widely seen among social scientists of the

last few decades, a model is a mental abstraction which
stands for or represents a concrete phenomenon.

Or,

in

James Miller's definition, a model is "a formal identity
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between a conceptual system and a concrete or
abstracted
system" (1978, p. 83).

It is in Miller's sense that

will use the term model, examining conceptual
systems
that have a formal identity with concrete social

I

systems.

Models in this sense serve to describe.

But

description requires a set of terms and propositions about
them.

Indeed, one of the main benefits of modeling of

collective learning systems will be to foster the precise

labeling of elements and their relations.

This is

especially important in a new field like collective
learning.

To contribute to a clarification of terms is

one of the aims of this dissertation.

With clearer terms, it is then possible to offer
precise propositions about the relations between elements
of the model.

These propositions may be tested, and in

time, lead to a network of grounded propositions forming

a theoretical system capable of explaining and predicting
a class of phenomena.

By then the initial analogy and

early models will have given rise to something more

—

mature system of thought.
Such a system of thought for collective learning

in general is far off, and is no part of the objectives
of this dissertation.

Rather, this dissertation seeks

to examine the root analogy and to clarify terms in its

use
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Model building is an iterative social
process.
Each new attempt to define assumptions,
terms,
and

propositions exposes what is unknown or
problematic.
And each model stimulates further thought.

Thus, the

authors reviewed in this dissertation build
on the insights of each other and the work of others.

My hope in this dissertation is to begin sketching
one more frame of a long film, one still picture
as part

larger motion toward a collective understanding
of collective learning.

CHAPTER

II

KARL DEUTSCH: A CYBERNETIC MODEL
OF GOVERNMENTAL LEARNING

Background
r

Karl Deutsch developed the first major model of a
social system as a system that learns.

As a political

scientist, he was interested in the long history of at-

tempts to create models describing the political process.

In that history students of politics had often borrowed
from images available to them, images often taken from
the organic and mechanical world.

But by the 1950s,

during which Karl Deutsch began his work, a new set of
images presented themselves, images taken from the world
of electronics, computers, systems theory, information

In all these, the central

science, and cybernetics.

image was of a system which used the flow of information
to control processes.

One of the pioneers in the field of cybernetics was

Norbert Wiener, author of Cybernetics (19^8) and The

Human Use of Human Beings

i

Cybernetics and Society (1967).

The term, cybernetics, is adopted from the Greek

"kybernetes" meaning a helmsman, the one who holds the
16
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rudder and steers the boat.

This captures well Wiener's

concern -with self-steering systems.
Karl Deutsch was a friend and colleague of
Norbert

Wiener and recognized the potential of
cybernetics as a
model for the self-steering nature of government. Such
a model could capture aspects of government not contained

in the older biological and mechanical models.

He saw in

the cybernetic image the possibility of modeling the senses

in which the political process meant a certain kind of

intelligence or learning.
Politics in Deutsch’ s usage is concerned with
decisions, especially those decisions which are binding on

members, either through members' voluntary compliance or

through the state's enforcement.

Since cybernetics was a

science centered around making decisions for the control

and steering of systems, Deutsch saw great potential in
the use of cybernetics for the political decision-making

process.

The Nerves of Government

The model which Deutsch developed received its first

full description in The Nerves of Government

Political Communication and Control (1963)»

>

Models of

Deutsch has

continued his efforts to model political process throughout
his lifetime, spending special attention on the modeling
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of international relations.

However, since our interest

in this dissertation is less with politics and
more with
learning by social systems, we will focus here only
on

^e_ Nerves of Go vernment

.

In this chapter, we will first

describe the key features of Deutsch's model; then we will
conclude with a consideration of the value of that model
in attempts to model collective learning by other kinds of
social systems.
A schematic diagram of Deutsch's model is shown in

figure

The model is an attempt to describe the dynamics

1.

of political decision-making in terms of the flow of infor-

mation.

As such, it relies heavily on the concepts of

cybernetics, some of whose main features we will describe
as follows.
One of the most important concepts for cybernetics is
the concept of "feedback."

Feedback is information about

the result of a system's actions, information used to

modify subsequent actions.

The household thermostat is a

common example of a cybernetic system using feedback.

thermostat senses the temperature of the room.

The

The thermo-

stat also has a control which sets the goal temperature

which the system would like to achieve.

For instance, the

thrifty householder might set his thermostat at 58 degrees.

When the furnace is on, it heats the room to 58 degrees.
At that point, the sensor of the thermostat gets information
from the room, telling it that it has reached the goal
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state of 58 degrees, and that information
in turn is
channeled to a switch at the furnace telling
it to shut
off.

Then, the cold air outside cools off
the room, the

temperature falls below the goal state of
58 degrees, the
sensor in the thermostat says, "We're below
goal state,
here is some more feedback, furnace.
Turn
on."

This cycle

by which the furnace gets information about the
results of
its own actions and uses that information subsequently
to

regulate its own behavior

is called feedback.

The furnace

turns on and heats up the room and so forth, in an endless
cycle of feedback and action.
We might also distinguish between amplifying feed-

back which tells the system, "That got us closer to the
goal, do more of the same," and negative feedback, which
says,

"That got us further from the goal; stop or try

something else."
As shown in figure

1

,

Deutsch's model incorporates

the concept of feedback, linking the results of a govern-

ment's "effectors" to subsequent "input" to governmental
receptors.
There is a further set of concepts in cybernetics

involving relationships between the goal, the system, and
the time required to meet goals.

One such concept is

cybernetics is that of "lag," which is the time between a
shift in the target, and the response of the system.

For
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example, the greyhound is chasing the rabbit and
the rabbit

veers left; there may be a "lag" of two seconds before
the

greyhound responds.

Clearly, the shorter the lag time,

the more responsive the system.

This concept can be useful

in considering the rapidity of response of a social learn-

ing system.

A second concept in cybernetics is that of "load,"

which is the amount of change in behavior per unit time

needed to meet a goal.

To take the case of the greyhound

and the rabbit, the rabbit is such an artful dodger that
a considerable load is put on the greyhound who is required
to change behavior rapidly every few seconds.

Applied to

social systems, we can see that there are periods during

which a social system has a heavy load of change per unit
of time to deal with.

called "future shock."

Load is a factor in what is commonly
In comparing social systems we can

compare the size of load they can each carry.

For example,

the performance of Texas Instruments has indicated that

they can carry a heavier load of change than that of their
competitors.
A third such concept is that of "gain," which is a
change in behavior in response to new input.

For example,

the greyhound on seeing the rabbit turn left may also turn
left.

The catch here is that the gain may either overshoot

or undershoot.

Thus, the greyhound may decide to turn only

part of the way to the left, undershooting the actual turn
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on the part of the rabbit.

A clearer example might be that

of the skeet shooter who, in
leading the clay pigeon,

overshoots.

An example of this in a social system
might

be the response of the automakers
to the input about an

increasing demand for small cars.

There may turn out to be

instances in which automakers have "overshot"
and put too
much of their effort on the production of
small cars.

Plymouth, for example, may have put too many of
their chips
on the lemon of a small car they produced to compete
with
the Volkswagen Rabbit.
A fourth concept is that of "lead," which is the time

within which the system can predict the future state of the
target.

A greyhound chasing a turtle has a long lead time

within which to predict the future state of the turtle.
But he does not have a long lead in chasing the rabbit.
Likewise, in an age of rapid change and future shock, it
can be seen that many social systems have less and less
lead time within which to respond.

For instance, if a

target of United States military policy is to maintain a
level of technological competency equivalent to that of the

Soviet Union, given the exponential rise in scientific and

technological development, there is less and less time

within which the policy-makers can be sure just what level
of technological competency the Russians will have.

They

could develop entirely new military technologies within a

matter of a few years.

That gives policymakers a short
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lead time, bringing with it certain kinds
of anxieties which
I believe are dangerous.

Deutsch's chart in figure
of cybernetics.

1

reflects the influence

The habit of modeling processes with boxes

and arrows has become part of the vocabulary of cybernetics
and systems worlds.

The reader should recognize that they

are mere ways of trying to represent a reality which is far

less clearly drawn than are the boxes.

However, within

Deutsch's model there are certain features which are
recurrent features of cybernetic models.

First, there are

receptors, or sensors, modes of knowing what is happening

outside the system and inside the system.

I

find it impos-

sible to conceive of a system having in any sense an

intelligence without such receptors.
Second, there is the concept of memory or storage.

Since a system exists in time, it must have ways of con-

necting its present situation with situations in prior
Without such connections in time there can be

times.

nothing that has the sense of the word "learning."

The

system becomes nothing more than flotsam on the waves of
time
A third concept is closely associated with that of

storage.
times.

It is not enough to store information about prior
That storage must be recalled.

Further, there must

be a principle of selectivity in the recall.

Learning, to

be true learning, must carry with it a degree of aptness
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in the response of the subject.

That aptness demands the

principle of selectivity, matching what is stored in

memory with what is sensed in the current situation.
Matching may be a fourth principle implicit in
Deutsch's model though not explicitly represented.

What is

represented in Deutsch's model is the "decision point."
This is the point at which two streams of information

converge requiring a decision.

Deutsch, incidentally, f

feels that usually it is better for a system to have many

streams for decision-making rather than one, allowing a

comparison of decisions.
A fifth concept in Deutsch's model is that of "effecr

tors."

i'he

system does not exist in a vacuum; it does

something with the information it receives and matches with
its memory to result in decisions.

It then does something.

On the chart you can see that the output of the effectors

loops around to become feedback, or input for the receptors.
The sixth element in Deutsch's model is one which to

my knowledge is one of his own devising,

consciousness.

By saying that a social or political system might have
consciousness, Deutsch means that the system is selfand
monitoring for coordination, simultaneous inspection,

decision.

That involves the processing of second order

For
messages.
messages, abstracted from first order
inspection of
example, "war rooms" allow simultaneous
system and its environment.
messages about the state of the
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This gives the political system a
measure of self-control
insofar as it knows what is going on inside
and outside the
system.
However, there are certain limitations built
into

consciousness itself.

First, it costs time and money for

a political system to monitor itself thoroughly.

are not cheap.

War rooms

Further, there is the danger that this so-

called consciousness in its very nature may abridge, constrict, and distort reality.

A message about a message

must necessarily be less than the first message or else it
is the message itself.

It is this kind of problem that is

built into the process of modeling, for example.

A model

must be less than that which is modeled or else it is not
a model.

But, insofar as it is less, it may distort that

reality.

This

I

is

a problem of consciousness too.

find Deutsch's concept of consciousness both

thought-provoking and slightly limited.

I

am certain that

his talk of consciousness of a political system has helped

people look at political systems in a new way.

However,

I

believe that it is unclear in his system exactly in whom
the consciousness exists.

Is it in President Johnson and

his cohorts in the war room?
large?

Or somewhere else?

Or,

is it in the polity at

If it is in Johnson, can that

consciousness strictly be called systems consciousness or
is it not merely individual consciousness?

system, where in the system?

If it is in the

It is for considerations
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such as these that

I

find it useful to keep in mind that

what exists is a combination of lesson sets and learners.
The lesson sets on the one hand can be viewed as embodiments
of consciousness.

The "situation map" in a war room is a

collected consolidation of the perception of large numbers
of military and intelligence personnel around the world.

In my terms, it might be viewed as a lesson set.

On the

other hand, that lesson set is being operated on by

individual learners like Johnson, McNamara and company.
There is a dialectic of learners and lesson sets.

I

do

not believe that that dialectic is adequately represented

in Deutsch's model.

Another limitation of Deutsch's model is its centralist orientation.

The implication is that decision-making

is done by discreet central units.

My impression of the

actual workings of government is that it is considerably
more messy than that.

There is an interplay of countless

individuals, interest groups, forces and considerations,

making for decisions that seem more to happen than to be
made.

A similar objection is that implicit in his model

is the view that decisions are somehow made rationally,

that is, there is the collection of relevant information

matched with relevant memories, confronted and simultaneously inspected for a conscious decision-making process that
leads to action. Again, my impression is that decisions

made by governments are not made nearly as rationally as
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the neatness of the boxes would suggest.

However,

not sure that Deutsch would disagree with this.

I

I

am

think

his point is to try to represent in schematic fashion

certain of the logical requirements and interactions involved in governmental decision-making.
I

model.

will go on here to further aspects of Deutsch'
It is interesting that Deutsch distinguishes

different levels of learning that are not unlike those of

Donald Schon.

First, he talks about changes in responses

to meet fixed goals; second, changes in goals for the

larger purpose of self-preservation; and finally, some

thoroughgoing self-transformation for larger purposes beyond self-preservation.

He further notes that such changes

can happen gradually as may have been the case in the

evolution of British parliamentary procedure, or by
revolution, as in the French Revolution.

Deutsch also attempts to identify the processes
needed for a system to have creativity and learning capacity.
There are two elements in this view.

First

is that there needs to be the possibility of

"dissociating" elements.

The system needs to be able to

break up its existing configuration into parts.

But that

breaking apart, to be useful, needs to lead to the second
process which is the "recombination" of the elements int
a new configuration.

A sequence of dissociation of elem-

ents and their recombination is, in Deutsch'

s

terms,

o
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creative on the part of the system.

believe the case of Texas Instruments,
described
by Jelinck (1979). may fit here with
what Deutsch is trying
to describe.
At Texas Instruments, until the early
1960s,
I

there had existed a decentralized system of
independent

product customer centers responsible for their own
planning,
innovation, manufacturing and marketing.

Their reorganiza-

tion in the 1960s in a sense dissociated the functional
elements of the existing system and rearranged them in a

new order.

The product customer centers continued to be

responsible for particular innovations and manufacturing,
but some of the marketing, and much of the planning activity,
became reorganized into a corporate-wide process.

This cut

down on overhead, eliminating unnecessary overlap of the

marketing function, and allowed for more coherent longrange planning.
I

see Deutsch' s notion expressed in various ways among

many of the people talking about organizational theory.

For

instance, Donald Schon advocates the separation of resource
units available to an organization at large, and task units,

assigned particular tasks.

These task units may then call

resource units when they need them.

In Deutsch 's terms,

such a configuration allows for the continual recombination
of elements in the organization according to the specific

demands
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This possibility for dissociation and
recombination
is the factor which gives rise, in Deutsch’s
opinion, to

learning capacity.

By learning capacity, Deutsch means the

range of possible effective internal dissociations and

recombinations within a system.

This learning capacity

varies with the uncommitted and reassignable resources

within the system.

In Deutsch’s view, although it is dif-

ficult really to assess the learning capacity of a given
organization, a rough measure of that learning capacity
is sometimes the size and complexity of the system's

structure.

He believes that the more complex the structure,

the more capacity it has for differentiated reassignment

of its resources.
case.

However,

I

I

am not sure that that is always the

think his principle is worth heeding,

that a social system which can reassign its resources and

bring about new recombinations of its elements is one which
may be viewed as having a good learning capacity.

On the

other hand, a social system incapable of reorganizing its

internal elements or reassigning its resources would be so
rigid as hardly to deserve the description of being capable
of learning.

If there still remains confusion about what

Deutsch means by this learning capacity, we can think of
individual learning capacity, and it is probably true that

individuals who are able to dissociate their prior configof ideas and to rearrange those elements in some new

configuration are individuals whom we tend to view as
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intelligent.
I

would add once again that the distinction
between

learners and lesson sets may help to advance further

Deutsch's notion of learning capacity.

It is not enough

to ask a social system to rearrange its parts.

also ask how that is possible.

I

We must

believe that one of the

elements making that possible is the examination of the
social system

s

own lesson sets by the individual learners.

A rearrangement of the system's elements without such

examination would be a mere random, mindless rearrangement.
The mind quality, as always, comes from the individual

human learners operating on the materials around them.
Therefore, to repeat my theme,

I

think it behooves social

systems to encourage their member learners to examine the

existing social lesson set as intimately as possible, and
further, to encourage those learners to suggest possible

modes of rearranging the lesson set elements.

Deutsch's Contribution to the Search for a
General Model of Collective Learning

My concern in this dissertation is with the collective
collective human process by which we might gain a greater

understanding of our own collective learning.

To what

extent has Karl Deutsch's model contributed to that search?
Is his cybernetic model of general enough validity that it
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may be fruitfully applied to the
understanding of social
systems of all kinds and sizes? Are there
any important
aspects of the collective learning dynamic
which seem to
be left out of his model? To what extent
can

it serve us

in the practical business of improving our
collective

learning systems.

Deutsch's influence
I

cannot emphasize enough how original and influential

Deutsch's model has been and continues to be.

It was the

first major attempt to model a social system in terms of

learning capacity.

The very notion of seriously pursuing

the idea that governments in some sense "learn" was a land-

mark contribution.

Others in political science and systems

theory immediately recognized the potential of that notion
and have pursued it in diverse ways.

Among the more cyber-

netically minded we might cite Ashby, Beer, Laszlo, and

Miller as among those who have pursued similar lines of
thought.

However, among many of these, the tendency has

been to keep more strictly to the cybernetic and electronic
model.

There the interest has been in systems of communic-

ation, decision, and control.

However, what is intriguing

about Deutsch is that to this he has added the imagery of
learning, which is something more than the mere processing
of information.

Indeed, this tension between the cybernetic

imagery and the human imagery of learning may be one of the
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sources of confusion in Deutsch’s model.

Besides the

Cybernet ically minded, there were others
influenced by
Deutsch e work. These included political
scientists such
as David Easton, who pursued a similar
systems analysis of
political life during the same period
(1953 and 1965), but
'

most important for our consideration in this
dissertation
is the set of people who pursued attempts to
model social

systems of one kind or another specifically in terms of
learning.

This is especially true in the work of Donald

Schon and Chris Argyris whose models we will consider at
length in chapter IV.

It is also true of others including

Edgar Dunn, Kenneth Boulding, Donald Michael, and James
Botkin.

Whether directly or indirectly, one can see the

influence of Deutsch'

s

ideas throughout their works.

By

offering his model, he made concrete a number of issues

which must be dealt with in any attempt to understand the
process of collective learning.

In what ways can Deutsch' s model be applied to
to social systems in general?

Deutsch 's concern is with politics, especially that

part of politics involved in decision-making.

To what

extent do other social systems like families, corporations,
schools, and the human species at large share features of
the nation state which is Deutsch'

The Nerves of Gorvernment?

s

object of study in
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First, it is probably true that all
social systems of
whatever kind or size, must engage from
time to time in the
process of making decision.
Since decision-making
is

Deutsch's central concern, his model here may
have general
applicability. However, this should not obscure
the fact

that different social systems may have different
degrees
of concern about decision-making per se and may
engage in

that process in different fashions.

It is true that it is

one of the central concerns of the United States congress

and of the United States presidential administration and of
the supreme court to be deciding continually on issues.

That is their business.

But decision-making may be less

the business of other social systems.

A college fraternity,

for example, is in many ways a discreet social system, but
it is relatively little concerned with making decisions

and considerably more concerned with making merry.

Thus,

the degree to which Deutsch's model is applicable to social

systems in general may vary with the degree to which

decision-making is central to that system's purpose.

Fur-

ther, even when decision-making is a central purpose of a

social system, that in no way guarantees that the process

will necessarily be accurately modeled by the model suggested by Deutsch.

For example, governmental units within the

United States may follow different processes for making
decisions.

Town government may hold in one locality; town

management, in another.

And town government may in certain
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ways differ from the decision-making
processes of the
federal government. Further, it
is surely true that the
decision-making process of the government
in the Soviet
Union is different from that in the
United States which
in turn is different from that in
South Africa or
India.

It may be true that Deutsch has
accurately identified the
full range of functions that any decision-making
entity
must perform. But the mention of these functions
alone

may not be adequate to describe fully differences
between

different decision-making organizations.
Nonetheless, all decision-making social systems

may be seen to share a second common characteristic, namely the processing of information.

I

find it impossible

to think of any social system without thinking of its

having at least some degree of information processing.
Humans do process information.
are computers.

That does not mean that we

But we do take in information, toss it

around, and give out information.

This is a social process,

and a process engaging us with our environmental realities.

Information processing is something that can be seen in a
family deciding what to buy at the grocery store or in a

corporation deciding what to charge for a new product.
I

think it a fair assumption that all social systems share

this attribute.

Therefore, Karl Deutsch' s model will surely

be useful in understanding that aspect of social systems

in general.
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A third way in which social
systems across all levels
may share attributes of Deutsch’s model of
politics is in
the presence of what he calls
"learning capacity." You

will recall that by learning capacity
he means the ability
to dissociate and recombine
resources to meet changing
demands.
Just as the United States government must
decide
every year on a budget, so too must a family.
Even though
that budget may shift little from year to year,
those shifts
represent the kinds of redistribution which Deutsch sees
as a part of a government’s "learning," or shift in

programs or goals.

Just as a government may decide on the

adoption of certain retraining programs, so too may a
corporation.

Just as a government may one year decide to

draft young men into the army and another, to send them off
to the Peace Corps, so too may a fraternity one month decide
to spend its energies on making snowmen and another, on

making money for the blood drive.

This stress on the dis-

sociation and recombination of resources is probably the
singlemost import element in Deutsch's view of collective
learning, and it may be seen to hold across all levels of

social systems.

Learning capacity, however, is something which
according to Deutsch varies with the size and complexity of
an organization.

His claim is that the more complex a

governmental system, the more likely it is to show

increased learning capacity.

If we accept that notion for
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the moment, it would imply that
there are ways in which
comparisons of small social systems with
large social
systems would be invalid, at least in
terms of their
capacities to learn.
That is, there may be ways in which
familities are not so smart as the United
States government.
This does not mean, however, that the
examination
of the capacity to dissociate and
recombine resources is

not something that does not hold across all
levels of
social systems, and it may provide a useful
yardstick for
the comparison of the capacities of varying social
systems.

Limitations of the model
If, as we have argued above, Deutsch’s model can
be

seen to apply to all kinds of social systems--systems

which make decisions, process information, have a political
life, and dissociate and recombine resources

— can

we then

apply his model to all social systems as a model without
reservation?

No.

For my part at least, Deutsch’s model

does not do justice to the full human reality in collective

learning endeavors.

Of course, it is very easy to criti-

cize a model, especially one as early and original as

Deutsch's, by what it leaves out.

And, as

I

hope

I

have

suggested above, what is in Deutsch's model is in many
ways highly useful.

But

I

feel we must build on what he

has offered to form a more complete description of human

collective learning.

I

will try here to suggest a few
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aspects of collective learning
that Deutsch may not have
included in The Nerves of Government
.

By focusing on decision-making,
we should not forget
that there may exist other forms
of human collective
learning.
Not all learning is centered around
decision.

Somehow to talk about the advance
of science as centered
around decision is surely inadequate.
Yet surely science
is one of the hallmarks of collective
learning.

So too

with the evolution of worldviews, philosophies
and myths
by which we somehow capture what we have
learned about
our world. Here our learning is centered not so
much on
decision as on description— another form of learning.

It

may even be possible to talk about subtle shifts of
attitude and confidence of the public toward government in
the

decade and a half since Vietnam and Watergate.

Yes, that

shift may to some extent be viewed as a "decision" to
put
less trust in the leaders of the country, but it is better

viewed as a shift in perception or commitment, learned as
a result of experience.

Not all collective learning is

explicable as decision-making.
Second, even when decision is at the center of

collective learning, that does not necessarily mean that
it takes on the centrist form implicit in Deutsch'
tyiere is a

sense that by and large Deutsch'

s

s

model,

concern is

with what governmental decision-makers in Washington do
as opposed to what citizens in Peoria may
think.
Again
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that is fine as far as it goes, but
it leaves something
out. something vital to the political
process-the partioipation of the people.
Such a centrist view is a natural outgrowth
of
Deutsch' s original metaphor— the model of a
helmsman at
a rudder.
But a state is not a ship; it is a collection
of humans.
These humans have a multiplicity of goals,

often pointing in different directions.

If the "ship of

state" were really a ship, it would likely be torn into

each on its own trip.

Of course, it may be true

that the "ship" can be seen as settling on a final vector,

but that settling is not the work of a single helmsman at
a rudder

process.

— it
X

is the result of a very social,

"political"

think Deutsch would agree with this; my only

objection is that the focus of the model is such that it
lends itself to a centrist orientation.

We will see a

contrast to this later in the model of governmental

learning offered by Donald Schon.

In brief, Schon sees

the role of government to facilitate a public process

of learning, one in which most often ideas arise at the
"free margins" and work themselves into the center of

governmental thinking only after a long, and complex
social process.

Such is not the perspective offered by

Deutsch.

Related to this reservation about this centrist

quality of Deutsch' s model is a feeling that his chart
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does insufficient justice to the role
of the environment
in collective learning.
It is true that his model depends
heavily on the notion of feedback which occurs
between the
time that governmental effectors do something and
the time

governmental receptors detect reactions.

But little is

said by Deutsch about what happens in between.

Yet that

surely is an important part of the whole process, a part
that needs elaboration.

Thus a decision in Washington

affects citizens in Peoria and policymakers in Moscow,
the nature of those effects may be critical to an under-

standing of the whole picture.
In a similar way, there may be another form of feed-

back not properly elucidated in Deutsch’ s model, an
aspect whose absence forms my fourth reservation.

That

spect concerns the effects of decisions on the very model

itself held by the government or social system.

What

I

mean to say is that what a social system does may in turn
change how it learns.

Or, to put it another way, a

social system can learn about itself.

A social system

can learn about how it receives information, and may

decide what to receive and what to exclude.

It may learn

to screen some information and exclude others.

It may

learn to accept some things as important, and ignore
others as trivial.

It may learn that some ways of

"confrontation and simultaneous inspection" work better
than others.

It may learn that some ways of "effecting"
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their decisions work better than others.

That is,

all

the functions identified by Deutsch are
themselves objects

of collective learning.

This aspect of collective learning

may be critical to the kind of self-examination and selftransformation to which he alludes and yet, are not properly
or adequately described in his model.

A fifth feature of learning not adequately represented in Deutsch'

Deutsch'

s

s

model is consideration of the future.

model tends to stress feed back rather than "feed-

forward," or the anticipation of possible feedbacks before
a decision is made between alternatives.

Yet such anticipa-

tion is surely a central feature of human psychology (Kelley
1955)*

it is an especially important feature today, when

the pace of change is rapid, the complexity of our actions,

immense, and the potential consequences of them lethal.

For instance, anticipation by the human body politic of the

consequences of nuclear war is imperative if we are to

prevent it.

Somehow, there does not seem to be adequate

room in Deutsch'

s

model for such anticipation.

Perhaps the reason anticipation is not an apparent
feature is that Deutsch has been so intent on pressing the

ways politics is like cybernetics that he has failed to

return to the fact that politics is about people, not
machines.

This is the last omission

I

will mention, and one

with the most significance.
This helps to explain my strange feeling that the
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politics his model describes is only part of what
fully politics.
race.

i here

I

feel is

Let us consider the politics of the arms

are indeed many important features of it which

Deutsch's model highlights well.

For example, it describes

well the feedback loop by which "the government" in

Washington a) "effects" a decision to build a new weapon;
b)

"inputs" the reaction of the government in Moscow (to

build one too);

c)

screens its recall to forget that it

built the first weapon;

d)

decides the Soviet Union is the

focus of evil in the world, intent on world domination;
e)

decides it might then be good and godly to build a first-

strike system; f) to n)

,

continuing on (forever?).

But there are other aspects of this whole "story"
that seem left out.
Connecticut.

Consider my little town, Woodstock,

In the fall of 1981, a number of townspeople

were independently growing alarmed at President Reagan's

bellicose talk.

One person, on hearing Helen Caldecotte,

visited her Women's Party for Peace offices, came back, and
called a meeting.

Five people came.

word spread, the numbers grew.
was filled with 175 people.

Over the winter,

In March, the Town Hall

They spoke their piece.

And

when the resolution for a nuclear freeze was put and 166
hands went up for "Yes," it looked like a collective form
of prayer.

Deutsch's description does not show the people

in that setting, nor the tens

similar ways.

of millions engaged in
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Rather, the boxes in the model are faceless; the

model is mute.

And if one imagines people in the model,

they are men in the war room of the White House, backs to
us,

staring at controls.

If one imagines words, they are

Fear not, dear people of Woodstock, we know how to decide
about nuclear war here in Washington."
Of course, such an image is a gross injustice to

Karl Deutsch, who has devoted his life to the modeling of

international affairs and to the quest for peace.

But if

the image is unfair to Deutsch as a person, it may not be

unfair to the culture from which his model arises.

For his

metaphor is taken from electronics, and electronics in many
cases have been robots born of war.

The electronic

communications and controls, the computers, the systems
theory, the cybernetics which are the source of Deutsch'

inspiration were largely inspired by massive military
research and development during World War II and the Cold

War that followed.
These robotic genes have two consequences for the

model Deutsch produced.

The first is that his model of

collective learning is less than human.

He tries to ascribe

to collections of humans one of his most precious qualities

as a human

— his

ascription?

ability to learn.

By mimicking chips.

How does he make this
It will not work.

-*-he

analogy is limited from the start, because electronics do
not have the quality of mind essential to what we fully
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mean by "learning."
Yes, there is today great interest in
artificial

intelligence, but it is very far from demonstrated
that
the kinds of quite ingenious things computers
can be made
to do approach what is involved in human learning.

Choosing

moves in chess is less than engaging in discourse on war
at town meeting.

Guiding a missile over the Urals is

different from inventing new ways to solve international
conflict

With such robotic roots, then, it should be no
surprise to see the model ascribing "consciousness" to
"governments."

In Deutsch's definition, such consciousness

involves self-monitoring for coordination, simultaneous

inspection and decision.

It requires the processing of

second order messages about first order messages.

But

what is lost in the building of this electronic icon is
that it is humans who are doing that "monitoring,"

"inspecting," "deciding," and "messaging."

Not chips.

The second consequence of these robotic roots is

that a politics of chips, rather than of human souls

engaged in collective speech and action, is a politics without sensitivity, perhaps a politics of extinction.

It is

one thing to design cybernetic systems capable of launching

World War III with neither a tear nor a grin; it is another
to reduce the political decision to the same.

dangerous.

That is

Safer is a view of politics populated by
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populated by people hearing one another out
at town meeting.
Not so neat, perhaps, as cybernetics. But
human, and

hence capable of learning.
That, then, is

model.

ray

central reservation about Deutsch's

He has left the learner out.

the source.

He has forgotten

Instead of a vision of collective human

learning, we are left with a diagram of collective elec-

tronics

.

So,

in our search for a general model of collective

learning, there are many elements from Deutsch’s cybernetic

model we could fruitfully use.

But to these, we must

reintroduce the actions of human learners.

CHAPTER III
MARCH AND OLSEN:
ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING UNDER AMBIGUITY

The concept of feedback advanced by cyberneticists

and incorporated by Deutsch was also quickly adopted by

organizational theorists.

But feedback for an organization

is seldom as clearcut as it is for a thermostat.

In a

thermostat there is no ambiguity about the temperature
set as the goal, the method of sensing environmental

temperature, and the rules for warming the room or letting
it be.

All aspects of the feedback loop are clearly

defined and have mechanical dependability.

Not so for

organizations, and it is organizational ambiguity that
forms the material of the work of James March and Johan
Olsen.

Background

James March has long been a leading theorist of

organizational behavior.

In 1958, with Herbert Simon,

he wrote the widely influential Organizations

.

a review

and critique of existing theories of organization.

There

they provide a number of concepts underlying March's later

theorizing about organizational learning.
45

Among these is
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the importance of conflict in organizations,
especially

between organizational units.

These conflicts may arise

from the need for a joint decision, differences
in goals,
and differences in perceptions of reality.
Organizations
seek to restore equilibrium through analysis of
the

differences and through group politics and bargaining.
The existence and resolution of such conflicts are clearly

embedded in March's perception of an organization's ability
to perceive environmental reality and to change organiza-

tional "programs" and goals.

The resolution of conflicts,

in March and Simon's view, seldom aims at or achieves an
"optimal" solution.

Rather, decision makers tend to

"satisfice," to settle on an alternative that at least

meets minimum standards of satisfaction.

The need for

satisficing in part grows from the limits of rationality
in organizations, which seldom have a clear and complete

picture of all alternatives, nor a complete and universally

accepted set of goals and criteria for evaluating such
alternatives.

From information science, March and Simon borrowed
the term "programs" to describe the standard operating

procedures followed by organizations.

These "programs"

are complex sets of responses giving detailed instructions

for the coordination of tasks and for the solution of

recurring problems.

An example might be the standard

operating instructions in producing a Volare station wagon
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at a Chrysler plant.
the organization

s

When existing programs do not satisfy

goals and criteria (often because of

changes in the environment)

organizations may change

,

their old programs, invent new ones, or borrow from other
organizations already having a satisfactory program.

Thus

the organization's programs can be seen as a product of the

organization's problem solving process.
March continued this line of thinking in his

collaboration with Richard Cyert, giving rise to A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963).

There they describe the

cycles of experiential learning by an organization in its

interaction with its environments.

An organization is seen

as preferring at a given time one "state" over others, and

as having internal decision variables and rules.

An

uncontrolled external "shock" leads to a decision which
changes the system's state.

Decision rules which lead to

preferred states are more likely to be used in the future
than rules which do not.
March's longstanding concern about the limits of

rationality of organizations is continued in his collaboration with M. Cohen, in Leaderships and Ambiguity: the

American College President

(

197 ^)

•

There they examine

situations of ambiguity in which organizational leaders
must rely on shaky inferences about the effects of their
organization' s behavior on the environment.

48

Ambiguity a nd Choice in Organization;^

The concerns with ambiguity and the
interest in

cycles of experiential learning are combined
in March's
collaboration with Johan Olsen of the University
of Bergen,
Norway,
Together they edited Ambiguity and Choice in
,

Organizations (1976), a collection of articles about
organizational choice.

Here,

I

will focus on their presen-

tation (in chapters five and six) of their own model of
organizational learning as it proceeds when conditions
interrupt or weaken a full cycle of organizational learning.

March and Olsen see "organizational intelligence" as
built from two processes

»

1)

consequences of choices and
experience.

rational calculations about
2)

learning from prior

But they see most organizations as severely

limited in their ability for rational calculation.

Rational

planning, forecasting and decision-making are made difficult by the existence of conflicting goals, lack of aware-

ness of alternatives, and insufficient knowledge about
the consequences of their actions.

Therefore the other

process for "organizational intelligence" seems critical-the trial and error experimental process by which managers
see which organizational behaviors lead to success or

failure and improve the organizational behavior accordingly.

But March and Olsen see even thi3 experiential learning as
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limited in the real world of organizations.

In most real

organizations, policy makers are faced with considerable

ambiguity about what happened and why.

In the face of such

ambiguity, they are forced to make decisions on the basis

interpretations of reality which may or may not be valid.

The complete cycle of experiential learning.
To understand these limitations, let us first examine

March and Olsen's model of a complete cycle of choice in
which each step of experiential learning clearly affects
the next in an unambiguous way, as shown in figure 2.

Figure

2.

March and Olsen's complete cycle of choice.

The lines in figure 2 may be read "affect," as in

"individuals' cognitions, preferences, and models of the

world affect their actions or their participation in a
choice situation."
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March and Olsen draw most of their material from
the
study of cycles of learning in university settings,
but
for our purposes let us consider some examples drawn
from
the United States Department of Defense.

Consider for

example individuals in the Department of Defense who held
a set of beliefs and model of the world under which the

United States and Russia would deter each other from nuclear
attack under the doctrine of "mutually assured destruction."
Let us also assume that those individuals prefer to keep
the United States superior in technology and without any

vulnerability to attack.

This set of beliefs, then, can

be seen as having led them to participate in a choice to

develop an arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles
capable of striking the Soviet Union in retaliation.

This

set of proposals and actions gave rise to an organizational

action on the part of the Pentagon to develop a wide arsenal
of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

But the effect of

this development on Russia was of course to spur Russia to
the development of their own arsenal of intercontinental

missiles.

As the Russians responded with more powerful

and accurate missiles, their actions affected the individual
beliefs and models of the world of the individuals in the
Pentagon, who then perceived the world as more dangerous

and as one in which the United States was vulnerable to
a preemptive first strike by the Soviet Union.

In their

view, reactions of Russia put into question the efficacy of
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the traditional Mutually Assured Destruction
("MAD")

doctrine.

"Learning" from the Russian response, they
can

be seen as having taken individual action
to propose a new

round in the arms race, which in fact was that chosen
as
the outcome of the organizational decision making
of the

Pentagon in the late 1970s.

Those decisions led to the

decision to develop a new couterforce capability in the
United States' arsenal including the development of the
MX missile and highly accurate first strike weapons launched
from Trident missiles.

We have yet to see what the Russian

reaction will be to that and where the next cycle of learning will take us, but at any rate, there is a limited
sense in which the Pentagon employees can be seen as having

"learned" from the environmental response of the Russians
to the arms race.
This,

I

think, would satisfy March and Olsen as an

example of a full cycle of experiential learning.

One

might note, however, that the learning in this full cycle
was confined to the field of vision of the individuals in
the Pentagon and in no way transcended the dangers of a

self-fulfilling prophecy and an endless loop in the arms
race.

Role constrained experiential learning

.

Usually organizations lack even the limited range of

experiential learning available through a completed cycle
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of March and Olsen's model.

Organizations are often denied

a clear and unambiguous
understanding of the environmental

responses.

In terms of their model, very
often the lines
of causality between boxes may be
broken and this in turn
affects the quality of experiential
learning.
For instance,
it is common in organizations
that individual beliefs and
views of the world may have little effect
on their individual actions, as diagrammed in figure
3

Figure 3»

.

Hole constrained experiential learning.

Let us imagine, for example, an individual working
in the Pentagon who on his own account begins to examine
the continuing cycles of experiential learning by which

the United States and Russia respectively react to one

another's buildup in arms in a spiralling arms race.

Let

us also imagine that this individual perceives that one of

the requirements for ending the arms race would be the

development of a new set of technologies making verification of arms treaties relatively certain.

What is our
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imagined member of the Pentagon
to do in his role at work
in the Pentagon? Is he to march
into work one day and
announce a plan for the cessation
of the arms race?

Probably not.

"It's not my department."

March and Olsen call such a situation
"role constrained learning" (1976, p. 57).
In this case an individual
may have learned from the environment
but
has no role in

which to take action on his perceptions.

m

There is no way

which his individual learning may lead to
organizational
adaptation.
I

would add that it may not be just role definitions

which may constrain an individual from taking action on
the basis of what he has learned.

For example, one can

imagine an employee in the Pentagon whose role it is to

consider verification technologies but who nonetheless does
not take action, not because of role but because he may be
too busy with other things, may not have the staff or budget
to devise a plan,

moment to act.

or may be waiting for a more opportune

Thus

I

find the descriptor "role

constrained" too narrow.

Perhaps something like "actor

inhibited" might be more inclusive, but it is not the label
that is important.

What is important is the block which

often exists between individual beliefs and actions.

Organizations commonly inhibit collective learning in this
way.
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experiential learning

.

A second break identified by March
and Olsen is
shown in figure 4.
It occurs when an individual
does take
action on the basis of changed beliefs,
but the individual
action has no effect on organizational
action, or has only
an unclear or ambiguous effect.

Figure 4.

Audience experiential learning.

For example, one can imagine that if someone in the

Pentagon did in fact propose a major new development in
verification technologies that the Pentagon as a whole
might reject such proposals on the grounds that verification
is not the Defense Department's main concern and that

limited resources must be spent on the development of
weapons instead.

March and Olsen call this "audience

experiential learning."

In this instance some individual

learning does occur, but the learning does not lead to

organizational adaptation.
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Supers titious experiential learning

.

A third break which can occur in the experiential

learning cycle occurs between the organizational
action and
the environmental response.

Sometimes organizations take

action but those actions fail actually to cause an
nmental response

,

or at least the response which

members of an organization expect.

Individual
action

\

Individual
beliefs
7T

v<

Organi zati onal
action

Figure

5*

-h

Environmental
response

Superstitious experiential learning.

Here, as shown in figure 5» the connection between

an organizational act and an environmental response is
severed.

Nevertheless, individuals may associate certain

changes in the environment with the organizational action,

inferring a causal connection when none exists.

Hence,

March and Olsen call this "superstitious" experiential
learning.

For example, many members of the Pentagon from the
1950s to the 1970s may have believed that military spending
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was good for the economy.

Acting on this belief the Pentag-

on had little hesitation spending large amounts
of tax-

payers’ money on the military buildup.

And what did those

individuals perceive as happening to the United States
economy?

Did it not thrive during those decades?

with whom did Pentagon officials have contact?

And

Their con-

tact was not with unskilled, unemployed workers in inner
cities; rather, it was with prosperous contractors doing

business with the Pentagon.

Thus it is easy to understand

why many members of the Pentagon could hold without question
the belief that military spending is good for the United

States economy?
The actual effect of that military spending, however,
is much more open to question than members of the Pentagon

might indicate.

Many economists argue cogently that

taxpayer monies spent on military spending, far from

boosting the American economy, create fewer jobs than
equivalent spending in other areas (United States Depart-

ment of Labor 1975; De Grasse et al. 1982).

And economists

as different as George Gilder and Gordon Adams agree that

defense spending spurs inflation.

In the view of such

economists the experiential learning of Pentagon officials
in this instance would rightly be called "superstitious."
It is based on the widespread fallacy of concluding that

because two events are associated, there must therefore
be a causal link.
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Experienti al learning under ambiguity

.

Finally, March and Olsen identify a break in
the cycle
of experiential learning that occurs
between the action
of

the environment and the accommodation of individual
beliefs.

Figure

6.

Experiential learning under ambiguity.

Here, individuals see only dimly or indirectly what

happened and why.

Despite such ambiguity, however,

individuals try to infer what happened and modify their

perceptions and actions according to such interpretations.
We have already suggested one such example in the case of
a Pentagon official whose experience is only with prosperous

contractors and never with unskilled workers whose opportunities for jobs and retraining may be lessened through the

appropriations for capital intensive and knowledge intensive defense projects.

In this case, the individual in the Pentagon is

sheltered from the full impact of the Pentagon's actions.
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Or, as another example, perhaps more to the
point,

employees

of the Pentagon working in their air-conditioned
offices

may be largely screened from the effects on villagers in

Vietnam bombed by United States bombers.

Or, as a final

example, it is sometimes difficult for the Pentagon to know

clearly how the Soviet Union is responding to the actions
of the Pentagon.

inadequate.

Our intelligence is in some ways

In all these instances, individuals are either

screened from an understanding of the effects of their

organization's actions or are forced to guess at what the
results of those actions actually are.
In the face of such breaks in the experiential

learning cycle, individuals continue, in March and Olsen's
view, to try to make sense of their world.

But lacking

adequate means of testing views against reality, members

provide themselves with cognitive consistency by a variety
of social ploys.

they want.

Individual members will tend to see what

Well-integrated members will like what they

see; alienated members, not.

Because no one can be witness

to all events directly, what members learn is screened by

the choice of the people they trust.

But people they trust

tend to be people confirming their likes and ways of seeing.

Thus under ambiguity, organizations are prone to what

Irving Janis called "groupthink" (1972).

They provide

one another confirmation of the rightness of their views

and actions without real tests from reality.
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Evaluation of the Model

Our concern in this dissertation
is to clarify issues
that must be addressed in
attempts to model collective
learning and to speculate on
features of collective
learning that may be seen in social
systems in general.
What then are the uses and limits
of March and Olsen's
model for our purposes here?
One value of March and Olsen's model
is that it

draws attention to the links between the
beliefs and
actions oj. individuals, the actions of
organizations, and
the responses of environments.
This is a useful addition
to Deutsch's cybernetic model described in
the previous

chapter.

There we saw the limits and dangers of a model

so abstract as to give no attention to the action
of indiv-

iduals.

March and Olsen help fill this gap by focusing on

the ways members of organizations serve organizational adap-

tation by changing their worldviews in response to the
world's actions, and by suggesting actions for the organ-

ization at large.

While March and Olsen's concern is with

formal organizations,

I

find it plausible that individuals

may fill similar roles in social systems of all kinds.

Whether in a family or a nation, a social system's
adaptations are surely mediated by the beliefs of its
members.

March and Olsen help bring attention to this

obvious but important aspect of collective learning.
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Perhaps the greatest value of the work
of March and
Olsen is to remind us that real organizations
often

operate

under conditions of ambiguity and that
despite the attempt
of individuals to learn, the organization
is unable to act
a way that adapts to the realities of
their experience.
As March and Olsen point out:

m

the literature on organizational learning is
rarely uncoupled. from the idea that learning is
adaptive. Experience is viewed as producing wisdom
and improved behavior. For purposes of studying
organizational learning under ambiguity it is
necessary. to relax such an assumption. Modern
organizations develop myths, fictions, legends,
folklore and illusions.
They develop conflict over
myths.
The connection between environmental response
to organizational action and individual interpretation
of that response is often weak.
(1976, p. 59)
.

.

.

,

The weakness of that connection may be common for

many social systems that are not the kind of "organizations"
studied by March and Olsen.

Thus, their perspective may be

useful for understanding aspects of governmental behavior
not readily accounted for in Deutsch's "rational" model.

Indeed, all of the disjunctions described in March

and Olsen's four types of experiential learning may well
prove fruitful in understanding difficulties in collective

learning for social systems of all kinds, not just organizations.

For example, role constraints may inhibit a

child's contribution to solving a family problem, and role

constraints may inhibit a citizen from offering ideas on
the intricacies of the arms race.

Since members of any social system fill "roles,"
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March and Olsen's notion of role constrained
experiential
learning is likely to be useful in analyzing
social

systems

of all kinds.

Of course, the rigidity of role definitions

vanes immensely from

one social system to another.

Thus,

roles in the Freeze movement may be less
"constraining"

than those in the kinds of formal organizations
which are
the objects of March and Olsen's study.

Nonetheless, the

notion is sure to have at least some usefulness for all
social systems.

Similar observations could be noted here about the
general usefulness of the three other forms of experiential
learning described by March and Olsen.

Their models are

likely to be useful in understanding collective learning
in social systems of all kinds.
We should note that March and Olsen's usage of

"learning" seems usually to refer to something done by

individuals, and that what is important to organizations
is "adaptation."

and preferences."

It is individuals who have "cognitions

The organization makes choices and takes

actions which may or may not be adaptive, that is, responsive to the real effects the organization has on the

environmental actions.
The focus on purely "adaptive," or after-the-fact

experience, may not give adequate attention to the role of

anticipation in learning, but that is by March and Olsen's
design.

Their focus is on experiential learning and grows
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from their observation of the
difficulties organizations
have in forecasting and planning.
However, the line between
lessons of the past and expectations about
the future is

sometimes quite thin.

We often articulate our sense of

the past in phrases like,

happen.

"If you do this, that will

Thus, the individual beliefs shown in the
March

and Olsen model are quite likely to have embedded
within
them expectations about the future.

A full model about

collective learning, it seems to me, should include some

accounting of anticipatory features of individual cognition.
The benefits of model building mentioned in Chapter II

are apparent in March and Olsen's model.

Their model prods

further modelling; their clarifications call for other
clarifications.

First, by building a model of the flow

of effects between environmental action, individual beliefs,

individual acts, and organizational acts, they have helped
lay open the question of what happens when the flow between
those events is broken.

Second, by articulating elements

and their relationship, they bring to mind in other

investigators additional considerations, which in an
iterative social process can contribute tov/ards a more
complete model.

For instance, March and Olsen's model of the links

between the four boxes brings to mind the possibility of
including in the model a further link, that between
organizati onal actions and individual beliefs as shown
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in figure

7.

Figure
environment.

7.

Experiential learning about internal

It is apparent that an organization'

s

actions

directly affect the perceptions and beliefs of individuals
in that organization.

For example, if the Pentagon chooses

to reject proposals for establishing verification technol-

ogies, the people proposing those technologies will learn
to propose such endeavors less frequently in the future.

My intention here is different from that diagrammed
by March and Clsen's "superstitious" learning or

"ambiguous learning."

In those cases, real links between

organizational acts and environmental acts are obscured,

requiring individual learners to modify their models of
the world on the basis of inadequate information.

Here,

my concern is with the direct effect of an organizational
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act on individual belief a.
Of course

such learning by individuals is not
about
the experience with tho external
environment which
,

is the

object of concern in March and Olsen' a
discussion of
"experiential learning." But I suggest that learning

about

the internal environment is at least as
important as a form

experiential learning as is learning about the external
environment.
It can help an organization to have a clear
ol

appreciation

oJ

its

o wn

nature, dynamics, and resources so

that in making decisions it does so with a clear image
of

what it can and cannot do.

Further, my own experience in

organizations is that individuals spend considerably more

attention to the nature of their organizational realities
than they do to tho realities of their external environment.

Moot employees, at least in the United States, see their
rewards coming from their ability to manipulate tho organ-

ization rather than from the organization' s effectiveness
in dealing with the external environment.

It would 3eern

that both kinds of experiential learning can help organiza-

tions bo more effective.

In fact, understanding the realities of a situation

requires that individuals perceive not only environmental

actions but tho full relationship of those actions to all
factors and dynamics v/ithin tho organization.

When individuals alter their beliefs without such
a holistic vi ew, there is a danger that their images will
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not match the full reality.

Therefore, it is important

to represent the process by
which all factors in the system

are acknowledged in the individual
"models of the world."

Another elaboration suggested by March and
Olsen's
model involves the nature of the
environmental
actions,

as suggested

m

figure

8.

First, it should be noted that

March and Olsen's model focuses on those
actions coming
from the environment that are in direct
response
to the

organization's action.

However, there are many actions

coming from the environment that are not at all in
response
to the organization's actions and that occur for
other

reasons.

Nonetheless, the organization is called on to

react to those extraneously induced action.

Any full

accounting of organizational learning should picture the
process by which organizations apprehend such external
actions

Figure
autonomous

8.

Environmental actions can be complex and
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Though March and Olsen
probably do not intend so,
their model encourages us to
think of the environment
as
unitary.
But in fact, organizations
are usually affected
by a multiplicity of environments.
Thus, for example,

the

Pentagon's actions affect contractors,
researchers, taxpayers, welfare mothers, politicians.
Nevada ranchers,
allies, and enemies. A decision
to build MX missiles in
Nevada may enrage some ranchers
and please some

hawks; it

may enrich cement manufacturers and
impoverish people
whose food stamps are cut; it may
comfort Americans

and

engender distrust in the Russians.

And as this example

suggests, sometimes organizations do not pay
attention to
certain environments which they affect. Individuals
in
the Pentagon get considerable feedback from
contractors

but little from Food Stamp recipients.

Often different subgroups within an organization
focus on different external realities.

The Navy may have

different concerns from those of the Air Force; Defense
Intelligence may focus on different environments than the

Pentagon's public relations people.

Such differences in

goals, concerns and perceptions of reality are part of
the source of conflict examined by March and Simon in

Organi zati ons

.

Therefore, it often happens in organi-

.

zations that the perceptions of environmental reality are

skewed by the results of the power conflicts within

organizations

.

It would seem, then, that an organization's
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experiential learning would be adaptive to the
extent that
it recognizes all perceptions and manages
to balance
them.

The complexities of this process, while a
continuing part
of March's discussion of organizations, are
not immediately

apparent in the simple, four-box model.
Despite such intraorganizational conflicts, however,
there usually does exist a set of beliefs shared by

virtually all members of the organization.

These can

include its charter, roles, strategies, tactics, procedures,

memories, language, technologies

,

etc..

Such shared beliefs

beliefs and views of the world are different from the

beliefs represented in March and Olsen's diagram.

The

shared beliefs socialize individuals, and affect their
actions.

Thus, they tend to set the direction and para-

meters of organizational choice and affect to which environments organizational members give their attention.

While

such shared beliefs are an implicit part of March's earlier
work, they do not appear explicitly in the simple diagram-

matic model of March and Olsen.
Thus, the articulation of March and Olsen's model

serves to suggest elaborations which may help in the

collective process of working toward a more general paradigm
of collective learning.

But the possibility of elaboration

does not detract from the usefulness of the model as it
stands.

March and Olsen's model offers a clear and simple

template with which to diagnose deficiencies in an
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organization's learning,

Someone wanting to improve
an
organization's learning can ask
a series of questions
about
it based on the model.
Are individuals constrained
from
translating what they have learned
from an environment
into their actions within
the organization? Are actions
based on experience thwarted
from being considered and
chosen as organizational actions?
Do the organizational
actions have clear causal effects
on the environment? How
are these ascertained? Are
individuals in a position to
see clearly what these responses
are, and to alter their
beliefs accordingly? Such questions
can be of immediate

practical worth to anyone attempting to assess
an organization and to improve its organizational
learning.

In short, March and Olsen's model, while
not

inclusive or complete, is useful for the insights
it
provides, for the new directions it suggests, and
for the

immediate uses to which it can be put.

CHAPTER

IV

DONALD SCHON AND CHRIS ARGYRIS:

BEHAVIORAL WORLDS AND CHANGES IN

ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES OF ACTION

Background

At about the same time that March and Olsen were

developing a model of organizations articulated in terms of

organizational learning, another team was developing
theirs.

Chris Argyris, an organizational theorist at

Harvard, and Donald Schon, a professor of education and

public policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

collaborated to develop a behavioral theory of
organizational learning.
Like March and Olsen, Argyris and Schon were concerned
to identify aspects of organization that inhibit

organizational learning.

But they focused less on the way

members of organizations learn about external environments
and more on how members learn about their internal

organizational environment.

Argyris and Schon were

interested to examine the ways behaviors, rules, and views
shared within an organization may limit the ability of the
69
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organization as a whole to reflect
on errors and to change
its goals and strategies
accordingly.
The theory Argyris and Schon
produced in their book,

Organizationa l. Learn i ng (197 8)

-

,

is the most complete yet

produced about organizational learning.

it is a book which

directly or indirectly addresses most of
the major issues
involved in modeling a social system as a
learning system
and which offers a number of concepts
which we will argue
later are useful in the construction of
a general model of
social learning systems.
Since our goal in
this

dissertation is the development of

a

general model of

collective learning, in the pages below we will evaluate
Argyris and Schon'

s

model for its general worth.

We will

examine specific concepts as we go ending the chapter with
an overall assessment of the value of the model of

organizational learning as a model of collective learning
by social systems in general.

The theory presented in Organizational Learning was

long in the making.
Q.l.9an J,ZAt iflnal-

Learning in detail it will help us to review

Argyris and Schon'
public systems.

Therefore before considering

s

prior work on the dynamics of firms and

This review will set the stage for a

better understanding of Organizational Learning

,

and will

offer some independent insights about public learning not
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dealt with in that book.

I&nald Schon; Bevond

i~

he Stable statP

Donald Schon has long had an interest in learning as

a

public endeavor as well as issues concerning technology and
society.

His interest in learning took full form in his

1971 book. Pay ond—Lhe Stable State .

Here he examined the

learning of public and private institutions under

conditions of turbulence.

No longer, explained Schon, can

institutions act as if they are in

a

stable state.

They

exist in environments which change rapidly and are

sometimes turbulent.

This has created stresses on many of

our existing institutions which are based on assumptions of
a stable state.

Many institutions recognizing the rapidity

of change respond with what Schon calls "dynamic

conservatism" by which he means that they change just as
little as possible, seeming to be flexible but aiming to

maintain the status quo.
In the face of unstable conditions,

institutions of

all kinds are faced with the increased need to "learn".

Schon' s usage,

In

"a social system learns whenever it acquires

new capacities for behavior.

.

."

(p.

116).

Schon gives

cases of such learning for a range of social systems.
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including formal organizations, loose
informal social
systems, and government.

Orga nizational Learning
In his analysis of organization,

Schon is concerned to

identify new patterns of response that help
organizations
renew their ways of doing things.

For short-term renewal

Schon recommends breaking down organizational boundaries,

bringing in "young Turks" and using underground networks
to

accomplish tasks that formal organizations can't.
For long-term adaptability Schon recommends a

combination of three elements.

The first element is the

establishment of pools of competency, resource spaces which
may be called upon to meet changing demands.

The second

element is special task forces assigned well defined jobs.
These first two elements are coordinated by the third which
is management, whose role it is to set the overall goals

and to determine how to allocate resources to achieve them.
Thus, they determine which task forces should be

established and how the pools of competency should be
assigned.

This threefold organization, Schon believes,

offers more flexibility to respond to a changing

environment than does an organizational structure in which
the management and resources tasks are cemented together in
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an unchangeable fashion.

Schon distinguishes between
what he calls the
center periphery model of
organization and the ”ad hoc"
model,
schon believes that there
has been a decline in the
the center periphery model
with its centralized
control and an increase in the
use decentralized adhoc
model.
He likes to talk of his
second form of organization
as "existential" to connote
that it responds to its current
state with new choices.

Important to Schon'

s

system is his recommendation for

the increased use of people serving
go-between roles.
such roles people cross boundaries
between existing

In

institutions, combining resources and needs
to meet
changing conditions to which the institutions

as they are

now constituted seem incapable of responding.

The

go-betweeners may take the roles of broker,
networker,
entrepreneur, or underground activist.

In all cases they

perform functions which existing organizations are slow to
perform.

Public Learning
While Schon was interested in learning by formal
organizations, his interest also extended to broader, more
societal forms of social learning.

For instance, he gives
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an account of the evolution
of stone cutting techniques
in
colonial America
In this case the
evolution of the
technologies was inseparable from
political and military
needs, from the availability
resources, and from the
.

pressures of economic need,

what evolved was a whole new

system of architectural, technological,
and economic
systems of which the stone cutting
technology was only one
part.
Or, as another example, Schon describes
the "system
for keeping us in clean clothes," a
system composed
of

loosely connected small stores, huge
equipment

manufacturers, transportation, and social values.

But the

evolution of such loose systems, that is their
learning,
their acquiring of capacities for behavior, is
largely

undirected.

No central agency determines how to improve

such a system.
In contrast to the undirected social learning of such

loose systems, the learning of government is relatively

more directed.

Schon calls this "public learning" which he

defines as "a special way of acquiring new capacities for

behavior in which governments learn for the society as
whole."

Government "undertakes a continuing, directed

inquiry into the nature, causes, and resolutions of our

problems"

(p.

117)

.

But this,

in an unstable state,

carries with it the need not just to solve specific

a
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problems, but also to "design and bring
into being the
institutional processes through which new
problems can

continually be confronted and old structures
continually
discarded"

(p.

117)

Schon's theory of government departs markedly
from
most previous theories.

Whereas prevailing theories were

concerned with how government met specific crises, Schon
is
concerned to develop a theory of how government can promote
a public learning process to meet a wide range of problems.

Traditional theories often view policy formation as
rational; Schon, as less rational and more a matter of

political struggle.
and Dunn)

Some theories (as in those of Campbell

tend to view public learning as a process of

social experimentations conducted somewhat in the tradition
of the physical sciences by federal policy makers.

On the

basis of his observations of the United States federal

governmental process, Schon rejects the accuracy of such
"rational/ experimental" models, and offers his own

alternative model of public learning.
Stages in the emergence of ideas in good currency.

Many models of government tend to view ideas as arising in
central government and being disseminated later to the

periphery.

But Schon asks where such ideas come from and

tends to see them as arising as the periphery and making
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their way to the center later,

schon calls this process

"emergence of ideas in good currency",

ideas in good

currency are ones powerful in the
formulation of public
policy. Governments can only handle
a fairly small number
of such ideas at one time since
there is a limited amount
of time,

resources and positions of power capable
of

carrying such ideas.

The ideas which are in good currency

tend to shift over time.

They must do so "at a rate

commensurate with (the government's) own changing
situation.

More broadly, the adequacy of a learning system

is in part shown by how far its ideas in good currency
are

adequate to the situation actually confronting it"
(p.

123)

Schon

'

s

model of the emergence and change of ideas in

good currency pictures a series of phases.

While Schon

makes clear that these phases are overlapping and not
clearly demarcated for purposes of exposition we will
identify six phases described in Schon'
shown in Figure

9

s

work.

These are

below, which attempt to indicate the

overlapping nature of those phases.
In the first phase of the emergence of ideas in good

currency a given social system is "dynamically
conservative," modifying its structure technology and
concept as little as possible, maintaining its system of
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Phases
1

.

2

.

3.

4.

5.

6

Dynamic Conservatism

Crisis

New Ideas at Free Margins

Ideas Spread to Public

Ideas Attach to Political Struggle

Ideas are in "Good Currency"

.

Time

Figure

9

Phases in the Emergence of Ideas in Good Currency
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ideas in good currency.

example,

Although Schon offers his own

will choose in the following
pages to use the
current example of the recent emergence
of ideas about the
nuclear arms race, in keeping with our
concern with issues
I

of global survival.

During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s the

United States strategy concerning nuclear policy
was based
on concepts and technology aimed at avoiding
war through

deterrence and "mutually assured destruction" (MAD)

Contained in this was the assumption that the United States
should continually improve its nuclear arsenal in order to
be certain that the Soviet Union understood that the United

States had an invulnerable and overwhelming retaliatory

capacity.

While this was the policy of all presidents

during that period there were disarmament groups at work,

promoting the idea of stopping and reversing the nuclear
arms race, but such work was largely ignored so long as the
"MAD" policy seemed realistic to policy makers.

It is also

true that during this period arms treaties were negotiated,
but these did more to define the rules of the game than to

actually slow the arms race.

Thus the number of nuclear

warheads possessed by the superpowers rose from a small
number in the 1950s to almost fifty thousand by the 1980s.

This period during which only minor adjustments were made
to the continuing arms race might be an example of what
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Schon meant by "dynamic
conservatism."
The second phase of Schon
's model occurs with a
crisis
in which events call into
question the efficacy of ideas
in
good currency. To continue
the example of arms policy,
events of the 1970s conspired
to call into question the
"MAD" policy.
First, technologies had
changed in ways that
made it possible to envision
scenarios where one side might
attack the other with preemptive
first strike against the
missile silos of the other side,
thus calling into question
the threat of retaliation on which
the "MAD” doctrine
depended.
Second, many in the conservative
United States

military industrial complex began to be
alarmed that the
Soviet Union's buildup of large intercontinental
ballistic
missiles might in fact be capable of launching
such a

preemptive attack against the United States land based
missiles, forcing the United States to capitulate for
fear
of destruction of its populated cities.

These perceptions,

combined with United States frustrations about Iran, helped
to elect Reagan president on a plank of massive military

buildup.

The Reagan administration then began talking of

waging limited nuclear war, alarming large number of
citizens.

A crisis in the course of United States policy

had been reached

— whether

to respond to the new realities

of the nuclear era with a new round of development of
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nuclear war fighting technology, or to
find some
alternative approach to the arms race as
a whole.
The alternative approach which was
seized on was the
proposal by Randall Forsberg and others that
the United

States and the Soviet Union agree to immediate,
verifiable

Freeze on the testing, production, and deployment
of

nuclear weapons and their delivery system.

This is an

example of the third phase in Schon's process of the

emergence of ideas in good currency.

During this third

phase, ideas develop at "the free margin" of society and
are seen to be applicable to the current crisis.

These

ideas are developed by people in "vanguard roles" - such as

artists, muckrakers, Utopians, philosophers and prophets.
In the case of the Freeze movement,

the specific proposal

has been attributed to Randall Forsberg, an MIT student of

international armaments and a former employee of the

Stockholm Peace Research Institute.

In 1979, seeing SALT

falter, she began advocating the Freeze proposal as simple

and acceptable enough to gain wide acceptance.

In 1980 a

band of long-time peace activists and Quakers in western

Massachusetts managed to get proposals similar to the
Freeze passed in a number of localities. The seeds were
taking root but they had yet to be planted in Washington.
In Schon's fourth phase,

the ideas at the free margins
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are diffused to a broad public through
networks,

popularizers, and the media.

The diffusion often involve

the invasion of the source group by other groups
waiting to

capture the aspects of the new proposal.
of the Freeze,

Thus in the case

the idea was rapidly diffused through

existing peace, church, and professional networks.

Popularizers arose, including the charismatic Helen

Caldicott

.

By early 1982, the mass media began to

recognize that the movement had intense and widespread
appeal (and hence could sell advertising)

.

As the idea

spread, different localities and groups altered the

original proposal to suit their own goals, but the vectors

were all in about the same direction.
In Schon's fifth phase,

alternative ideas become

attached to political struggles in which careers and power
ride on the public choice determining which ideas shall

prevail.

Perhaps a major reason for the success of the

Freeze movement has been that it became an object for

public debate and vote in countless town meeting and state
referenda.

passage.

Local organizations were formed to promote its

Public learning was no longer a theoretical

inquiry; it was inquiry raised to the level of public

decision.
In Schon's sixth and final phase,

the ideas once at
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the "free margin" are adopted
by the powerful people at the
center of government.
The ideas are legitimated.
They
have become part of the small set
of ideas that are "in

good currency" that are commanding
serious attention as
solutions to actual crises.
They are no longer merely
ideas in the hands of kooks; they are
on the verge of being
considered as public policy and law. For the
Freeze, this

occurred swiftly.

Most Washington politicians in 1982 were

hardly aware of the Freeze, but as the
power of the

movement burgeoned, leaders left to catch up with
their
electorate.

Kennedy and Hatfield proposed a resolution in

the Senate and by the summer the resolution nearly
passed
in the House and did manage to pass in the Spring of 1983.

The fact that the idea had become legitimate may be seen by
the attempt of the opposition to delegitimize it by

implying that the Freeze supporters were "dupes of the KGB"
and too naive to be included in the decision about nuclear
war.

But by the fall of 1982 the Freeze had clearly become

what Schon an "an idea in good currency."

It was an issue

in many congressional campaigns and was voted on by more

than a quarter of the electorate in state and local

referenda.

The Reagan administration was acknowledging the

power of the movement by the orchestration of statements
against the Freeze by leading members of the Cabinet and by
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the President himself.

By the end of 1982, Reagan’s

proposal for a massive military
buildup and the
counterproposal for a Freeze were
both "ideas in good
currency" vying to become the
policy of the nation in
nuclear age.

a

The example of the Freeze helped
highlight a
difference between Schon's view of
public learning and that
of others.
Karl Deutsch, you will remember,
modeled

government as a central processing unit
similar to that of
a computer.
Schon's model is an entirely different one
from such rational information processing model.

His

acknowledges the human struggle the mix of politics
in the
messy process by which nations learn new ways of
coping
with problems.
Schon

s

model is also very different from models which

tend to think of governmental learning as happening at the

center of governmental power.

it is further different from

the model given by Rogers and Schoemaker who describe the

diffusion of innovation as something primarily eminating
from the center to the periphery.

But in Schon there is

much more acknowledgement given to the importance of the

periphery.

Says Schon,

"The opportunity for learning is

primarily in discovered systems at the periphery, not in
the nexus of official policies at the center.

Central's
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to detect significant
shift at the periphery,

to

pay explicit attention to the
emergence of ideas in good
currency, and to derive scenes
of policy by induction"
(p.

177)

Thus Schon's model of public
learning serves as a
useful counterpoint to the centrist
and rational model as
exemplified in the work of Karl Deutsch.
He is further
valuable in his attempt to offer a
schemitization of the

phases through which public learning is
likely to proceed.
And perhaps most pervasive is his acknowledgment
of the

existential quality of public learning as something

requiring choice under uncertain and changing

circumstances.

A rgyriS an d

S chon's

Theory in Practice

Donald Schon's first collaboration with Chris Argyris
came in 1974 with the publication of Theory in Practice:

increasing Professional Effect i veness

.

To this Chris

Argyris, brought his many years of experience as a leading

organizational theorist.

He had written extensively about

the relationship between interpersonal competence and

organizational effectiveness (1962) and that relationship
remains at the core of his eventual analysis of what
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inhibits or helps organizational
learning.

Argyris also

brought to the collaboration his
use from prior works
(1965) of feedback loops to model
organizational behavior
for instance, he modeled through
such feedback loops the
deterioration of a research and development
organization,
emphasizing the way in which interpersonal
competency can
lead to conditions that impede the
effectiveness of the

organization's Research and Development and
which reinforce
those varying dysfunctional interpersonal
behaviors.
Such
feedback loops become an important part of Schon
and

Argyris

s

analysis of organizational learning.

in Practice ,

In Theory

Argyris and Schon develop another element

central to their eventual model of organizational

learning— the concept

of theories of action .

They see

humans as constructing theories of what to do under various

circumstances.

situation

S,

Schematically a theory of action says, "In

if you want to achieve consequence C,

assumptions a...n, do A"

(p.

under

6).

Argyris and Schon distinguished two kinds of theories
of

action— espoused theories " and

"

theories-in-use

.

espoused theory is one which someone says he follows;

theory-in-use is the one he actually follows.

An

"

a

These are

not always congruent, and the person may be unaware of the

incongruence since the theory-in-use has passive dimension
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which can only be inferred.

It is theories-in-use
which

command more of Argyris and
Schon's attention, for such
theories determine what
organizations actually do.
Because theories of action, and
especially
theories-in-use, are so important
to Argyris and Schon's
theory of organizational learning
we will pause here to
consider certain ramifications
of this point of view.
The
formulation given above is so bare that
it is important to
realize some of its implications,
for the point of view
chosen is bound to determine what a theory
of

organizational learning will stress, and what
it will
ignore.
We might first note that these
theories of action are

inferred rather than observed directly.
special burden on the inferer.

another person may not.

reliance on inference.
about this procedure.

This puts a

what one person infers

There may be some who dislike this
For my part

I

have few reservations

it is the one followed by Piaget and

many other cognitive psychologists in studying individual

cognition and

I

see no compelling reason not to rely on

inference in examining organizational learning.

Questions

of how to go about such inference and how to make claims of

universal validity are ones discussed earlier in chapter
II.
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We should also note that Argyris and
Schon's view sees
humans as theorizers as creatures who
put together

strategies for action, but these strategies are
not
automatically arrived at.
They are the work of learners
who have constructed a certain view of reality.
While

Argyris and Schon do not discuss such issues, they are
imbedded in their view.

Any view of learning or

organizational learning necessarily rests on

a

theory of

knowledge and truth.
It is also worth stressing that Argyris and Schon's

concern is with action
.

.

They are not concerned with other

forms of less active learning such as ones involving

reflection or the acquisition of knowledge and

understanding or in the search for truth and beauty.

Their

concern rather fits the concern of practical businessmen

whom organizational theorists serve.
whether

a

But one may question

theory of action is a complete theory of

learning, one accounting for less active forms of learning.
For instance,

the acquisition of knowledge and the search

for truth and understanding may follow more contempletative

and reflective forms of activity than those followed by

decisive businessmen.

Scientists may respond to different

imperatives than technologists (Polanyi 1962)

.

Of course

Argyris and Schon argue that a theory whose goal is action
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must be based somehow on theories
whose goal is
understanding.
Nonetheless the focus in organizational
learning here is on organizational
learning aimed at action
and only secondarily an organizational
learning aimed at
understanding.

Associated with Argyris and Schon's
concern with
action is their stress on consequences.

They are very much

in the American pragmatic tradition.

That tradition, as

expressed variously in the works of William
James and John
Dewey among others, tends to hold that the test
of a belief
or theory is in its practical consequences.

While we do

not have room here to discuss the merits of that
widely

held view, we should at least note that there are many who
put less stess on consequences as the test of belief.

Michael Polanyi, for instance, argues that the pragmatic

concern with consequences is in many ways at odds with the
true nature of science.

Scientists, he argues, follow

heuristic urges, personal hunches resting on personal
commitments, long before the facts of experimental

consequences justify such hunches.

The tests of a

scientific theory in his view include such things as
coherence, breadth and beauty, and less on the test of

consequences.
Another feature of Argyris and Schon's formulation
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worth emphasizing is the situational
nature of theories.
This too is in some ways in the
pragmatic tradition. For
instance, John Dewey frequently
reminded us that there is
no final separation between the
knower and the known nor
between the environment and the environed.
Similarly, one
does not sense that Argyris and Schon
expect members of

organizations to be establishing absolute and
immutable
truths, or to be discovering a priori knowledge
independent
of experience.

Their concern is with what to do in the

flux of organizational experience.

Argyris and Schon'

s

This pragmatic cast of

view of theories of action in many ways

determines the strengths and limits of their eventual
theory of organizational learning.

O rgan i zationa l Learning:

A Theory of
Acti on Perspective

Or ganizational theories of action

Argyris and Schon build on the concept of theories of

action to give their major account of organizational

learning in their 1978 book, Organizational Learning:
Theory of Action Perspective

.

A

They argue that just as the

theory of action can be inferred from an individual's

behavior so can one be inferred from an organization by its
behavior

(p.

13)

.

Organizational behavior is composed of
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decisions and actions carried
out by individuals governed
by collective rules.
An organization's theory
of action,
then, is made up of the norms,
strategies, and assumptions
imbedded in its practices
(p. i 4)
For examplei
a

.

semiconductor firm has certain
norms about quality, certain
strategies for assuring quality
(e.g. training new
employees) and certain assumptions
linking strategies to
norms (e.g. that a fixed sum for
training per year is
adequate)

Organisationa l — earning is the correction of pr^nr
The norms,

strategies, and assumptions of an

organization's theory of action are supposed to
achieve
organizational goals.

But when outcomes do not match

expectations, a condition of

"

error

11

exists.

Organizational learning, as defined by Argyris
and Schon,
is the detection and correction of such
error.

Error

usually results from changes in the internal and
external

environment of the organization.

As an example,

if the

above semiconductor firm failed to meet its quality control
standards, found out why (e.g. increased worker turnover),
and made changes in procedures (e.g. more money for
training) so that its standards were met, "organizational

learning" could be said to have occurred.
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Thus we can see

that-

4-u~

he pragmatic
framework which

Argyris and Schon applied
to the individual
learning is
brought to bear on
organizational learning.
Their focus
will be on practical
consequences, and not on
less active
practical forms of learning.
Fur ther the stress on
response to error runs the
risk of reducing
organizational
learning to a mechanical
model of learning.
This may limit
the range of behaviors
included in Argyris and
Schon's
model.
It excludes the kind
of "heuristic urges"
Polanyi
sees as motivating the
learning offered by scientists,
it

may even ignore the kind of
indigenous play and tinkering
offered by inventors.
Such behavior is not adequately
described by response to error
alone.
And if this is true
of individuals, it may well
be true of organizations.
Healthy businesses do not simply
respond to error,- they
also create and recognize
opportunity. They develop new
products, and perceive new markets.
Argyris and Schon's
model is successful at describing
the more bureaucratic and
conservative aspect of an organization.
It may
not,

however, be as successful in describing the more

entrepreneurial and inventive aspects of
organization.

Individua l s a re agents of organizati o nal learning
.

This pragmatic organizational learning does not happen
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in a

vacuum— its agents are individuals.

It is they who

recognize, for example, that the chips
produced by a
semiconductor firm fail to meet expectations
of quality.
It is they who inquire into the
causes of error, invent
solutions, and make them a regular part
of subsequent

organizational practice.

Organ J.Z at I Qna l— earn i ng—cL£—change in shared map of
organizational theory-in-use
However, if individuals detect error but fail to
imbed

solutions in the organization's theory-in-use, only

individuals will have learned, not the organization.
"Individual learning is a necessary but not proficient

condition for organizational learning"

(p.

20)

.

Organizational learning, in Argyris and Schon's phrasing,
requires that "learning agents' discoveries, inventions,
and evaluations must be imbedded in the organizational

memory.

They must be encoded in the individual images and

shared maps of organizational theory-in-use from which
individual members will subsequently act"
"aha red map,

"

(p.

19)

.

By

Argyris and Schon mean "public

representations of organizational theory in use to which
individuals can refer"

(p.

17)

.

They include such things

as diagrams of work flow, office layouts,

and statements of
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procedures.

They are the meshing of scattered
individual

images of organization which once pieced
together become

"...guide to future actions by members of the
organization.
As musicians perform their scores, members
of an

organization perform their map"

(p.

17 ).

Organizational

learning results in the alteration of these maps.
It cannot be emphasized enough here that a subtle
but

important distinction has been made here,

a

which we will return in later discussions.

distinction to
For Argyris and

Schon see organizational learning as not merely the sum of
individual learning; rather they see organizational

learning as a change in something we might call

"supraindividual

,

"

a

change in a shared map of the

theory-in-use inferred to govern the behavior of members
and their organizations as a whole.

Scattered individual

learning has somehow been brought to the level of
in something organizational

— the

a

change

organizational

theory-in-use.

Another aspect of Argyris and Schon'

s

view worthy of

note is the highly suggestive quality of speaking of

organizations as creating "theories."

The latent image,

not pursued by Argyris and Schon, begins to approach those
of the mystic Tielhard de Chardin in his view of the

"noosphere" and of Hegel's "Spirit" coming to know itself.
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Organizations are theorizers.

They are entities which try

to come to grips with the realities
within which they act.

individuals are the agents of that learning.

But

organizational learning is richer than
individual learning.
It is almost as if the organizations

^Le theories of the

world, are ideas of reality.
The more apparent value of Argyris and
Schon's model,

however, is that they have articulated such

a

clear and

consistent definition of organizational learning that
further discourse is made easier.
is seen as a

Organizational learning

pragmatic endeavor, in which members detect

that outcomes have not met expectations, and reflect

together until they have changed their shared map of the

organization's strategies, assumptions, and goals.

£ta cLe.s in organizational inquiry
Argyris and Schon do not consider that every change in
the shared maps qualifies as learning.

Some changes may

result by fiat, force, ecological eruption, or chance.

These lack the cognitive quality which distinguishes
learning.

Organizational learning, by their definition, is

the result of inquiry.

They

schematize that inquiry has

of four phases as shown in Figure 10.

a

cycle consisting

(In some of Argyris

and Schori*

s

descriptions the last
of these four phases
is
broken into a number of
further phases. We will
use the
four phase model here.)

DISCOVERY
Of error

in

GENERALIZATION

INVENTION

of the results as a
regularized part of

organizational Theory-in-use

of

of new strategies,
assumptions, or norms

PRODUCTION
inventions

Figure 10
Phases of Inquiry
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For the discoveries and inventions
of individuals to

bring about organizational learning,
they must be produced,
evaluated, and generalized by the
organization.
That is
they must become a regularized part
of the organization's

map and practices.

As such they are unaffected by
the

departure of the original inventors, and become
part of the socialization of new members.

regularization marks the completion of

a

a

standard

Such

cycle of

organizational learning.

—Organizationa l—diale ctic."

or the cycle

of_inguiry. is continuous
Figure 10 above also diagrams the never-ending nature
of organizational learning,

in which the solution to one

problem gives rise to the next.

Thus the new strategies,

assumptions, and norms regularized as a part of an

organization's theory-in-use are sure to beget their own
dilemmas or errors which must be met by a subsequent cycle
of organizational learning.

Argyris and Schon called this

"organizational dialectic," stressing the continual

conflictual nature of this process

(p.

42)

Since the term "dialectic" is a permanent part of my
own model of collective learning,

I

should note that their

usage of the term is very different from that

I

developed
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earlier (McClellan 1978).

Theirs is concerned with the

cycles of the problem solution problem
process.

Mine is

concerned with the interplay of individual
learners, their
supra individual lesson sets, and their
environing
realities.

Returning to Argyris and Schon, they see an

organization as having "good organizational dialectic" when
the members are continually open to recognizing and solving

conflict.

This is characterized by the willingness to test

for errors and incongruities,

to inquire into the nature of

conflicts, and to overcome them in a satisfactory way
(pp.

144-146)

.

Li mits of stage schemes
The notion that there may be stages in the process of

inquiry is hardly new, nor is this particular

schematization as presented by Argyris and Schon.

Elements

of it can be found implicitly in discussions of science

since the time of Bacon.

For instance, John Dewey's

discussions of problem solving in Logic:
inquiry (1924) contains similar elements.

The Theory of

What is useful

here is the attempt to apply such analysis to inquiry that
is organizational

rather than individual.

It would be

desirable for an eventual general model of collective
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learning to continue such attempts to
clarify analytically
separate stages.
However

I

find myself wondering if the process of

inquiry is quite so neat and linear as presented
in this
chart.

My own experience of inquiry,

and the accounts from

works such as Ghislin's book Creativity

Structure Of Scientific Revolutions

,,

.

Kuhn's The

and Polanyi's Personal

Knowledge all attest to the messy, multivariate,
back— forth— many— stages-all-at-once-nature of inquiry as it

actually proceeds within individual inquirers.

If this is

true of individuals, it seems even more likely to be true
of collections of individuals.

While some individuals may

only be "discovering" organizational error, others may

already be "inventing" solutions.

organization may often perform
simultaneously.

a

And,

as a whole,

an

number of functions

The actual cauldron of organizational

politics is much more full of bubbles and blobs than is

represented by the chemical equations of the lab.
This is not to say that Argyris and Schon would

disagree that the actual process of organizational inquiry
is messier

than their idealized pattern suggests.

Remember

that Schon in Be yond the Stable State saw public learning
as a vast complex process with overlapping stages.

here,

I

rather, to stress that while a schematization of

mean
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stages may be useful for analytic
and linguistic purposes,
it should be viewed with caution
as a full representation
of reality.

-Sing l e- l oop.

earn i ng and donm

g -]

oop

i

Par nin^

One of the best known distinctions
made by Argyris and
Schon is that between two kinds of
organizational learning,
each changing a different aspect of the
theory-in-use.
In

"single-loop learning," it is the strategies
or assumptions
that are modified; in "double-loop learning,"
not only are

the strategies and assumptions modified, so are
the norms,

goals, and objectives of the organization.

Argyris and

Schon called the former "single-loop" because only one

feedback loop is involved

— that

which links the detection

of error to the strategies the organization uses in forming

its goals.

"Double-loop learning," in contrast, involves

a

second feedback loop which links the error to the very
norms which define effective performance.
An example of single— loop learning might be the case

mentioned above of a semiconductor firm correcting a drop
in the quality of its product.

the company's norm

— only

a

Here there was no change in

change in the assumption about

the amount of money required to adequately train the

workers.

100

But consider the more difficult
learning recently

required many United States semiconductor
firms when they
began losing large shares of the market
to Japanese
competitors.
Examination of the causes revealed among
other things that the Japanese were delivering
much more
reliable chips and that the old United States
standards of

quality control were simply not good enough.

For United

States firms to compete, they needed to raise quality
standards.

But actually to meet much higher standards,

corporate quality control strategies needed revamping,
giving rise to suggestions to such structures as "quality
control circles" modeled after those of the Japanese.

Also

important to the Japanese firms were systems guaranteeing

lifelong employment and indexing of an employee's pay to

yearly corporate performance.

For United States firms to

adopt such "strategies" actually implied alteration of

central United States norms about worker participation and
control.

These in turn were in conflict with older norms

about managment control and the division of profits.

Thus

many United States firms have been involved in a learning

process that pervades their organization's theory-in-use,

affecting not only assumptions and strategies but central
norms as well.

This would be an example of what Argyris

and Schon called double-loop learning.

But unlike the
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straightforward single-loop learning
which focuses on
increasing effectiveness without
changing central norms,

double-loop learning is difficult,
requiring the
understanding and resolution of conflicts
between members
holding different norms.
Such conflicts, which are usually
treated as undiscussable, need to openly
discussed if
double-loop learning is to be achieved.

De utero-learning

Argyris and Schon distinguish a third kind of

organizational learning which is one level more general
than either single-loop or double-loop learning.

Whereas

those involve learning ways of correcting specific errors,

"deutero-learning" involves learning about organizational

learning in general.

It is second order learning,

connecting errors in the way an organization's theory and
use detection corrects its first order errors.

Deutero-learning is reflective, requiring that members
examine prior context for learning to discover what helps
or

impedes organizational learning.

of organizational learning,

Like all other kinds

deutero-learning requires

a

complete learning cycle of the sort shown earlier in Figure
10.

It ends with the regularization of new practices in

the organizational maps and theory-in-use.
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This distinction is not
new to Argyris and Schon;
Edgar Dunn (1971) discussed
"learning to learn", and

Gregory Bateson (1972) draws
on one of his early articl
es
which used he termed
"deutero-learning. » But the
familiarity of the notion does
not belittle its value; it
focuses our attention on the
processes which social systems
learn about their learning
in general,
it is this notion
which we have earlier
abbreviated as "(CL) 2," or collective
learning about collective learning.
It is of that process
that I hope this dissertation
may be a part.

Beh avioral wor~M
If organizational
deutero-learning is to be successful

say Argyris and Schon, members
must examine how an

organization's habitual styles of interpersonal
interaction
affect the organization's capacity for learning.
Argyris
and Schon call these characteristic styles "
behavioral

KQ f Ids
.

.

They include the language, norms, and strategies

for interpersonal actions that typify an
organization and

permit it to be described by such terms as "defensive"
or
openend," "cautious" or "experimental."

If organizational

learning is a matter of bringing together individual's

scattered perception of error and collectively imbedding
new procedures in the organization's theory-in-use,
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then clearly the quality of
interpersonal relations can
have a great impact on the quality
of organizational
learning.
For that reason, most of
Argyris and Schon's
attention in Organizational learning
is devoted to the
study of different behavioral worlds and
their effects on

organizational learning.
The importance of behavioral
worlds can be sensed

first by considering the conditions
that give rise to error
and the responses required to correct
conditions, as

summarized in Figure 11.
In order for the corrective responses
in Figure 11 to

be carried out members of the organizations must

collaborate.

But the quality of collaboration will depend

on the nature of the behavioral worlds that the members

inhabit.

For instance, consider the case mentioned above

of the semiconductor firm meeting higher standards of

quality control.

Some members may advocate quality control

circles, but their norm of greater worker participation may
be in conflict with some other members'

managerial controls.

older norm of tight

Or some may advocate greater profit

sharing, but this may conflict with the norms of those who

view profits as reserved for investors.

In order for the

firm to deal with these incompatibilities, members must be

willing to surface the conflicts and resolve them.

But the
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Conditions for error

Corrective responses*

Mistaken assumption

Reformulate

Incongruity

Reconcile

Incompatibility

Resolve

Vagueness
Ambiguity

Specify
Clarify

Excess/sparseness

Prune/enrich

Untestability

Make

testable

Scatter

Concert

Information withheld
Information kept important

Surface
Bring into good currency

for action
‘Corrective responses to conditions for error

may

of the organization.

Source:

be inhibited by the behavioral world

Argyris and Schon, 1973, p .59

Figure 11

Conditions for Error

behavioral world of the firm may shun such
conflict.

theory-in-use of members may have as

a

The

governing norm the

avoidance of open interpersonal confrontation.

Therefore,

the organization may not even surface the incompatible

options in the first place.

Instead, members may ignore

the problem, and seek less fundamental ways of approaching
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the quality control problem.

That is, the modes of

interaction characterizing the behavioral world of the
firm
would have inhibited the firm's double-loop learning.

Case studies and ethnography

Argyris and Schon construct elaborate models of two

different behavioral worlds and of their effects on the
capacity of an organization to learn.

But before we go on

to consider those models, we will first pause to examine

the methods by which Argyris and Schon study behaviors,

collect their data, and construct their models.

Argyris and Schon'

s

method is the "case study" method

often used by organizational theorists.

Some of the dozen

or so cases Organizational Learning are drawn from Argyris

and Schon'

s

researchers.

own extensive experience as consultants and
Some of their data comes from tape recordings

of their interventions as consultants.

Other cases are

apparently based on accounts written by members of the
authors classes.

Still other cases are drawn from the

organizational theory literature.

The diversity of cases

is one of the strengths of the book,

convey in

a

synopsis.

a

strength hard to

One gets some sense from the cases

of what is meant by the general models.

An acceptable model paradigm of collective learning by
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social systems in general will only emerge if
researchers
from different disciplines report their findings
and

procedures with sufficient texture and detail to persuade
each other that their findings are indeed commensurable,
and that there are valid commonalities to be found
in the

learning observed in a wide variety of social systems.

Without such solid detailed description, researchers will
suspect that claims to generalizations arise more from the

imagination of the model builders than from the reality
whose diversity the models purport without proof to match.
So paradoxically,

the richer the description of detail, the

more likely the acceptance of claims of generality.
Such questions of methodology have already been

carefully thought through by ethnographers.

Glaser and

Strauss (1967) have shown techniques by which theory can be

grounded in observation.

Clifford Geertz (1973) has called

for "thick description" so rich in concrete observations of
an entire context that the researchers can feel confident
in comparing the observed context to another.
(1980)

Egon Guba

delineates a set of rigorous methods by which

researchers naturalistic observations can achieve

trustworthiness in the eyes of others.

These methods

include such techniques as prolonged observation and

collection of raw data for the establishment of

a
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credibility; random sampling and thick
description of
context to establish a sense of fit;
use of self audit
trails to establish dependability of
analysis; and
tr i angul at i on to establish confirmability.

By the standards of ethnographers, Argyris
and Schon

are partially successful in at least one case

major chemical company.

— that

of a

in that study by one of the

authors, the analysis was sufficiently long,
intense and

detailed to establish credibility.

But even in that case,

the author does not give us an audit of his own process
of

observation and analysis, nor sufficiently rich raw data to
be entirely convincing that his conclusions are valid

generalizations.

I

have even stronger reservations about

the cases based on reports done by students in the authors'

classes.

True, these cases all give detailed accounts of

conversation between the reporter and someone else in that
person's organization.

An excerpt of such a case is given

on the following page in Figure 12.

However, we are not

given much more than a dialogue and private thoughts; the

complexities of the setting, the nuances of body language
are left out.

What is reported is done so in recollection

well after the events.

Of course Argyris and Schon do give

much richer description than many other organizational
theorists, whose tradition often values the kinds of charts
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and boxes which give busy
executives a quick handle on the
chaos they face.
That is fine for action, but
for the

development of grounded scientific
theory capable of
commanding trust across disciplines, my
own taste

is to

want more.

Here it seems to me is an example
of an

occasion on which a sharing of methodological
perspectives
across disciplines could greatly further
the quest for a
theory of collective learning that is both
scientifically
sound and practically useful.
My reservations about the way Argyris and
Schon report

their observations does not mean that

models to be of no worth.

I

Far from it.

consider their
I

am confident

that their models emerge from a wealth of experience,
even
if not articulated.

Further, as aids to further

observation, the concepts and classifications in their

models are invaluable.

Their stated goal has been to aid

in the "mapping" of organizational learning.

It is a goal

which they have achieved.

Model

I

theory-in-use

Let us return then to the behavioral worlds which

Argyris and Schon see.

On the basis of their wide

experience as consultants to business, education, and
government, they offer a model of the theory-in-use held by

Model

I

Theory-in-Use

Governing
variables

Design and man
age the environ-

ment
ly.

unilateral-

Self-sealing.

defensive, inconsistent, in-

(Be persua-

congruent. con-

appeal to

sive,

Actor seen as

trolling, fearful

larger goals,

of being vulner-

etc.)

able,

withhold-

ing of feelings,

overly concerned about
self

and others

or undercon-

cemed about
others.

Maximize winning and mini-

Own

mize

(Claim owner-

group relation-

ship of the task,

ship (depen-

be guardian of

dence on actor,

losing.

and con-

Defensive interpersonal and

trol the task.

the definition

and execution

little

of

Single-loop
learning.

helping of

others).

the task.)

Minimize gener-

Unilaterally pro-

Defensive norms

ating or express-

Little testing of

tect yourself.

(mistrust, lack

ing negative

theories public-

(Speak

of risk taking.

feelings.

ferred categories

in in-

ly.

conformity, ex-

accompanied by
little or no di-

ment, emphasis

temal commit-

on diplomacy.
power-centered

impact on others

competition and

and

rivalry).

between rhetoric and behavior,
ity

reduce incongruity

by defensive

actions such as

blaming, stereotyping, sup-

pressing feelings,
intellectualizing).

Be

rational.

Unilaterally protect

others from

being hurt (with-

hold information,

Low freedom

of

choice, internal

commitment.
and risk-taking.

create rules to

censor information

and behav-

ior,

hold pru

:

e

meetings).

Source:

Argyris and Schon, 1978, pp. 62-63

Figure 13
Model

I

testing of

theories privately.

rectly observable

data, be blind to

to incongru-

Much

Ill

most members of most orn^ni ~
organizations. As shown in
Figure 13,
"Model I" describes the
personall i-n
persona
theory- in-use that governs
the interpersonal behavior
of individual members
of
virtually all organizations
Argyris and Schon have
encountered.
The left column in
Figure 13 lists typical
norms or objectives that
govern individuals' behavior.
The
next column identifies
strategies typically used to
achieve
those norms.
The middle column lists
the effects such
norms and strategies have on
the climate within which
members interact. The next
column summarizes the effects
of such a climate on
organizational learning. And the
last
column gives the result:
reduced organizational
•

effectiveness.

Inh ibiting

1

nop

e;

Argyris and Schon describe the
difficulties which the
Model I behavioral world produces
for attempts
at

organizational learning.

The most important of these they

call "primary inhibiting loops"

m

(p.

46).

These are loops

the sense diagrammed in the
Figures 14 and 15.

the conditions for error

That is,

(listed earlier in Figure 11)

cause individuals to behave with one another
in

inhibits organizational learning.

a

way that

The typical modes of

interpersonal behavior, in turn reinforce those
conditions
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for error,

in a self sustaining
cycle that limits the

ability of the organization
to detect and correct
errors.
Argyns and Schon call such
loops "priory" to indicate
that they involve the
all important
interpersonal
of individual members.
But such primary loops
can engender
"secondary inhibiting loops,"
ones involving the dynamics
between subgroups of the
organization
(p.

Ambiguity

in division

of responsibility

-

Vagueness in criteria
for task assignment

Source:

109).

»
w
—

~

.

Dysfunctional
response

Argyris and Schon, 1973,
p .52

Figure 14

Example of an inhibiting loop

—

Modei-l

-Behavior*

w?ma-

Source:

—

_

,.

Conditions
for error

Argyris and Schon, 1973, p .96

Figure 15

Inhibiting loop
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The effect of the Model

I

theory-in-use is to limit

the organization's learning
system.

Defensive

interpersonal strategies mean
that individuals avoid open
confrontation and are unlikely to
test openly aspects of
their theories of action, such
as the assumptions,
strategies, and norms governing
interpersonal behavior.
When members' assumptions and views
are not discussed
openly, there is no opportunity
for them to be disconfirmed
and corrected.
Instead, members hold theories of action
which remain untested, and self-perpetuating.
Argyris and
Schon call such privately held theories " sel f-seal
"
i

ng

Their cost is to avoid the kinds of information
that could
lead to learning.
The Model

I

theory-in-use does not necessarily inhibit

single-loop learning, that is, the alterations of
assumptions or strategies.

As long as such learning does

not create conflict within the Model

I

governing variables,

the strategies and assumptions can be changed.

Model

I

But the

theory-in-use is bound to inhibit double-loop

learning, which by definition entails conflict between

people supporting different norms.

with the Model

I

But conflict is at odds

demand that negative feelings be kept
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hidden.

So long as members hold
to that conflict-avoiding

behavior, double-loop learning
is impossible.
The more
central the norms in conflict, the
less able a Model I
theory-in-use is able to deal with
this conflict.
Model

I

theory in-use creates similar
inhibitions on

attempts to encourage organizational
"deutero-learning. n
Such learning to learn requires shared
reflection on the

inadequacies of the existing norms, strategies,
and
assumptions.

But this reflection creates the kind of

negative feeling, uncertainty, and conflict which
Model
avoids.

I

Further, deutero-learning requires joint inquiry

in which members gather together scattered
impressions of

organizational dynamics.
Model

I

Once again this is prohibited by

which offers members no guides or collaborative

inquiry into uncomfortable topics.

Argyris and Schon offer a number of case histories

which exemplify the many ways in which existing

organizations capacity for learning is inhibited by the
Model

I

theory-in-use.

We cannot review here their

complexities, but will simply reproduce the charts Argyris
and Schon present to summarize the dynamics of such limited

learning systems.

Figure 16 and 17 give the general model

of organizational learning constrained by Model

individual theories-in-use.

I

They call this model of most
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existing organizations
the "Model 0 - 1 "
to distinguish it
from a second ideal
model which we will
describe below.

Primary
inhibiting

loops

—-

Error

Correctable

Learning

errors

cycle

—

Action

Secondary

Appropriate response

inhibiting

loops

Decrease probability

Uncorrectable
errors

Organizational

Primary loops

camouflage and
games of

that inhibit

deception

learning

for double-loop

deutero-

Double binds for
individuals

Source!

and

deutero-learning

Argyris and Schon, 1978, p.110

Figure 16
Model 0-1: Limited Learning Systems
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The Model O-I learning system
is capable of correcting
errors which are not too threatening
to members.
But it is
incapable of dealing with errors
whose detection and
correction threaten central norms
of the organizational
theory in-use.
Since these require revision
from time to
time in a changing world, long-term
organizational

effectiveness suffers.

-0

11

—

SflEninq Systems .

To overcome the limitations of

the common Model 0-1 organizational
learning system,

Argyns and Schon first envisage

an ideal organizational

learning system, and then suggest ways to
work towards such
an ideal.

The model they envisage (called Model O-II)

is

not one they have ever encountered; rather,
it is

description of an organization constructed on principles
more likely to permit the organization to "double-loop"
learn and to "deutero" learn.
An effective learning system would require that

individuals follow a theory-in-use that allows them to
jointly inquire into the conditions for error listed above
in Figure 11.

Argyris and Schon present a model of such a

theory, the Model II theory-in-use shown in Figure 18 on
the following page.
In contrast to Model I's minimization of negative
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feelings and avoidance of
public testing of theories. Model
II's interpersonal behavior
encourages public testing.
Whereas Model I begat private,
self-sealing views. Model II
begets views stated clearly enough
to be discomf irmable by
others.
And whereas the defensiveness
of Model I's
behavioral world limited learning
to unthreatening

single-loop learning, under Model II
members mutually
support one another in taking the risks
required
of

double-loop learning.
The organizational learning system which
Argyris and

Schon think would be engendered by a Model II
theory-in-use
is diagramed on the following page in
Figure 19.

Xou and me as ends and means
There may be something revealing in the way Argyris
and Schon laid out their chart describing their ideal Model
II

theory-in-use.

There is a sense, in our culture of

reading from left to right, that the final goal of the

patterns described in the Figure 18 is the "increased

effectiveness" listed in the right hand column.
again,

This, once

is firmly in the common American pragmatic

tradition.

And it is, of course, a central goal of most

organizational theorists.
Nonetheless, on reflection,

I

am left feeling
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uncomfortable about the view of
people in this model. At
first, I applaud the picture
of an open, non defensive
organization in which actors have
"bilateral protection of
others." But on examination
this seems for Argyris and
Schon do be a secondary instrumental
value.
The final

value is organizational effectiveness.

This is a different

value than that contained in Kant's
stricture that persons
be treated not as means but as
ends themselves.

Nor is it

the same as Jesus's plea for "agape,"
for care that does
not tally benefits and costs.
Behind Argyris and Schon'

model one senses there is utilitarian view
of men, one

treating persons as instruments of labor for
the purposes
of organizations in the late twentieth century.
In the terms used by Argyris and Schon,

there may be a

conflict between different "governing variables" contained
in their model.

On the one hand, they seem to desire a

radical transformation of interpersonal behavior toward

greater trust and mutual support; on the other they seem to
serve the instrumental values of the status quo.

Any

current model of collective learning must wrestle with
similar issues.

Hhe worth

of such models

Some readers may feel that such an instrumental view
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of humans is shown in Argyris
and Schon's use of charts and

boxes.

And some may grow glassy-eyed in
the face of
Argyris and Schon's complicated charts
and models.
Sometimes it is difficult to understand
those models and to
know whether they refer to anything
real.
The reality of

organizations is much more messy and human than
the boxes
suggest.
Argyris and Schon would agree.
But the purpose of models is not to claim complete
and
final understanding of reality, but rather to aid
in the

growth of at least partial understanding.

Models give us

ways of looking at the world, of ordering chaos.

Someone

starting out cold in the study of "organizational learning"

would be forced to spend time coming up with some
categories by which to capture at least part of reality.
Thanks to Argyris and Schon's models, there is no need to
start cold.
The area in which Argyris and Schon's models are most
useful is the area of interpersonal behavior of members of
an organization.

This is their major contribution to an

understanding of collective learning.

They have shown with

precision the manifold ways in which shared styles of
interpersonal behavior may effect learning by the

organization as a whole.
It must be admitted,

however, that this careful
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examination of the internal
organizational environment has
been at the expense of an
examination of other environments
affecting an organization.
Argyris and Schon have
described well the factors
affecting an organization's
ability to learn about its
internal workings.
But they

have said relatively little
about the impact on
organizations of changes coming from
outside, such as
changes
practices of competitors or allies,
changes in
the physical environment, or in
the economy.
And nothing
is said about the intrapsychic
and spiritual aspects of
being, which, I will argue later, are
important to a

m

complete understanding of ourselves and
our operations
together in complete social systems. All the
above
realities may affect how an organization
learns, and they
are realities about which an organization
must constantly

learn if it is to sustain itself in its changing

environmental realities.

Of course, Argyris and Schon may

feel that by focusing on situations in which outcomes do

not match expectations,

they are incorporating messages

about all relevant environmental realities.

That may be

true, but nonetheless the fact remains that the conditions
of error that receive the bulk of Argyris and Schon'

attention are those conditions internal to the organization
itself.

A complete model of collective learning would need
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to say more about the
impact of external environmental
realities on collective learning.

Intervention
The Model O-II learning
system, although
construct, serves a practical

a

theoretical

purpose-it

is a normative
model of the goal state members
of an organization can
strive for when they embark on an
effort to improve their
organizational learning.
Members will also need a map of
their existing learning sytem, to
clarify the systems
dynamics that currently limit learning.
Finally, members
will need a model of how to make the
transition from the

existing learning system to

a

better one.

Argyris and Schon think it unlikely that an

organization can provide these three elements
without the
help of an outside "interventionist" skilled in

organizational learning.

Such an interventionist can

provide a model of the goal, help map what exists, and
guide the transition.

Without a skilled interventionist,

the members of an organization are likely to continue
the

Model

I

interpersonal behaviors that obscure the

information needed to detect and correct errors in the
existing learning system.

Argyris may be right about the necessity of an outside
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interventionist.

But my reaction,

is to despair that

enough such interventionists
could ever be bred to bring
about a rapid transformation
in human collective learning,
instead, I hold the hope that
ideas like Argyris and
Schon's can travel faster than
consultants, and that
learners can recognize ideas'
worth and use them on their
own for self-transformation.

Argyris and Schon's descriptions of
the transition
process tend to follow the
discovery-invention-production-

generalization pattern shown earlier in
Figure 10.
say Argyris and Schon, learning how
to accomplish

But,

each of

these four steps will in turn involve a
complete cycle of
its own as shown in Figure 20 on the
following page.

Thus

members will need to discover how to discover,
invent
to discover, produce ways to discover,

regularize those patterns of discovery.

ways

and generalize or

Only then will the

learning about discovery have become embedded in
individuals' images and organizational maps.
Such a diagram may be useful for analytical and

diagnostic purposes.

Nonetheless, there is

taking diagrams too seriously.

a

danger of

For instance, one wonders

if one could have an infinite regress of analytical loops.

Key to the process of intervention is the creation of
a "diagnostic map" by the members of the organization and
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Source:

Argyris and Schon, 1973,
p.i4i

Figure 20

Learning to double-loop learn

the interventionist working together.

This brings together

scattered and previously private impressions and
data into
a

single coherent picture of the organization's learning

system.

It helps members see how the organization is

inhibited in its learning, as well as the degree to which

members were not even aware of such limitations.
Argyris and Schon recommend beginning this mapping
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with a "census of the
problems" (p. i 78 , assessing
the
degree to which the problems
are accessible, defined, and
solvable.
Then Argyris and Schon
have clients complete
detailed, firsthand case studies.
These may be written, in
which case Argyris and Schon
ask clients to record both
what is actually said between
members as well as what the
recorder thought privately.
(This helps to clarify
differences between espoused theories
of action and
theories- in-use, and between what
is discussable and
)

taboo.)

If written accounts are
impractical,

tape

recordings of problem-solving meetings
can be used.
In any
case, case studies should offer
directly observable data,
not secondary categories as are given
by some

questionnaires.

This primary data, then, can be used to

reveal the nature of individual therories-in-use,
the norms
and strategies forming the behavioral world.

This in turn

permits identification of the "primary loops" that
inhibit
organizational learning, as well as the "secondary loops"
impeding inter-group behavior.

Argyris and Schon also suggest questions that may be
asked to reveal the nature of organizational games which
affect learning.

These games, by which individuals aim at

maximizing long-term income while minimizing responsibility
for error,

encourage members to whitewash information, thus
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inhibiting public appreciation
of realities.
Once a map of the existing learning
system is
completed it can be used to predict
the organization's
behavior under a variety of circumstances.
This allows the
map to be tested and revised.
As predictions are
confirmed, client commitment to the
map increases.
However, initially, clients are likely to
resist the
diagnosis offered by the interventionist's map.
But those
very reactions offer further confirmation
of the presence
of a certain kind of theory-in-use.

In order for clients to become committed to

interpersonal theories of action closer to those of Model
II,

they need some demonstration that it works, and how to

make it work.
critical.

Here the behavior of the interventionist is

By constantly adhering to Model II values in his

own interactions with clients, an interventionist offers a

living model to his clients.

By embracing and working

through expression of negative feelings, by constantly

seeking clarification and confirmation of views, by

discussing the undiscussable, by encouraging risk and

discouraging competition and perfectionism, by exposing his
own maps and theories to testing

— by

all these means

— the

interventionist demonstrates the beneficial possibilities
of a Model II theory-in-use.
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With mapping completed,
and with Model II before
them,
members of an organization
will still need to invent,
produce, and generalize a
more effective learning
system
for their organization.
This is hard work, but
success in
the discovery phase will
have encouraged members
to begin.

They will now have a
realistic sense of the difficulties
of
transition, the costs of keeping
Model I, and the benefits
of Model II.
Since the publication of
Hxganizat or al Learning
Argyris (1982) and Schon (1982)
have continued their
i

,

investigations of learning in
organizational settings,
using extensive transcriptions,
and elaborating on methods
for unfreezing the Model

I

theory-in-use, and encouraging

the learning of Model II modes
of behavior.

Thus we see that Argyris and Schon,
calling on their

extensive experience as consultants, offer a
clear and
detailed set of guidelines for those attempting
to serve as
interventionists in organizations.
I like their practical
intent.

Any general model of collective learning, if
it is

to make a difference in the world, will follow
their

example and include clear guides and tools for those
who
are collectively attempting to learn collectively about

collective learning.
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Mm
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Argyris and Schon insist that
organisational learning
is an ongoing process in which
solution of one problem
gives rise to the next.
It is in the spirit of "good

organizational dialectic," then, that

I

examine their model

of organizations as a contribution
to the problem of

understanding societal learning at large.

My concern

motivating this dissertation is to begin
working toward
general model of collective learning,
toward one

a

that holds

for all aid societal transformation
in an endangered age.
To what extent,

then, does the work of Argyris and Schon

contribute to that quest?

To what extent does their model

of organizations hold for other kinds of
social systems and

offer help for society as a whole?

Off ers terms and tools
As a contribution to dialogue about collective

learning, their work is invaluable.

Although

I

to describe at length aspects of their thought,

have chosen
I

have

hardly done justice to the complexity of thought in their
cases and models.

Their work gives the most detailed

account in the literature of the links between styles of
interpersonal behavior and organizational learning.

Their
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articulation of the ways
Model

I

theories-in-use produce

conditions of error, and the
way error reinforces such
theories-in-use, has given us
a "map" by which to
know
where we are. Their
construction of an ideal learning
system based on Model II
principles helps us to talk about
where we might go. Their
guidelines for interventionists
have addressed issues of how
to get there.
So extensive is
their work that it touches on
most of the issues we are
likely to confront in working
toward a general theory of
collective learning.
By articulating a view
of

organizational learning as

a

change in shared

theories-in-use accomplished via the agency
of individual
members, they add substance to the
discussion about the
relation of individuals and their groups
in collective
learning.
By defining organizational learning
in terms of
error,' they clarify the kinds of philosophical
choices
that must be made in constructing a theory of
collective
learning.

By distinguishing between "double-loop" and

single-loop" learning, they have revealed the intense
and
central role of norms and goals, and the inevitability
of

stress and conflict in trying to change them.

By

describing such conflict they have highlighted the
importance of theories-in-use that support members in

addressing it.

By revealing the inevitability of conflict
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in deutero-learning, by
admitting the pain such

self-examination of habits and norms
produces, they have
prepared us to endure the process.
In short, theirs is a
major contribution; they have
given us terms for discussion
and tools for action.
That does not mean, of course, that

model without reservation.
I

I

I

accept their

have already pointed to ways

find their perspective limited.

These include the focus

on internal environments to the exclusion
of others; the

pragmatic assumptions which may limit the kinds of
learning
considered by the theory, and the tendency to view
persons
and means for organizational ends,

in conflict with

espoused Model II norms.

the mode l apply to oth er social systems
My concern here,

however, is not with that kind of

reservation; rather, it is to ask, "Could their model of

organizations serve as a model of collective learning by
social systems in general."
In order to answer "yes" to that question, we will

need to be convinced that the elements in their model are

elements found in all social systems.

Are the elements

found in families and nation states, volunteer fire

departments and armies, schools and scientific societies,
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friendships and the human
species?
One element can surely
be found in all of those-the
presence of behavioral worlds,
it is almost a necessity
that for there to be a social
unit there must be a degree
of shared understanding
by members about how to
act.
That
is, individuals must share
similar theories-in-use that
pattern their exchanges. Members
of a family must share
compatible theories about what to
do when they are angry;
members of a nation must share
rules about how to choose
its leaders.
By extension, then,

it is probably fair to infer
that

social systems have "theories of
action," both "espoused"
and "in-use, " they share certain
assumptions, strategies
and goals.
While one family may value the expression
of

feelings, good and bad, another family may
suppress them.
While one nation may value freedom of speech,
another may
accept state control of the press.
There may be other
terms besides "theories-in-use" with which to
describe what

members of a social system share, and

I

have already

indicated my sense that that term may be to narrow.
Nonetheless,

I

am willing to accept the notion that all

social systems share something like a theory-in-use.
All social systems may also be seen to have some form
of social structure,

however informal.

While structure
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does not command much of
Argyris and Schon's attention
in
Organizationa l Learning , we have seen
that in Beyond H,.
ittable

St ate schon felt that some
organizational structures

were more flexible than others,
allowing more rapid
allocation of resources to changing
tasks, and thus

facilitating organizational learning.
Just as all social systems may be
seen to have norms,
so too may it be important for
them to have models of ideal
future states, to organize collective
transformation.

Argyris and Schonorganizations.

s

Model II serves this purpose for

Some variant of it may well serve for

families and nations.
These, then, are a few of the ways in which
Argyris
and Schon's description of organizations may
hold as a

description of other social systems.

However, there may be

other elements of their model which do not so easily
fit as

descriptions of other social systems.
One such element is the assumption by Argyris and

Schon that organizations have clear and limited sets of
goals.

That may be so.

But as the size and complexity of

its goals and the goals of its members.
a

Could you give me

neat list, for example, of the "goals of the United

States of America"?

Millions of people have been tossing

that list around for some time.

I

am not saying such a
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very long list could not
be made, nor that a short
list
like the Bill of Rights
would not help; I am only saying
that the task would be
frustrating, full of confusions,

conflicts and abridgements.

But the utility of Argyris and

Schon's model rests on a workable
definition of a social
system's norms and goals.
In a complex and pluralistic
social system, the utility of
their model

may be limited.

Argyris and Schon's approach may also
be limited in a
second way as a tool which large social
systems can use to
foster their learning.
Their approach depends on bringing
together scattered impressions for
consolidation of a

shared map of members' collective learning
system.

They

have used this approach with relatively small
groups of

people in organizations.

But we have yet to invent

adequate techniques by which to accomplish this for
nation or a species.

a

This is not to say Argyris and

Schon's approach is not a useful model; it is.

But we have

far to go before we can accomplish in large systems what

they have in organizations.
In sum, many of the elements in Argyris and Schon's

model can be seen as adequate to describe social systems
other than organizations.

But as the complexity of social

systems increases, the utility of
decrease.

a

goal-based model may
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IS- their model

inc l usive e n ough to work ?

introduction to £x ganizat ona
_

i

earning

,

i

n their

Argyris and Schon

point out that "unless people
acting as agents for
organizations and
are able to learn how to detect
and correct double-loop errors,
the survival of society may
be in doubt
(p. 5) .
But, with the exception of a
few such
sentences, society as a level of
analysis or action is
ignored in .Organ izational T.P* r ninr,
This maintenance of a relatively
restricted focus is
of course sensible.
It allows Argyris and Schon to keep
their already ambitious project within
manageable bounds.

Nevertheless, there is

constraints

a

difficulty in such sensible

it may exclude from analysis important
parts

of the reality which Argyris and Schon wish
to explain.

The difficulty is that, by Argyris and Schon'

s

own

admission, the source of the inhibitions to organizational

learning is in society at large.

As they say, the

inhibition to organizational learning is "reinforced (and,
as we shall see, caused)

by the theories of action with

which most people are acculturated in modern industrial
societies"

(p.

with Model

I

4)

.

"People in our society are programmed

theories-in-use that predispose them toward

single-loop learning rather than double-loop learning"
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(p.

122)
I

agree.

Elements of Model

I

are everywhere— in

spelling bees and S.A.T.'s, in
Reagonomics and the arms
race.

Look again at the governing variables
and strategies
of Model I as shown in Figure 13 and
consider the extent to
which they are taught from pre-school to
"post-docs."

Maximizing winning, minimizing losing" is the name
of the
school game in class, in sports, in social life.
Be
rational; minimize expression of negative feelings;
define

behavioral objectives; control tasks unilaterally.

These

are all likely to be habits of someone who has had ten or

twenty years of schooling in our culture.
But how do Argyris and Schon propose to change such

deeply ingrained habits?

By a few sessions with an

interventionist.

In some of the most competitive,

Where?

high pressure organizations around.

It is not surprising

that Argyris and Schon report very few cases of lasting

double-loop learning and in those, very limited success.
Not that

best yet.

I

I

don't respect the attempt

—

I

do.

It's the

am just afraid that intervention as Argyris

and Schon describe it will simply be incapable of bringing

about the scope of societal learning demanded by our times.
It is unlikely to be sufficiently successful either at the
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level of organizations or at the
level of society.
The interventions they suggest are
likely to be

limited in their success with organizations
because they do
not counter the inertial force of
societal pressures acting
on members of the target organization.
Even if a company,
for instance, were to magically change
its espoused theory
of action,

employees would still encounter Model

I

forces

everywhere else they went, making it difficult for them
to

maintain commitment at work and integrity elsewhere
in
their lives.

But a magical organizational change is

unlikely in the first place

— it

will require the cumulative

commitment of the organization's members.

But here, we are

left with the difficulties individual members face in

trying to change the Model

I

theories of other members of

their organization.
I

am reminded of a friend with whom

I

worked at

a

software consulting firm, a firm that was both high

pressure and "hip."

One weekend in 1970, my friend

attended an "Esalen East" workshop.

On Monday he came in

esctatic, and urged one and all to bare their deepest
feelings.

People did not.

And when during

high-priced friend was let go,

I

a

recession, my

wondered if at least part

of the reason was not that he made people feel at least

slightly uncomfortable with his questions.

It may be
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revealing to note that since then his
efforts have been
directed at developing men's support
groups outside of
organizational settings.
Thus individuals learn that it is
dangerous to try to
change the behavioral norms of others within
existing

organizations.

I

find it unlikely, therefore, to expect

much change in the Model

I

behavior to come from solitary

members, nor to come from the society at large which

surrounds an organization.

The habits of the organization,

when reinforced by those of society, will be difficult to
change.
We have seen that the interventionists of Argyris and

Schon have had only limited success with individual

organizations.

Therefore it may be unrealistic to expect

such interventionists to have a cumulative effect on

society at large.

Not that Argyris and Schon even discuss

such cumulative effects

— they

offer no comprehensive

strategy at all for change at the societal level.
Of course,

there may not exist any single switch that

can convert all of society at once.

We must start

somewhere, and Argyris and Schon are doing so, in a domain
in which they are knowledgeable.

But

I

am skeptical in

part because the very organizations likely to hire

high-priced consultants like Argyris and Schon are also
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likely to be "successful" ones,
saturated with the
win-lose, competitive ethos
which inhibits the risky
business of moving away from
Model I. Many are also likely
to be ones in which members
are employees; thus the already
threatening business of questioning
existing norms will be
doubly threatening, because
careers and income may be in
jeopardy.
Finally, many of those organizations,
at least
in the United States, will be
ones in which the

relationships are instrumental, with members
treating one
another as means rather than ends.
Such relationships may
be less capable of working through
the threats of systemic
diagnosis and change than relationships founded
on genuine
care.

What strategy, then, would

I

suggest instead?

This is

not the place for me to discuss in detail how
to overcome
the kinds of limitations mentioned above.

That will have

to wait for subsequent discussion of strategies
encouraging

collective learning.

For now though, clues from the work

of Argyris and Schon might suggest how to begin.

First,

it might make sense to focus on groups that are

already more sympathetic to Model II theor ies-in-use and

already suspicious to those of Model

I.

These would need

to be social systems characterized by open and honest

dialogue, and by mutual support and care.

Such social
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systems are probably less
likely to be found in the
competitive worlds of business,
government and academia in
which Argyris and Schon
have done most of their work.
Rather, there may be more
chance of their appearance
in
religious communities or new
age groups, knowledge
intensive industries, alternative
schools, home schools,
peace groups, and the like. My
hunch is that such social
systems are more likely to
incubate effective collective
learning about collective learning.
A second clue for the design
of successful strategy
comes from Schon' s observation in
Bevond the Stahls
that public learning tends to be
systemic.

occur isolation.

A change in one element of

sure to involve changes in others.
to change, others must change.

change, so will others.
a

Changes do not
a

culture is

In order for one thing

And when one thing does

Thus it makes sense to strive for

strategy of collective learning which focuses not
on an

individual organization, but rather on a social community
as a whole.

Margaret Mead's study of the Manus suggests

that in some ways it may be easier to transform an
entire

socio-cul tural system than it is to change some small part
of

it

(1956)

.

A history of America, from the time of the

pilgrims through the experiments of the utopian communities
of the last century on through the establishment of the
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alternative communities of the
last two decades, attests
to
the awareness that experiments
in thorough going social
change may be best incubated
in autonomous communities
committed to a shared vision.
Thus we may be more likely
to find successful experiments
in collective learning

about
collective learning in communities
committed to that
effort,
in such communities members
might then receive
support and reinforcement for their
efforts
to change.

They would get such support
everywhere

— at

home, school,

worship, play.
But such systemic efforts by
sympathetic communities

must not be short-term.

They must be sustained if they are

to reach the level of regularized
change in a community's

collective culture.

No weekend workshop this.

Lifetimes.

With such sustained and systemic efforts by

sympathetic groups, there may be some hope of creating
lasting living models of what collective learning can
be.
But if we limit ourselves to the strategies of Argyris
and

Schon,

I

see little hope of success.

Organizations and

their members will not be able to change because they will
be overwhelmed by the force of the prevailing Model

culture.

I

And if organizations themselves do not change,

then there is little hope that the society as a whole will.
So in the end,

Argyris and Schon'

s

theory is not
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"pragmatic" because it fails
to understand the whole.
But
it is surely too much to
expect one or two individuals
to
comprehend the whole.
Instead we are forced
to look for

strategies that promote widespread
participation from a
diversity of perspectives in a
sustained dialogue about
collective learning. Only with
such participation can we
hope for a theory grounded in
the great range of concrete
realities of our diverse experience.
And only with such
participation can we hope for a social
whole harnessing the
insight and energy of its members, who
are its learners and
its workers.
Only then is there a chance of arriving
at a
theory that is adequate, a theory of the
whole, a theory
that works.
The participants in such a collective
endeavor are

sure to find themselves time and again using
the concepts,
terms and tools developed by Chris Argyris and
Donald
Schon.

CHAPTER

V

JURGEN HABERMAS: SOCIETAL LEARNING AS

HOMOLOGOUS TO COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

If

complain that Argyris and Schon have too
narrowly
limited their consideration to learning
by organizations,
I can hardly have the same
complaint about Jurgen
I

Habermas,

who conceives of the entire "hisotry of the
species" as
arising from episodes of societal learning.

Jurgen Habermas is not easy to understand.

Immersed

in a conceptual heritage including that of Kant, Hegel,
Marx, Adorno, and Piaget, and developing his own concepts
and

distinctions over the last three decades, his writing in a

given article is only comprehensible in relation to the rest.
He writes at a high level of abstraction which, one senses,

can only be fully known in his own German noun-building.

My

attempt to abstract a paraphrase here does not do justice to
the original.

I

offer it in the spirit in which American

tourists bring back sketches of the Alps.

Habermas's Model of Societal Learning
and the Historical Process

Let me, then, offer a postcard synopsis of some key
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features of Habermas's model as
writings.

I

infer it from his various

While these differ in phrasing and detail, their

overall thrust is consistent with the provisional
flowchart

I

have abstracted in figure 21.

Existing Social Order
Technological
learning

Normative Learning

Socialization of
individuals to norms

can

1

accumulate as
a store of
cognitive
potential for
later implementation

stimulate forces
of production to
new levels which
old relations of
production cannot accommodate

Individual development of moral
reasoning
1

New forms of social
integration
expressed in world
views, embodying a
higher stage of
moral reasoning

Trial institutionalization
of new forms of social
integration
'

Unleashing of technical
knowledge for productive
forces
|

Stabilization of new social
order based on higher stage
of moral consciousness
Figure 21.

Social evolution per Habermas
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T e c hnical knowledge an d
normative knowledge

To understand the model requires
understanding a

distinction Habermas draws between two
dimensions in which
the species learns: 1) ‘'technically
useful knowledge
deci-

sive for the development of productive
forces" and
2)

"moral-practical consciousness decisive for structures

of interaction" (1979, p. 148).

These two dimensions correspond to the two aspects of

what Marx called the "mode of production"
(1979, p. 138).
On the one hand a given mode of production is characterized
by a certain stage of development of the "forces of production," that is, the labor power, the technical knowledge,

and the organizing knowledge which coordinate labor.

On the

other hand, a mode of production is characterized by a stage
of development of "relations of production," that is, social

institutions determining how labor is combined with the

means of production, who controls production, how wealth is
distributed and how interests are satisfied.
Habermas sees the former dimension

production

— as

— the

forces of

regulated by "rules of instrumental action,"

which direct the transformation of material, and by
"rules of strategic action" which coordinate cooperation
in production (1979, pp. 131-132,

p.

145).

The second dimension--the relations of production

is affected by "rules of communicative action" which

structure the distribution of products, control, and

14 ?

interests.

The rules of communicative action are linguis-

tic, intersub jective

,

supraindividual understandings by

which interactions are mediated (1979,

p.

118

).

They

prescribe the reciprocal expectations of members of society
about interactions and consequences, about roles, norms,
and principles justifying these norms (1979, p. 82).

At

the core of these rules are law and morality, which provide

consensual regulation of conflict without force (1979,
P.

99).

Historical materialism and societal learning
The distinction between the two dimensions--the

technical and the normative--is important because it is
the basis on which Habermas "reconstructs" historical

materialism.

Marxists have traditionally focused on the

economic base as the sole source of development in history,

viewing law, politics, and social consciousness as mere
"superstructure."

One of Marx's statements most often

cited in support of this view is the following:
The mode of production of material life conditions
the general process of social, political, and
intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of
men that determines their existence, but their
social existence that determines their consciousness.
(1970, pp. 20-21)

Habermas argues that the context indicates that
Marx did not intend the distinction to be applied in all

circumstances but "only for the critical phase in which
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a society passes into a new developmental
level" (1979,
p.

In such a crisis, Marx sees the following

143).

occurring:
the material productive forces of society
:
come
into conflict with the existing relations of
production.
From forms of development of the productive
forces, these relations form into their fetters.
Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes
in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to
the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.
(1970, p. 21)
.

.

By this account one could view the process as

endogenous learning in which individuals develop new

cognitive-technical capabilities which are put to use,

developing the forces of production to a stage at which
the relations of production are no longer adequate.

In

this sense, the societal learning in the technical domain
could be seen as a "trigger" to the development of new

levels of societal integration.

Is technical learning the "trigger"?

Habermas claims that the historical record offers

important cases

— among

them the rise of European capitalism

--in which the development of productive forces followed,

rather than "triggered," development of advances in social
integration.

Habermas tries to clarify the situation with

a distinction between the development of a store of poten-

tially usable technical knowledge and its actual use.

Habermas says, "This

potential

knowledge, however

Thus
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can be implemented to develop the
forces of production only
when the evolutionary step to a new
institutional framework
and a new form of social integration
has been taken"
(1979,

P-

1 47).

Unfortunately, on the prior page, Habermas
himself
cited cases (in Polynesia and South Africa)
"in which system
problems arose as a result of an increase in
productive
forces, overloading the adaptive capacity of
societies

organized on kinship lines and shattering the primitive
communal order."
Thus, Habermas leaves the reader confused about

whether technical learning is or is not a trigger to social
evolution, and

i'f

so, when.

The confusion is compounded by

the fact that Habermas sometimes talks of systems problems

arising from the development of productive forces, and
sometimes, as the result of ecological factors such as popu-

lation growth (for example,

p.

162).

(For that reason

the sources of system problems have been drawn with dotted

lines in figure 21.)

Normative learning follows its own
developmental logic

Whatever Habermas's views on the role of technical
learning as a trigger of social evolution, his main

objection to the Marxist historical explanation is that it
fails to recognize the pivotal role of normative learning

150

as the "pacemaker" of social evolution.

For, though Marx's

description may account for the development of disequilibrium between forces of production and relations of production,
it fails to account for the restoration of equilibrium, at
a new level of social integration.

For that to happen, the

relations of production must be altered, and that demands
a non- technical kind of knowledge, a moral mode of thinking

that gives rise to new structures of interaction preferable
to the old.

Thus, in Habermas's view, the replacement of

the overburdened kinship system by the state required the

achievement of a level of moral understanding less tied to
the power of persons and more dedicated to general

principles.

But without such developments in the collective

moral-practical understanding, the social system would be
unable to overcome its tensions caused by disequilibria

between the forces of production and the relations of
production.

The social system would be stuck.

But with

an advance in the system's structures of interactions, the
social system is suddenly able to unleash stored-up

technical knowledge, improving the forces of production.
"Thus for social evolution, learning processes in the domain
of moral-practical consciousness function as pacemakers
(1979, p. 160).

If that sounds like heresy to historical materialists,

they may be even more discomfitted to hear Habermas say
that moral understandings and their rules of communicative
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communicative action "do develop in reaction to
changes in
the domain of instrumental and strategic action;
but
in

so doing they follow their own logi c" (italics
his).

These developmental logics betoken the independence--and
to this extent the internal history--of the spirit"
(1979,
p.

123).

Is this an echo of Hegel's "spirit coming to

know itself"?

Not quite, for Habermas's analysis is

"materialist" by making reference to system crises in the

mode of production, and "historical" by seeking causes of

evolutionary changes in the whole range of contingent
circumstances.

Habermas does claim that normative struc-

tures display their own developmental logic from stage to
stage.

However:

This logic says nothing about the mechanisms of
development; it says something only about the range
of variations within which cultural values, moral
representations, norms and the like at a given level
of social organization-can be changed and can find
different historical expression. In its developmental
dynamics, the change of normative structures remains
dependent on evolutionary challenges posed by
unresolved, economically conditioned system problems
and on learning processes that are a response to them.
In other words, culture remains a superstructural
phenomenon, even if it does seem to play a more
prominent role in the transition to new developmental
levels than many Marxists have heretofore supposed.
This prominence explains the contribution that
communication theory can, in my view, make to a renewed
historical materialism.
(1979. P* 98)

—

Individual and ^societal learning are
interdependent"
Before we examine the logic of development, the
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internal history' of normative learning, we should review

Habermas

s

statements about how it is that societies can

"learn" and in what sense they do so:

Individ ually acquired learning abilities and information must be latently available in world views
before they can be used in a socially significant
way that is, before they can be transposed into
societal learning processes
Since the cognitive development of the individual
takes place under social boundary conditions, there
is a circular process between societal and individual
learning.
The rationality structures embodied
in the family have first to be absorbed by the child
in the development of his interactive competence.
But the state of societies could itself only
be changed by constructive learning on the part of
socialized individuals.
It is only in a derivative
sense that societies 'learn.'
(1979, p. 121)
,

.

.

.

Or,

.

.

.

.

in another phrasing:
It is the personality system that is the bearer of
the ontogenetic learning process; and, in a certain
way, only social subjects can learn.
But social
systems, by drawing on the learning capacities of
social subjects, can form new structures in order to
solve steering problems that threaten their continued
existence.
To this extent the evolutionary learning
process of societies is dependent on the competencies
of the individuals that belong to them.
The latter
in turn acquire their competencies not as isolated
monads but by growing into the symbolic structures
of their life-worlds. ( 1979 P* 15*0
»

Societal homologues to individual
moral development
Since Habermas sees social evolution as requiring

learning by both society and individuals, his research
strategy is to examine some existing theoretical models of
individual cognitive development for clues towards a model
of learning at the societal level.

His suggestion is that
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there are homologues between the structures of consciousness

developing during the history of the species.
Thus, drawing on the work of Piaget, Freud, and

Jane Loevinger

,

among others, Habermas presents evidence

for the existence of stages in the development of the ego

— for

example, l) symbiotic, 2) egocentric, 3) socio-

centric-ob jectivistic, 4) universalistic.

He then goes on

to suggest that similar stages may be discerned in the

evolution of worldviews seen in societies' myths, religions,
philosophies, and cosmologies.

Similarly, Habermas draws

on the work of George Herbert Mead and others to suggest

that homologues exist between the structures of ego identity

and group identity.

But it is in the domain of moral

consciousness that Habermas has furthest pursued the

suggestion that homologues exist, and it is those we will
consider here.
The focus on moral consciousness is appropriate given

its importance for the reconstruction of historical mate-

rialism.

Returning to figure 21, we will remember that

societal learning occurs both in the cognitive-technical
areas bearing on the mode of production, and in the moralpractical, bearing on the maintenance of inter-subjective

understanding on which social interaction and integration
depend.

The dynamics of production are well worked out

by historical materialists, and Habermas has not pursued

cognitive homologues in that domain.

But reconstruction
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is needed in the interactive domain,
and it is here that

Habermas has focused his work.

And while the evolution

of worldviews and the structure of collective
identity

contribute to this, it is

’’law

and morality [which]

mark

the core domain of interaction," for they provide
the

consensual, non-violent regulation of action conflicts

which allows other forms of communicative action to
continue
And, of course, Habermas had available to him an

already worked out model of moral development at the
individual level

— namely

that of Lawrence Kohlberg.

A

summary of Kohlberg’ s stages of moral reasoning, as reported

by Turiel in 1974 is given in figure 22.
Habermas describes the three major divisions of
Kohlberg' s model as follows

At the £re conventional stage at which actions, motives,
and acting subjects are still preceived on a single
plane of reality, only the consequences are evaluated
in cases of conflict. At the conventional stage
motives can be assessed independently of concrete
action consequences; conformity with a certain social
role or with an existing system of norms is the standard.
At the postconventional stage these systems of norms
lose their quasi-natural validity; they require justification from universalistic points of view. (1979,
,

,

,

p.

156)

Habermas then uses Kohlberg' s classifications to distinguish
a number of levels of social integration according to the

stage of moral reasoning evident in the following three

societal structures:

non-conflictual

,

1)

those structures of general, normal,

everyday action, as in family relations;
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'•
Sl.ifti'i of A oifit ComiioiiMiets
(according 10 Lawrence Kohlhtr/')
I

Obedience and
punishment
orientation

Lenten trie defereme to superior power
or prestige, or a trouble a voiding set.
Objective responsibility.

i
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lev cl

Instrumental

Right action

hedonism

isfying the seif
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those of others. Naisc egalitarian-

ism and orientation to exchange and
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Good-hoy

iproc

ity.

Orientation to approval and to pleasing
and helping others. Conformity to ste-

orientation

images of majority or nabehavior, and judgment by

reotypical
role

tural

intentions.

II

Conventional

Law and-order

Orientation

orientation

rules,

toward authority,
and the maintenance of the

fixed

level

social

order. Right behavior consists of doing

one's duty, showing res pec t for authority.

and maintaining the given

order for
(

ontrac lual-

its

own

social

sake.

Right action is defined in terms of individual rights and of standards which

legalistic

orientation

'

have been initially examined and agreed
upon by the whole society. Concern
with establishing and maintaining hidividual rights, equality. and liberty.
Distinctions are made between values
having universal, prescriptive applicability and values sjKcifie to a given
society.

l

Right

*n i versa 1-

III

is

defined by the decision of con-

accord

ethical-

science

print iplc

ethical

orientation

comprehensiveness,

in

with

self -chosen

level

principles appealing to logical
universality,

These principles are

consistency.

stract; they are

and
ab-

not cone rete moral rules.

These are universal princijdes
tice,

I’ostc on ven tinnal

of. jus-

of the reciprocity and equality of

human

right>,

dignity of

and of respect for the

human

beings as individual

persons.

Smote:

I

liioi

Turicl. "Conflict anil Transition in Adolescent Moral Develop-

ment." Chilli nutUijimenl

Sources

Figure 22.

-T)

(

1074

)

14-29.

Habermas, 1979, p.77

Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning.
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2)

the structures of conflict resolution,
morality and

law given hortative expression in
worldviews, myths, etc.;
3) the structures of institutionalized
law and binding
morality. For a given society the stage
of moral reasoning
seen in each of the three structures may
be at variance.

Habermas’s tentative sketch of these configurations
is
given in figure 23.

Societal Structures

Level of S ocial Integration

Normal Action

Worldview

Law

Neolithic societies

C

Pre + C

Pre

Early civilizations

C

C

C

Developed civilizations

C

Post

C

Modern age

Post

Post

Post

Key;

"Pre" = preconventional
"C" = conventional
"Post" = postconventional
;

Figure 23* Habermas's stages of moral development
in societal structures.
.

Habermas admits that his scheme is tentative, and

gives little evidence for corroboration.

But the following

example which he offers may give a sense of the pattern
by which societies institutionalize moral structures

homologous to those observed in individual moral development.
By his account, in neolithic societies the normal (i.e.

relatively non-conflictual) actions were regulated by con-
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ventional kindship norms, and motives were
assessed independently of consequences. But the neolithic

legal system

was preconventional

,

only consequences.

relying on feuding law that assessed

But the neolithic legal system was

preconventional, relying on feuding law that assessed
only
consequences, compensated damages, and restored the
status
quo ante.

Conflicts were sometimes settled by temporary

couts of arbitration whose "law" was merely that to which

parties could agree.

The consciousness embedded in world-

views, on the other hand, had elements of the conventional

stage of moral consciousness.

Thus, many myths tell stories

of conflict resolved by "conventional" criteria.

As suggested in figure 23 above, that consciousness

became institutionalized in law with the development of

early civilizations.

While neolithic societies sometimes

institutionalized special roles for special needs (for
example, temporary chiefs for wartime), such roles were

not permanently linked to the system of justice.

But as

conflict over land overloaded neolithic capacities to
handle conflict, the role of a ruler who adjudicated

conflict became permanent.

But his legitimacy came from

deciding on cases according to a structure of moral
consciousness widely expressed in worldviews.

No longer

were conflicts resolved merely by what parties could agree
to according to their concrete distribution of power, but

according to social norms grounded in tradition.

These
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norms embodied principles characteristic of a
conventional
stage of morality, including the evaluation of actions

according to intentions as well as consequences, the

ascription of liability to individuals, and the adminis-

tration of punishment rather than retaliation.

A seventh stage of individual moral development

Beyond the stages sketched in figures 22 and 23

,

Habermas also gives hints about the possible character of
normative structures of the next emerging society.

But to

understand that, we must first understand a seventh stage
of individual moral development which Habermas adds to

Kohlberg's original six, and which serves as the base for
the next societal homologue.

Stage

7

is summarized at

the bottom of Habermas's scheme in figure 24.

Kohlberg's highest stage, Stage

6

,

(in the 1974

formulation) has at its center the individual conscience

operating under self-chosen abstract universal principles.

An example of such a principle is Kant's categorical
imperative;

"Act only according to that maxim by which

you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law."

In Kohlberg's sixth stage, the conscience

seems to be operating under something akin to Kant's "pure

practical reason" which makes its ethical choices independent of a person's inclinations, needs, or interests.
However, it is precisely such interests which are
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Habermas

A seventh stage of moral development per
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the concern of ethical choice.

Thus Habermas's approach,

rather than washing moral reasoning of the taint
of needs,

maintains them as an integral part of deliberation.

The

difficulty in the Kantian approach is that the search for
the universal is made dependent on the individual, who is

expected, on his own, to suppress all his individual

inclinations as factors in his reasoning.

Habermas's approach, on the other hand, admits the
presence of individual interests, but seeks to overcome
them through a communal dialogue.

The goal of such

dialogue would be to reach a consensus about which interests
are generalizable and which are not.

This requires

reflexive discourse in which individuals continually submit
their principles of justification to testing by others.
Thus individual conscience and interpretation of need

become objects of discourse.

But participants of such

discourse should as far as possible make their judgments in
a way that is free from the distortions of internal or

external constraints.

And they should seek an agreement

with whose validity any and all such participants would
agree.

Of course, such participation does not exist, but

it serves as the ideal for a "universal ethics of speech."

Thus Habermas’s seventh stage differs from Kohlberg's
sixth in that "the principle of justification of norms is
no longer the monologically

individually

applied principle

of generalizability but the communally followed procedure

1

6

of redeeming normative validity
discursively."

The next stage of

s o cial

integration

What then would be a future societal
homologue to this
seventh stage of moral development?
Habermas offers only
hints.
It would replace the moral freedom of
the autonomous individual of stage 6 with freedom that
is political
as well as moral.

A world society of unconstrained indiv-

iduals would have participation as a central principle.

And

the

pursuit of happiness' might one day mean something

^ii'Terent--for example, not accumulating material objects

<

of which one disposes privately, but bringing about social

relations in which mutuality predominates and satisfaction
does not mean the triumph of one over the repressed needs
of the other" (quoted by McCarthy 1979, p. xxiv)

However, Habermas reminds us that every stage of

societal learning, while institutionalizing a solution to
one problem, dialectically gives rise to consciousness of

another.

Thus, Habermas speculates that while a post-

modern society may solve current problems (such as distribution of scarce material goods)

,

it may engender a new

problem centered on the supply of motivation and meaning.

Criteria of progress

According to Habermas, the dialectic of history is
not haphazard, and reveals a principle of progress.

Any
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theory of social evolution implies direction and criteria
for progress.

But Habermas rejects older criteria such as

"survival," and "complexity" as arbitrary and inadequate.
Instead, he rests his sense of progress on the intrinsic

nature of the communicative action that is at the center
of his philosophical system.

For communicative action, if

it is to lead to consensus, must be founded on certain

presuppositions:

"the presupposition, for instance, that

true propositions are preferable to false ones, and that

right (i.e.

justifiable) norms are preferable to wrong

ones" (1979, P* 177)*

These presuppositions are not a

matter of choice, they are unavoidable.
ite to meaningful discourse.

They are prerequis-

Therefore, Habermas concludes:

do not regard the choice of the historical-materialist
criterion of progress as arbitrary. The development
of productive forces in conjunction with the maturity
of the forms of social integration, means progress of
learning ability in both dimensions: progress in
ob jectivating knowledge and in moral practical insight.
I

(1979, p.

177)

Evaluation of Habermas's Model for Collective
Learning about Collective Learning

Our concern in this chapter is to gain an understanding

of some existing models of collective learning which offer

major contributions toward the "001 task" of collective
learning about collective learning.

Of those major models,

that of Habermas is the one with the broadest and deepest
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theoretical penetration.

The paraphrase of his philosophy

have given does not do justice to the
scholarship and
originality he applies to a range of fundamental
philosophical issues. His theory of the history of
the species
builds on intimate knowledge of historical materialism;
his
theory of societal learning proceeds from novel,
carefully
I

worked out philosophies of knowledge and communicative
ethics.

His consideration of issues of development draws

on a great range of scholarship from diverse disciplines.
As such, his model goes far towards a paradigm which bridges
a variety of perspectives.

Of the available models, his

is philosophically the most complete and coherent.

Habermas's breadth does not detract from his immediate
value for our historical moment.

In an age when technical

learning has given us devastating nuclear arsenals but when
normative learning has yet to offer institutionalized modes
of resolving international conflict, other people need to

follow Habermas in elucidating the process by which such

institutionalization may occur.
Here, an understanding of the link between individual

learning and societal learning may prove critical.

Society

will not be able to institutionalize systems for resolving

international conflict without substantial learning by
individuals.

But individual learning by itself will not

be sufficient; it must be alloyed into something different

in kind--societal learning that addresses our common problems.
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For reasons like this,

I

consider the central value

of Habermas's work to be his attempt to
construct a model
that links the "history of the species" to
individual
cognitive development. Neither is adequately
explained,
it seems to me, without an account of the
other.
A theory
of societal learning must include a theory of
individual

learning, and vice versa, since each is dependent on
the
other.

Habermas s Model Depends on the Validity
of the Individual Homologues
'

.

Habermas's model is not without problems.

Principle

among them is his reliance on homologues for the elaboration
of his theory.

r

irst, a homology depends on the validity

fHe description in the root homologue.

If the descrip-

tions of individual learning are inadequate, they cannot be
the basis for an adequate account of societal learning.

But the models of individual development which Habermas
uses are themselves open to some question.

Many questions cluster around the issue of whether
or not the models are in any way culture-bound.
For
instance, one of Kohlberg's proteges, Carol Gilligan

(

1981

has suggested that her mentor's model of moral development
has a masculine bias, and that it does not accurately

describe the development of moral reasoning in women.

For

example, she sees the Platonic path to universal principle

as less important to many women than the development of

)
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their ability to care creatively for
parties in a conflict.
Thus, a model of the development of
society's normative
structures would be substantially different
if based
on
the homologue of Gilligan's model
than if based on Kohl-

ber

'

s.

Another example of variation in source models
is the suggestion by Seymour Pappert that
computers may

immerse children in a "culture" so different from
any

prior human culture that the Piagetian model of
cognitive
development may have to be revised. Specifically, he

sees

the importance of "procedural" thinking— the
creation,

nesting and repeating, revising, and blending of
procedures
—as so central to computers that, when kids begin working
with them, their cognitive development may take
paths

unanticipated in Piaget's model.

A revision in that model

would, once again, require a shift in the societal

homologue
Of course, considerable study has been devoted to
the cultural universality of the Piagetian and
Kohlbergian

models, and Habermas would quickly admit that scientific

models are necessarily captive of their historical settings.

But to the extent that there exists dispute about models
of individual learning, a model of societal learning

constructed by homology is also open to dispute.
Similarly, a theory of societal learning based on

homologies is limited by the choice of homologues.

Thus
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Habermas has chosen, rightly
of moral development.
(19 75

)

I

think, tto focus on models

But he has ignored work by Fowler

and others which offer models of spiritual

development.

As this is different, and as the models dif-

fer, so too would models of societal learning
constructed

on such models.

Is the use of homology valid?

A second, more fundamental issue is not so much

whether the root homologues are well chosen and valid, but
whether the very use of homology is a valid basis for the
construction of social theory.

This is an issue to which

Habermas himself is sensitive.

He warns against over-

hasty parallels between societal and individual development,
and enumerates a list of provisos about the use of such
homologues.

These include consideration of the many ways

in which societies differ from individuals, altering the

nature of the homologous structure of consciousness.
Nonetheless, he feels genuine homologues can be found,
and makes the search for them central to his research
strategy.

thought.

As a strategy, it is a useful stimulus to
The history of science is full of examples of the

beneficial uses of analogy and metaphor.

But the lasting

value of the metaphor is not just in the initiation of
thought, but in the degree to which the inner structure of
the metaphor gives a coherent and compelling account of
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the phenomena.

And here the jury on Habermas's homologies

is still out.

For my part,

I

find the descriptions of the homologies

given so far as sketchy and unconvincing.

Habermas works

from a European theoretical tradition quite
different from
that of American empiricism, and develops
his thought from
logical imperatives rather than empirical ones.
But I

would like a more thorough examination of the degree
to
which his theoretical structure is confined in the historical and anthropological record.

When biologists construct

theory by referring to homologies between a human arm and
a bird's wing, they are using clear and carefully observed

comparisons.

Homologies between individual and societal

learning need to be similarly grounded in careful observation.

The biologists'

use of homology is also more restric-

ted than Habermas's in another way: theirs does not leap

from the level of individual to group phenomena.

When

biologists compare the bone structures of a human and a
bird, they are comparing individual creatures, presumably

genetically linked to common individual ancestors.

But

when Habermas compares the structures of consciousness in
individual humans and societies, he is comparing two

different levels of organization whose "genetic" links
are obscure.

My reservation about such cross-level comparisons is
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that, while societal structures may
arise from individual

structures of consciousness, that does not
mean that they
replicate individual structures in a mirror-like
fashion.

Though a molecule is made of atoms, its
structure

is not a mere repetition of atomic structure
"writ large";

new organizing principles come into play.

Nor is Henry

Moore’s sculpture "The Family" reducible to its molecules.
And modern culture is hardly reducible to the individual

psychology of Henry Moore and others.

In a similar way,

although societal learning is obviously constituted of
individual learning, thinking of it as only a mirror-like
homologue may miss something.

New organizing principles

may be required to understand the leap from individual
learning to societal learning.

While

I

what those organizing principles may be,

cannot yet state
I

am cautious

about treating societal learning as a merely magnified image
of individual learning.

Habermas is cautious about a similar cross-level

comparison
tion.

— that

made between biological and cultural evolu-

Among his reservations is the fact that while the

mechanisms of genetic imitation are now well analyzed, the
same cannot be said of the mechanisms involved in cultural

tradition and learning.

As he says;

As long as these mechanisms are not adequately analyzed,
however, we cannot judge whether the comparison between
imitation and tradition is merely metaphorical or
whether the underlying social learning mechanism is
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m

some way functionally equivalent to the process
of
mutation.
One difference should arouse our suspicion;
whereas the mutation process produces chance variations
the ontogenesis of structures of consciousness is a
highly selective and directional process. (
1979 p. 172)
.

In what sense is societal learning homologous
to individual learning?

Habermas does not seem to take his homologies between

individual and societal learning as merely heuristic tools,
but as something reflecting actual processes.

But his

exposition of the nature of the processes and homologues
is not always clear.

Perhaps some confusion might be reduced if we distinguish here between two ways of viewing society as "learning.
One way is to think of society as a learning entity,
as an individual is a learning entity.

just

The second way is

to think of society as part of an integrated process in

which society is both a result of individuals' learning
and a cause of it.

To think of societal learning in the

former sense would mean that a homologue between individual
and societal learning envisioned the societal entity as

mirroring the same stages, structures and dynamics of
learning as individual entities display in their learning.
But Habermas usually does not seem to be thinking

in these terms, at least on careful examination.

Rather,

he seems to be thinking of societal learning in the second
sense.

He talks of individually achieved structures of

consciousness.

In this sense, a homologue is not so much

1
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a case of entities having similar
structures, but ones

embodying similar principles of consciousness.

Thus,

when Habermas classifies early state civilizations’ legal
order as "conventional," he does not seem to be describing
a learning entity (the state) which behaves toward other

states according to "conventional" modes

*

rather, he seems

to be saying that legal system's method of thinking about

resolution of conflict (internal to the society itself)
had characteristics of the conventional model of moral
reasoning.
However, we can then ask who it is who is reasoning

confentionally
question,

I

.

Although Habermas does not ask that

am sure he would agree that it is individuals--

for example, the rulers,

judges, and the majority of the

members of society giving assent to the legal system.
So in what sense can "societal" learning be said to have

occurred?

Perhaps in this sense

— that

those members of

society who rule or prevail have made conventional moral

reasoning the collective rules of the game.

But this

is a less forceful homologue than it first seems, and

certainly different from the first sense mentioned above.
At the center of these difficulties is a need for
a clear definition of "who" it is that is learning in

"societal learning," and in what sense. These slippery
issues are ones we will pursue in the next chapter.
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Research questions
Let us accept the interpretation
that Habermas means
societal learning to be some sort of
societal institutionalization of more mature modes of
individual reasoning.
What, then, can be said of the status
of his "research
agenda" and its import for collective
learning about
collective learning? What questions remain
to be answered?
First, much more needs to be learned
about the psychosociological process by which advances in
individual
cognitive structures become the structures
which
are

followed by the members of society in dealing
with their
collective problems.
Is this a matter of the percentage
of members achieving a level of cognitive
development,
or a matter of the level achieved by key decision
makers?

Can the distribution of such individual achievements
be
measured, or only guessed at in this historical record?
To the extent that historical patterns of individual

development can be measured, do such measures support

Habermas's assumption that there exist discreet stages of
societal learning, following an invariant pattern.
Not

bnly do we need to know more about how individual
learning
affects society, we also need to know more about
how
societal structures constrain and motivate individuals'
learning.
o ut

Such questions raised by Habermas's model call

for research, which builds and integrates the knowledge

established by the separate disciplines in the social
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sciences

Beware of bifurcations
If the individual learner turns out to be pivotal

after all, even in the hidden core of Habermas’s scheme,
that warns against the neat separation Habermas makes

between the technical and normative domains of societal
learning.

I,

as an individual learner, do not make such

a neat division.

worldviews,

I

live in a world in which technologies,

and legal structures all are impinging on my

consciousness simultaneously and continuously.

It is

difficult for me to divide my reasoning about nuclear power
into purely technical or purely normative domains.

Nor is

it easy to identify when a multiplicity of technical and

economic factors triggered normative thinking, and when

normative insights suggested technical directions.

My

mental life is an ecology of mutually interacting
influences.

It seems better understood as an orchestra

rehearsing toward a symphony than as a series of solo
voices.
It should not be surprising, then, that many careful

historical examinations protray technical and normative
factors as affecting each other in parallel, rather than
in sequence.

Thus, Robert Merton's lucid study, Science

Technology, and Society in Seventeenth Century England.

describes the interacting effects of puritan values,
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technological developments (in mining,
transportation, and
the military), social developments
(as in postal systems,
the Royal Society), external
forces (such as military
threats), and economic forces (for
example, profits from

maritime trade).

Merton concludes his study with a
caution
against one factor social theory.
The continual interpenetration of
forces in social

history merely reflects the fact that societal
learning
operates through individual learners whose nature

is to be

continually integrating disparate cognitions.

This suggests,

in other words, caution about Habermas's bifurcation
of

technical and normative learning.

And it suggests that the

issue of which factors are "triggers," "base" or "super*-

structure," an issue inconsistently handled by Habermas,
and long plaguing Hegelians, Marxists, and Weberians, is

an issue arising from an artificial bifurcation.
But if we shift to wholisitc or ecological models of

societal learning, with wholistic individual thinkers as
operators, then perhaps we might be better able to model
the observed dynamics.

Habermas's contribution is to link an account of the

history of the species to the logic of development of
structures of individual consciousness.

What one senses

is now needed is a theory that better integrates theories

of individual learning and theories of societal learning;
that includes societal learning as a factor in individual
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learning and vice versa; and that unifies them
under a
single scheme.
Such an integration is a long way off.

in that direction, in the next chapter

I

As a step

will adopt a

view of individual learning as largely influenced by
collective factors, and a view of collective learning as

arising from the learning of social individuals in social
intercourse with each other.

CHAPTER

VI

TOWARD A GENERAL MODEL OF COLLECTIVE LEARNING:

CLARIFICATION OF ISSUES AND TERMS

In Chapter

I

,

I

pointed to the growing number of

efforts to model social processes as processes of collective
learning.

I

argued that such modelling could aid under-

standing of social systems by clarifying assumptions,
terms, concerns, and issues, and by revealing new dilemmas

in turn.
This iterative, question-answer-question process was

evident in our review of models in Chapters II to

V.

In

Karl Deutsch's seminal work, we found concepts and terms
useful to those who followed.

!

Among these were the

delineation of functions that must be performed for a
system to process information, pathologies which result
from those functions not being met, and distinctions among
kinds of learning according to what is changed in the
process., However, we also saw that this cybernetic model,

born of electronics, gave little attention to the role of
human learners in human social learning.

March and Olsen's

model, however, makes no such omission; they conceive of

organizational adaptation as a direct outgrowth of what

individuals perceive to be the effects of organizational
175
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action on its environment.

With this view they are able to

identify limits to experiential learning brought on when
the links are weakened between individual beliefs, indiv-

idual actions, organizational actions, and environmental

responses.

But the simplicity of their model helps to

reveal factors which they have left out, such as the shift
in a member's beliefs engendered by his organization's
actions.

Such learning about the internal organizational

environment is addressed in detail by Argyris and Schon.
In perhaps the most thoroughly worked out model to date,
they describe the manifold ways in which the "behavioral

worlds" and "theories-in-use" affect what an organization

learns and how well.

In particular they demonstrate how

the prevailing "Model

I

Theory-in-use" with its win-lose,

protect yourself attitudes, inhibits open organizational
inquiry into threatening issues.

Argyris and Schon develop

methods of intervention to help members of organizations
move from Model

I

to Model II.

But,

such intervention

faces a difficult task, because the Model

I

behaviors are

a pervasive part of our culture and not easily changed with

interventions in a single organization.

That is, Argyris

and Schon' s model, complete as it is, is not complete
enough; it does not account for the force of societal

factors.

And while such larger societal forces do receive

lacks
attention in the work of Jurgen Habermas, his model

any detailed description of the process by which
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individual learnings actually get impounded in
homologous
social forms.

We Now Need a More General Model

Each of the above models makes its own contribution
and reveals its own shortcomings.

This is to be expected

because each arises from the concerns of its disciplines
and does not intend to go beyond them.

But while this is

prudent scholarship, it creates a dilemma.

A complete

account of the learning in any given social system is
likely to require an account of the learning of social
systems other than itself.
No social system is entirely autonomous; it is affec-

ted by the learning and actions of other systems.

For

example, the learning by a business organization is likely
to be affected by the learning by departments, competitors,

governments, and by society at large.

A government's

learning is likely to be affected by that of business
organizations, and by society at large.

A society's

learning is a function of learning by component parts, and
is affected by other societies with which it comes into

contact.
The range and complexity of these mutual influences
is not adequately represented in any existing models.

Each,

by focusing on the subject of its own discipline, largely
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ignores the full range of influences.
;

Argyris and Schon,

for example, shed light on interpersonal dynamics
within

organizations, but do not attempt to examine the
societal
sources of those dynamics.
I

By their own description, Model

interpersonal behaviors are part of almost everyone’s

socialization and are at the core of industrialized society
and culture.

And though they say there can be no organiza-

tional change to Model II behaviors without social and

cultural change, they do not offer a theory of social change.
Instead, they stick to their disciplinary strength--the

examination of interpersonal relations in organizations.
Thus their strategy for intervention and change is primarily

focused on learning by individuals and relatively small
groups, and not on larger societal processes as well.

Of

course, Argyris and Schon are aware of this dilemma.

What

I

am suggesting here is that one way out of the dilemma

may be to search for a more inclusive, integrated theory,
one which may suggest more wholistic and effective

strategies for action.
In a similar way, Deutsch's model of decision by

central governmental organs lacks an account of the immense
sea of social intercourse on which political decision
floats.

And Habermas's grand theory of social evolution

lacks an account of the dynamics by which the cognitive

development of individuals becomes embedded in society’s
institutions.
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Each model is incomplete.

Each, by focusing on only

one level of collective learning to the exclusion
of others,

fails to do justice to the full range of factors
affecting
the level in question.

By focusing on one part, each model

not only fails to understand the whole, it also fails to

understand fully the part which it examines.
This was appropriate for the period of trailblazing

during which these models were made.

And

author is aware of these difficulties.

I

But

am sure each
I

sense the

time is now nearing when a more integrated model might be

possible.

The fact that scores of recent studies (cited

in Chapter I) from a diversity of disciplines have all

examined a social system as a "learning" system, suggests
-

there may be an implicit common perspective permitting

their integration.
If this is a time when the developments in separate

disciplines prepare

the way for a cross-disciplinary

integration, it is also a time that calls out for such

integration for practical reasons.
dependence.

This is an age of inter-

Most social systems are part of a vast, often

global network of other social systems.

Most depend on

each other for sustenance, security and satisfaction.

The

problems any one system faces are often enmeshed in a
tangle of related problems in other systems.

more and more a multisystem matter.

Learning is

So it would help in

addressing the problems of our time, if we were able to
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fashion an integrated model accounting for the interactions
of the collective learnings of the parts and the
whole.

One approach to integration might be simply to patch

together existing models of the various levels of social
systems.

But, the result would be like a lizard's body

with an elephant's head and the legs of a daddy longlegs

neither pretty to look at nor likely to live.
A more pleasing approach would be to search for a

universal pattern.

It is worth asking if there is a common

pattern in the learning of social systems of all kinds and
sizes--families and Freeze movements, businesses and
nations.

But, as noted above the pattern would need to

account for the effects of the learning of social systems
on each other.

It would need to be able to be applied

simultaneously to the learning of a focal social system,
its subsystems, its peer systems, and the suprasystems of

which it is a part.
This second approach, however, demands that a host
of issues be addressed.

The first is whether such a model

is possible in principle, whether all social systems share

enough learning-imbued features to provide common ground for
a general model.

Another is to specify in what sense the

term collective learning is being used, and why such usage
is valid.

Further, any general model will need to specify

the process by which collective learning proceeds, with

acknowledgment of the impact of other social systems'
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learning.

Are there varieties of collective learning?

Gan a typology be advanced to describe the variety
of
collective learning styles?
a general model must address.

These are some of the questions

My approach in this chapter

will be to address them in turn by suggesting my own preliminary responses to them, in the hope that such a prelimin-

ary model may aid the process of further modeling.

Identifying Common Learning-related Features
Shared by All Social Systems

The first issue any attempt to form a general model
of collective learning must face is whether there are
enough' commonalities across all social systems to provide

a basis for comparison.

And a general model must not only

demonstrate that these commonalities exist; it should also
be as explicit as possible about its assumptions about the

nature of those commonalities, for they will set the

parameters
limits

— the

— within

terms, questions, premises, views, and

which the modelling will proceed.

section which follows

I

In the

will suggest a tentative list of

commonalities and assumptions about them.
ators could offer a different list.

Other investig-

But the strength of

any eventual model will vary with the extent that its

basic assumptions about common elements are clear and well
founded.
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For my purpose here

m

defining what

I

I

need not be overly precise

mean by a "social system."

I

have in

mind a group of humans, interacting
to accomplish functions,
following some pattern of communication
and interaction.
These groups are "systems" in the
sense that the actions
of one member affect other members,
in a network whose
whole is not comprehensible only in
terms of the parts.
However,

am not subscribing to a purely "general
systems"
view of social groupings, with its tendency
to overdraw
I

the sharpness of boundaries between
systems, to stress

self-maintenance at the expense of self- transformation,
and to understate the complexity of a system's
goals.

I

And

emphatically wish to avoid the tendency among many

general systems theorists to talk at such a level of

abstraction that they forget that social systems are peopled
with real, living, unique, quirky individuals whose minds
and personalities are a source of surprise, innovation,
and learning.

Just as persons are unique, so too are social systems.
No two families are exactly the same, nor any two

businesses.

Each has its own history and character.

Further, following the definition above, social

systems may include groupings that vary greatly in size
and complexity.

They may be as small as a couple and as

large as the human species.

They may be relatively simple

in purpose and pattern (as in the case of thirty thousand
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people at a baseball game) or relatively
complex (as in
the interactions of people in a thirty
thousand person
company)
There is any number of ways to classify
this
.

diversity; for purposes of discussion,

I

will suggest

classifying social systems into the following ten
levels:
dyads, as in friendships or marriages; small
groups,

as in

discussion groups; crowds, as in a theater; informal
organizations, as in neighborhood groups; formal organizations, as in businesses or universities; movements, as in
the "Freeze"; poleis, as in the Greek city state or the

New England town meetings; governments, local, state, and
national; interna tipnal organizations, as in the United
Nations; socio-cultural systems, as in that of the Tasaday
or modern industrial society; and homo sapiens.

The immense diversity of size, complexity, purpose,

history, and character of social systems should make us

question whether any meaningful general model is possible,
even in principle.

There is the danger of confusing apples

and oranges, and baking orange pies.
But a biologist can safely compare apples and oranges
as fruit, and fruit and humans as living things.

Similarly,

it is at least conceivable that social systems as different

as a bridge club and a nation might share some salient

common features.

Without such salient common features, however, a model

of social systems in general will not be possible.

Further
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for our purposes, those features must be integrally related
to learning}

they must be important to the process of

"collective learning."

Finally, the features must be

genuinely held in common, with similar meanings for the
different social systems.
Such common features can be found in the models we
have already reviewed, although those models were not

intended as general models.

Although Deutsch was describing

governments, all social systems may be seen to process
information, make decisions, and dissociate and recombine
resources.

All social systems may be seen to share March

and Olsen* s description of organizations as systems linking

individual beliefs, individual actions, systemic actions,
and environmental response.

Surely all social systems have

"behavioral worlds" and something like "theories-in-use"
as described by Argyris and Schon.

And all social systems

are faced with occasions on which outcomes do not match

expectations, and all go through some process for either

hiding the error or bringing forth ideas about how to
correct it.

Finally, although Habermas was describing

society at large, social,

systems of all sizes share some

of the features he describes.

Among these are the presence

of technological and normative systems, and members capable

of cognitive development, communication, and discourse.
These features above are enough to suggest that

sufficient common ground exists to form the basis for a
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general model of collective
learning systems. Further,
common features are to be found
in other models not reviewed
here, and from other disciplines.
However, each feature is
expressed in the terms of its source
discipline; their

combination would be a hodge-podge.

Therefore,

I

will

suggest below five common features
phrased in simple terms
not encumbered with special usages
by different disciplines.
Any features held in common by all
social systems
are sure to be so commonplace as
almost to escape notice.
In fact, one of the benefits of
this excercise may be to
restate things that are so obvious they
are often ignored.
But while the presence of the commonalities
below should
be obvious, it may be less obvious that
they are
all the

products of prior learning and the producers of
new
learning.
Therefore, I have usually phrased the

common-

alities in terms of learning.

And because these terms

provide the materials for a subsequent sketch of collective
learning,

I

will delineate my assumptions about them.

The

first of the five commonalities is the presence of "environing realities."

All social systems exist in environing realities.
It should be obvious that social systems of all kinds

exist in the world and interact with it.

Whether a family

or the human species as a whole, a social system gets its

energy, food, and materials from its physical environment.
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And whether a business or a nation, a
social system interacts with other social systems.
Three sorts of environing realities can be
distinguished.
The first consists of physical realities,
both
inorganic and organic.
The second consists of social

realities, including those outside the social
system and
those inside.
I include a third sort of reality-

spiritual realities
existence..

— widely

felt to be a part of our

While these may be described by such different

terms as "God," "soul," "Atman," "ground-of-being,

"

or

"ultimate reality," they form an intense part of the

experience of most human cultures.

Each existing model tends to focus on a particular
aspect of reality.

For instance, most of Argyris and

Schon's attention is directed at internal social realities.
But a general model, if it is to be complete, should account
for interactions with all the environing realities, since

each has important influence on the life of a social system.

Even the spiritual realities, even if thought of as illusion
by a modeler, deserve inclusion because beliefs about

spiritual realities do direct actions of members of many
social systems.

"Environing realities" suggests my meaning better than

"environments."

"Environments" as commonly used calls forth

the notion of physical and biological settings;

I

wish to

call forth the notion of all realities on which a social
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system depends.

Farther, "environment" often overdraws

the "boundary between a social system and its world;

I

wish

instead to picture a flux of interacting, overlapping
realities.
These environing realities are "learnable."

Members

of social systems may study their nature and learn ways
of dealing with them.

Insofar as the survival, well-

being, and satisfaction of a social system depend on its

environing realities, it must be able to learn about them.
Because environing realities meet real needs of real people,
changes- in those realities are important motivators for

learning.

Each class of environing reality requires slightly

different kinds of learning to account for the differing
levels of predictability and purposiveness in their
phenomena.

Biologists use different approaches from

physicists, social scientists from biologists, and mystics

from social scientists.

Different social systems may

vary in their skill in learning about each of the kinds of
reality.

A complete model of collective learning should

give an account of the full range of realities learned
by different social systems.

Environing realities are not discreet entities
separate from learners; in many ways they are the products
of collective learning.

At a physical level, for instance,

the air in Los Angeles in i960 was the product of the

188

collectively learned automobile culture;
the air in 1983
is the product of collective
efforts to reduce pollution.
At a more conceptual level, the
very view of

"reality" is

to a considerable extent a social
construction (Berger and

Luckman 1967).

For example, Turnbull has described
how the

"same" physical forest is viewed as two
very different

realities by two cultures in Zaire
(1965).

The hunter-

gathering Mbuti pygmies view the forest as friendly,
animate, conscious--almost a mother or father.

A group of

villages, however, view the same forest as an enemy,

literally to be beaten back, a source of evil.

Environing

realities, this is to say, are "learned"; they are the

literal and conceptual products of social systems'
collective learning.

A complete model of collective learning should reflect
this interactive quality, by which environing realities are

both products of collective learning and propellors of it.

All social systems are composed of learners
No one will dispute the second commonality- -that all

social systems, by definition, are composed of individual
humans.

And few will dispute that virtually all humans

learn; even the most severely "retarded" humans learn some

things.

The capacity for learning is one of the hallmarks

of our species.
ing,

I

Since my concern is with collective learn-

will henceforth refer to members of social systems
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as learners.

Any model which fails to include a description
of
the learner (as sometimes happens in the
cybernetic

models),

simply is not representing the reality of social
learning
systems.
Further, an eventual general model of collective

learning will need to state and justify its assumptions
about the nature of learners.

These assumptions will

affect what the model pays attention to and what it
suggests as strategies for improvement of collective
learning.

There is a great number of questions about the

learner that any model must address; we will mention only
the most salient ones here.

What do learners learn?

A model which thinks of

learning as a change in behavior will be very different
from a model which thinks of learning as involving a change
in cognitions.

Argyris and Schon would not have found what

they did if they had confined themselves to behavior; by

assuming that theories-in-use are inferrable, they pursued

research revealing much about people's process of reasoning
I

favor the view that learning involves changes in

cognitions.

This is not to say learning does not lead

to changes in behavior;

it obviously does.

But

changes as mediated by internal mental activity.

I

view such
This

view is supported by the fact that identical stimuli
may lead to less than identical responses, that children
can generate an infinite number of never-experienced
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sentences, and that organisms modify responses to
achieve
goals.
In all these instances, the behaviors seem to
have

been more than a mere response to stimuli; they seem to
involve mental mediation. (Wallace 1970).
Various names have been given to mental constructs

including

schemata" (Piaget 1969)1 "personal constructs"

(Kelly 1955 )

.

"scripts" (Shank and Abelson 1977), and

"theories of action" (Argyris and Schon 1974).

However,

each of these has its own meaning and sphere of concern.

Since

I

wish to include learnings of all kinds, and to

prepare the way for a description of collective learning,
I

will simply refer to all such cognitions as "lessons"

and the totality of those cognitions as an "individual's

lesson set."

These are a "set" in four senses--as a group,

as an organization, as a formation of habits, and as a

preparer and conditioner of further learning.

The lessons

in the set are a vast network of interrelated cognitions
able to be configured in countless ways for countless

purposes.

They overlap and are difficult to classify.

For

discussion, they may be seen to include at least the following overlapping sorts of learnings;
1.

Lessons about environing realities

,

theoretical and

factual knowledge about physical, social, and spiritual

realities
2.

Lessons about how to behave

,

practical social habits
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3.

telling what to do when, with whom,
where, and how
Lessons about technique, skills, and
technologies
(other than social); instrumental,
how-to knowledge
Lessons about language about how to
communicate
,

di spositional lessons

feelings associated with things,

,

attitudes, including the sensing of what
is problematic
or promising
6.

Lessons about pu rposes

,

why-to knowledge, ethics,

norms, and values, needs, interests, and
goals
7.

Lessons about learning

,

how to find and solve problems,

and how to teach others
I

lessons.

have not included instinctive lessons or genetic

Over the long course of societal evolution, such

learnings" may or may not play an important part.

A com-

plete model should state its position on such factors, for
instance on the effects of the "coevolution" of genes and
culture suggested by Lumsden and Wilson (1981).

My own

inclination is to accept that coevolution is a factor over
periods of tens of generations, but that collective learning
is of far greater importance over shorter periods, and now
is on the verge of controlling genetic change itself.

In this network of lessons, some are a more pervasive

part of an individual's lesson set than others, and harder
to "unlearn."

Thus, Argyris and Schon have described how

much more threatening it is for someone to question her
central goals than it is to question instrumental tactical
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lessons.
Hoy/_do le arners learn ?

Any general model must

describe how people learn if it is to do justice to the

wellspring of collective learning.

Although no universally

.

accepted theory of learning exists, the choice of learning
theory is likely to affect the nature of the model.

One

based on Skinner's theory would stress schedules of
reinforcement; one based on Piaget would pay attention to

assimilation and accommodation.

An eventual model should

offer a grounded theory that integrates understandings from
such fields as individual psychology, social psychology,
and cognitive anthropology.

For now,

I

will draw on elem-

ents from Dewey, Piaget, Argyris and Schon, Deutsch,

Barnett, Fisher, Skinner, and others in a highly provisional

sketch intended only to suggest what sorts of elements

might be considered in an eventual model.
I

In particular,

wish to highlight the issue about the ways an individual’s

learning is affected by her interaction with others.

A

paper diagram, however, cannot do justice to the fluid
quality of mental activity, in which many things are

happening at once.

A computer model might come closer.

Further, an adequate model must reflect the fact that learners learn in different ways, using reason, intuition,

sensation, feeling, imitation, and judgment.
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H oy/ -tree is tho _ learner ?

Any model must make assump-

tions about the degree to which a learner's
actions are
determined or free, predictable or novel. The
deterministic
assumptions of behaviorists for example, are likely
to lead,

to a view of collective learning that is
quite mechanical,

structured, and reactive.

promise of prediction.

Such a model could hold out the

On the other hand, the assumption

that learners have some degree of freedom is likely to lead
to a more existential model,

less concerned with prediction

than action.
While
freedom,

I

I

cannot review here the ancient debate about

will admit my preference for the view that all

learners have the capacity for choice, freedom, and unpredictability.

The extent to v/hich that capacity is exercised

may be to some extent ’’determined" by socio-cultural influences.

Indeed, one of the "variables determining" the

effectiveness of collective learning may be the degree of

freedom and novelty encouraged in learners by their social
systems.

At any rate, in my vi ew, the term "learning"

cannot have its full meaning without such freedomj without
it learning is confined to "adaptation."

How social is the learner ?

There can be varying

assumptions about the degree to which a learner is a separate, autonomous monad living in its o wn world and the degree
to v/hich the learner is a social creature, influenced by

others and influencing them.

A model built on an atomistic
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view of learners is likely to resemble a billiard
table with
balls knocking against each other. A model based
on a more

fluid social view might more resemble a weather
system,
whose currents move and blend with each other.
I

prefer the more fluid view.

No one lives alone

feral children are rare and do not survive without human

intercourse.

without social intercourse one remains what

the Greeks called an "idiot," a purely private person.

There is a large body of current thinking to support
the view that learners are both products of social inter-

course and producers of it.

George Herbert

I,

lead has argued

persuasively that minds arise through social intercourse
(1962).

In his view, thinking is a form of internalized

conversation

(p.

3 75 )

«

We become self-conscious

intelligence through the reflexive action of language,

pointing out meanings to one another.
emerges the field of mind" (p. 133 )*

"Out of language

"Mind can never find

expression, and can never come into existence at all,

except in terms of a social environment"

(p.

223).

Mead, and later Erikson (1968) have argued that the

growth of one's sense of self depends on social interchange
and mutual mirroring.

Piaget recognized the importance of the social matrix
for the development of a child's reasoning

(

1969 ).

Thus,

"decentration" is only possible through the child's

experience of others in social interactions.

Lawrence
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Kohlberg has noted that the
development of a person’s
moral
reasoning is prodded by exposure

to someone else's
reasoning

at a slightly higher
level (1966).

Many anthropologists have
shown the extent to which
a learner's mode of thinking
is a function of his
culture.
Jack Goody has argued that the
development of print and
literacy has allowed people in
modern societies
to think

differently from those in earlier
traditional societies
1977 ).
Writing permits lists, formulae,
and
(

tables; it

permits skeptical and "constructive
rumination" across time
and space. Luria observed illiterates
using concrete,

context-bound modes of solving problems,
while schooled
people used more abstract logical operations

(1976, 1979).

All these views support the perception of
the learner
as a social creature whose thoughts and
thinking are largely
a product of his interactions with others.
In this way a
learner is socialized to his culture.
The relationship is not one way, however.

social is to interact.
others.

Others influence me and

To be
I

influence

As Berger and Luckmann have argued, the result is

a dialectical process in which man collectively
produces
a social world, which acts back on its producers,
who

internalize its order in the process of socialization, in
an unending cycle (1967).
In this social process, there are some parts of an

"individual's lesson set" which are relatively accessible
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to other people and some that are
not, as

figure 26

diagramed in

.

Figure 26

.

Individual lesson set.

This is not the same as Polanyi's distinction between

tacit and explicit knowledge (1962).

As he shov/s, know-

ledge that is tacit can be conveyed even if it cannot be
told, as happens when a master conveys nonverbalized skills
to an apprentice.

Here,

I

am concerned with the distinction

between what can be conveyed and what cannot.

The lessons

which are accessible provide the material with which
collective learning proceeds.
The boundaries between accessible and private are

gradual and flexible.

What is accessible to a friend may

not be to a stranger.

What was unconscious and private

before psychoanalysis may monopolize conversation afterward.
In one organization, there may be very little accessing of
one another's lessons;

in another, a great deal.
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Do_ learners differ?

To say that learners are

socialized to their cultures is not to say
they are all the
same.
Even genetically identical twins are exposed
to

diapering experiences, which form differing
individual
lesson sets. A model of collective learning
which ignores
these differences ignores the attribute by which
collective
learning is more than individual learning. Just as
two

people's experiences are certain to have differed, so will
their lessons.

This may prod the two to search for lessons

ch can accommodate the full scope of their experience.

Social interaction between unique individuals can be a goad

toward understandings broader and more universal than that
achievable by an individual learning alone.

Why do learners learn ?

A complete model should ac-

count for what motivates learners and toward what ends
they learn.

There is not space here to review the range

of thought on motivation, nor to support a view here.
as a first step,

I

But,

will at least state my assumptions as

I

now hold them.
Across a variety of explanatory systems, it seems to
me,

there is a common theme

— that

learners seek a more

satisfying harmonization of their lesson sets and their
worlds.

Dewey sees inquiry as "the directed or controlled

transformation of an indeterminate situation into a deter-

minately unified one"

(

1938

*

P*

17 )

•

Piaget describes

learners as in a continual process of "equilibration" to
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bring their schemata into balance with
reality.
assimilation of data and accommodation

Through

of schemata, the

schemata are enriched to make maintenance
of equilibrium
easier over a broader range of environmental
demands (1969).
Leon festinger's theory sees people as seeking
to reduce
dissonance between their cognitions
( 1957 ).
But learners
may not just try to reduce dissonance;
under favorable
conditions they may seek out questions (Arlin
In
1975).
Folanyi's terms they may have "heuristic urges,"
personal

commitment

with universal intent

(

1962 ).

But such

searches lor trutn may not be possible until more pressing

basic needs have been satisfied (Maslow 1954

,

1968).

And,

at a physiological level, Donald Hebb posits that organisms

seek an "optimal level of arousal"

(

1949 ).

At the level

of social organizations, March has suggested that members

"satisfice" rather than seek optimal solutions (1953).

Cangelosi and Dill have observed that the prime movers in

organizational learning are stresses--"performance stress,"

when performance does not meet goals, and "disjunctive
stress," or conflict between groups and individuals (1965).

In all these views, the learner may be seen as seeking
a more satisfactory harmonization

—a

reduction of dissonance,

and a fuller understanding of the world.

This may include

harmonization of bodily needs through learned behaviors,
harmonization in social relations,

in personality,
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harmonisation of spiritual impulses, and
harmonization of
lessons.
In all these cases, needs are
being

met through

actions mediated by mental activity.

Learning seeks to

alter the lesson set in a way that
better harmonizes the
lessons with each other and the learner
with her
world.

o ummary

learners.

.

All social systems are seen to have

Any general model must state its assumptions

about the learner.

Mine are that learners have lesson sets

with which they seek to harmonize the elements of
their
experience.

Learners are social; they and their lesson

sets are the products and producers of society.

They

exchange lessons, and that exchange enters into the process
of individual learning.

Each learner's experience and

lesson set are unique; by comparing them, learners are

prodded into expanding the range of their lessons beyond
the confines of their own experience.

All social systems have collective lesson sets

Every member of any social system brings with her an
individual lesson set of the kind represented earlier in
figure 26.

Some of her "accessible lessons" are shared with

others in the social system.

Further, members hold in com-

mon certain central lessons with which they order their
lives together as a social system.

These relationships,

for a dyadic social system, such as a married couple, are

represented schematically in figure 27.
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Learner
Figure

Learner

1

27

•

2

A dyadic social system.

The "co-ordering lesson set" includes all the shared,

learned understandings

,

habits, knowledge, and dispositions

with which members of a social system order their lives
together.

It includes the kinds of lessons enunciated in

the earlier description of the individual's lesson set.

These are summarized in figure

28

;

to them is added an

eighth sort of lesson, about modes of co-learning.

So

central are these modes of co-learning for a model of
collective learning that

I

will treat them separately

in the following discussion.

Environing
realities
Social behavior
Technology
Language
Dispositions
Purposes
Learning
Co-learning

Figure 28.

Co-ordering lesson set.

It is difficult to imagine any group of people

persisting as anything like a "social system" without at
least a minimal co-ordering lesson set.

A couple would

have difficulty surviving without at least some shared under

understandings, goals, values, interests, and agreed upon
rules of interaction.

A church would hardly be a church

without come shared beliefs.

A scientific community

could not function without common language, concerns, and
standards.

An industry requires a core technology.

nation rests on laws.

A
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The lessons in the co-ordering
lesson set are vital
to a social system and are held by
virtually all members
of the social -system.
But there is a second vast set of

lessons held by only some members but
nonetheless accessible to others when needed.
I call this the "aggregate
accessible lesson set." It is that portion of
the lessons,
shown above in figure 26, which include all
accessible
lessons in all members' individual lesson sets.

It does

not include the widely held co-ordering lesson set, nor

private lessons.

All social systems have such an aggregate accessible

lesson set.

A husband and wife, for example, are constantly

accessing each other's lessons

— about

keys, her second cousin's name.

where he left the car

A business could hardly

run without members being able to access each other's

specialized knowledge--a salesman's experience with a
customer, a lawyer's about new tax

lav/s.

The life of a

society is made up of individuals sharing lessons, large
and small.

One of the functions of any social system is

to pool lessons to accomplish purposes not possible in

isolation.

The ability of members to call on one another's

separate lessons may be one of the hallmarks of a healthy
social system.
There is no sharp demarcation between the aggregate

accessible lesson set and the co-ordering lesson set.

Lessons may vary in the percentage of members holding them,
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their governing force, and in their
importance for the
life of the social system.
Thus the belief that all citizens should -have the right to vote is
probably held by
virtually all Americans, has the force of law,
and
is

clearly part of the' American co-ordering lesson
set.
I.ly
belief that governments should foster societal
learning
is accessible to others but not part of
the American co-

ordering lesson set.
easily classified.

In between there are lessons not so

Belief that liquor should not be sold

was for a time part of American law, although held by only
a portion of the population.
I

will consider a lesson to be a part of the co-

ordering set to the extent that it is held by all member
learners, governs their interactions, and is central in

ordering their lives together as a social system.

To the

extent that a lesson does not meet these criteria, it is

part of the aggregate accessible lesson set.
Because the demarcation between the co-ordering set
and the aggregate set is gradual does not eliminate its
usefulness, anymore than the gradient between "green" and
"blue" reduces the usefulness of those terms.
A helpful tool for describing such gradients is the

"fuzzy set theory" developed by Lotfi iadeh
The anthropologist Willett Kempton

(

1973 )

to quantify the gradient of responses,

(

1972

,

1976 ).

used this theory

classifying mugs,

cups, and drinking vessels as subsets of one another.

This
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technique might be usefully applied by an eventual
model
of collective learning to distinguish members
of
the

aggregate and co-ordering sets.
I

will use the term "collective lesson set" to refer

to the composite of all lessons contained in the
aggregate

accessible set and the co-ordering set.

It does not contain

those lessons which remain private to individuals.
It is important to recognize the extent to which

lessons in the collective lesson set are "meta-individual"
as well as individual realities.

real for me; what

What

I

have learned is

learn and is accessed by another is

I

real for both of us.

What the two of us have learned in

order to co-order our relationship is real for us as

individuals and real between us as a system of individuals.
That the collective lesson set is a "meta-individual"

reality can be seen by considering the origins and destinations of lessons.

They do not pop up from nothing; they

emerge from an endless mixing of prior lessons among

millions of minds.

Newton said that if he saw farther it

was because he stood on the shoulders of giants.

The fact

that he and Leibnitz both independently invented calculus
at about the same time suggests that the collective lesson

set of the time was finally ready for that invention, only

waiting for individual inventors to recognize the emergent
possibility.

Kroeber (1917) has pointed to the frequency

of simultaneous invention as support for the
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supraindividual quality of culture.)

what

This is to say that

individual learns is "more-than-individual"
insofar
as it has origins in the lessons
of other individuals.
an,

Not only the origins hut the
destination of some
lessons suggest a more-than-individual
quality. When one
member of a social system may access
the lesson of another
member, the lesson has in a way become
common property.
It is there for public use.

What Newton learned has been

used by countless learners since; the lessons
outlived the
original learner.
Some lessons in the aggregate accessible set
become
so central to the life of a social system that
they become

part of the co-ordering set, but they seldom arrive there
without some alteration.

The originator's lesson is

usually modified by others, and recombined with other lessons in new configurations.

Locke's philosophy did not

make its way into the American co-ordering lesson set
unchanged.

Adams and Jefferson, supreme court justices,

and others have reworked his ideas, and those of others,

with less concern for the originators than for the learning
tasks at hand.

The constitution is a meta-individual

creation.
The constitution, once created, became a reality with

more-than-individual force.

It set the rules which

individuals were to follow.

To it, millions of young

Americans have been socialized, with little choice.
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It channels our actions
and learning, even as we
go about
its reinterpretation.
The meta-individual quality
of the collective lesson
set will he important in my
discussion later about whether

collective learning is distinguished
from individual
learning.
Culture" as used by some cultural
anthropologists
refers to much the same sort of
shared learned things as
I include under the
term "co-ordering lesson set."
Unfortunately, not all anthropologists use
the term in
the

same way; hundreds of definitions
exist, not all of which
put the learned quality at the center.
Further, "culture"
is now used by organizational theorists
and executives
to

refer to organizational character.

means opera.

If

I

And "culture" to many

were to use "culture" instead of co-

ordering lesson set,

I

would be misunderstood by many.

would also break the continuity of my usage of
"lesson
sets" to describe individual, aggregate, and co-ordering
I

levels of activity.

Finally,

I

would lose the emphasis on

^^6 learned quality of elements in collective learning.

Like the first two commonalities

learners

— environing

realities

the collective lesson set is both a product

of learning and producer of it.

Such an important part

of the ordering and enriching of a social system's life

should be represented in any eventual model.
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All social systems have learning fields
The fourth feature shared by all social systems is

that they have what
I

I

will call "learning fields."

By this

mean that at a given time a social system has a range of

dissonances to resolve and a range of opportunities for
exploration.

It has potential learnings waiting to be

learned.
I

use the term "field" in two senses

as a charge.

— as

a space and

As a space, a learning field is the range

within which a social system may learn and beyond which
it cannot.

Homo sapiens can now learn about quasars, but

could not do so until the collective lesson set included
radio telescopes.

The learning field has enlarged.

As a charge, the learning field contains tensions

and potentialities which energize learning.
may come from a variety of sources.

These charges

The collective lesson

set may be at odds with environing realities, by inaccurate
or incomplete understanding of it.

That may be the case

for the United States lesson set as it tries to cope with

changing realities in Central America.

Or a charge may be

engendered by conflicts between elements of the co-ordering

lesson set, as in the conflict between the United States
habit of hegemony and its belief in self-determination of
peoples.

But charges need not just be "negative," they

may be "positive" as when the scientists Darwin and Wallace
sensed within the collective lesson set the opportunity for
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a new theory of evolution.

These charges are sensed by individual learners as

agents of their social systems.

But a social system may

have a myriad of small charges, opportunities for learning.
So it selects only some of them for collective attention

according to the strength of the charge and the habits of
the system.

Thus, only a few issues achieve the status

of what Schon called "ideas in good currency."

Each social system varies in the range of its field
and the configuration of its charges, but all systems have
some such learning field.

It is in the nature of any social

system that it is established to solve a certain class of
problems.

Each pays attention to a certain sort of issues

and opportunities.

A hospital responds to epidemics and

invents solutions.

A business is sensitive to problems

with its profits and to opportunities in its markets.

An eventual model should somehow represent how a
social system senses and responds to demands and opportu-

nities for learning.

All social systems have modes of co-learning
The fifth feature common to all social systems is

properly a part of the co-ordering lesson set.

It is the

modes by which members of a social system share what they
have learned and change what they share.

It is the means
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by which learners access
the aggregate accessible
lesson
set and reconfigure the
co-ordering lesson set into
more
satisfying order. I call this
"co-learning” because it
involves the joint sharing of
learnings and the
joint

learning of new co-ordering lessons.
ordering lesson set's language,

It draws on the co

tools, and social rules,

which form filters limiting exchange
between learners.
It can be represented as shown
in figure
29.

Figure 29.

Modes of co-learning.

Any social system has some modes of co-learning.
Members of any system are continually communicating with
each other, exchanging what they have learned.

However,
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the mode for such communication
might vary.

In

0 ne society
it may be oral, in another,
oral, written, and electronic.
In one business the exchange of
ideas may be frequent,
candid, and informal in another
it may be infrequent,
[

defensive, and formal.
All social systems also occasionally
modify their coordering lesson set, however slowly.
Because the environing
realities which sustain social systems
change, so too must
members change their co-ordering lesson set's
methods
of

dealing with those realities.

And because members live

and think, they are likely to see new possibilities
which

alter the co-ordering set.
societies change.

Even the most traditional

If they do not, they are not likely to

survive changing circumstances.

And in the modern world

of rapid change, heavy demands are put on members of social

systems to anticipate and respond to such change.

It

requires rapid co-learning.

Co-learning is composed of many functions.

The

method or style of fulfilling each of those functions may
be seen as a sub-mode of a social system's overall mode

of co-learning.

in figure 30

,

A sample list of such sub-modes is shown

drawing on the insights of the authors

reviewed earlier.

A moment's reflection should confirm

that each of those functions is met in some way by all

social systems.

Deficiencies in meeting them result in
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Functions

Examples of

Storing lessons

Oral/literate/electronic

Accessing lessons

Random/intenti onal

Framing lessons

Testable/ untestable

Channeling lessons

Single channel/multichannel

Distributing lessons

Elitist/populist

Concerting lessons

Hierarchical/participatory

Sensing learning
charges

Real-time and gradual/
crisis- oriented

Assigning specialized
learning

Haphazard/planned retraining

Dissociating and
recombining lessons

Informal-individual/
structured- organizational

Testing lessons

Impressionistic/controlled/
existential-experimental

Facing conflicts over
alternative lessons

Denial/airing

Resolving conflict

Win-1 ose/win- win

Instituting lessons

Informal custom/formal law

Socializing learners

P lanne d/i nf o rmal

Learning about
collective learning

Haphazard/intentional

Figure 30.

vajryinir morinr,

Constituent modes, of co-learning.
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the kinds of pathologies suggested
by Deutsch.

All these

component modes of co-learning may also he
seen on reflection to he the products of prior collective
learning.

T oward a typology

One task for an eventual model

.

to offer a typology hy which the varieties
of

approaches to collective learning in different social
systems may he classified.

This would be useful for

research! and for a practical assessment of real social
systems.

Paul Shrivastava (1983) has offered such a

typology for organizational learning systems based on two
dimensions:

1)

the extent to which the learning systems

are evolutionary or designed and

2)

the extent to which

they are individually oriented or organizationally
oriented.

An eventual general model of collective learning

might pursue that path hy developing a multi-dimensional
typology based on the variation for each of the sub-modes
listed in figure 3a

These commonalities can be a basis
for a general model
To review, we began with the question whether the

diversity of social systems share enough commonalities to
permit a general model.

I

have argued that all social

systems share enough commonalities to permit a general
model.

I

have argued that all social systems have

environing realities, learners, collective lesson sets,
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learning fields, and modes of co-learning.

Each of these

is both the product of prior learning by
the social system

and the producer of further learning.

As such, they provide

grounds for answering that a general model might be
possible
at least in principle.

,

The development of a general model is still a long

way off, however, with many issues yet to be resolved.

resolution of those issues will,

I

The

hope be easier with the

terms and clarifications we have made thus far.

Defining Collective Learning

Any general model will need to clarify the sense in
which it is using the term "collective learning," and why
the term is appropriate.

We have already gained a sense of the diversity of

possible responses to this issue in the models we have reviewed.

Although each uses the term in a variety of ways,

we may summarize them as follows.

For March and Olsen,

the term refers to organizational adaptation to the environ-

ment.

For Argyris and Schon it is the process by which

individuals detect and correct error in the organizational
theory-in-use.

For Deutsch it is a dissociation and recom-

bination of the system's structures, channels, and resources
to meet goals, change them, preserve the system, or preserve

some higher values.

For Habermas, it is the incorporation
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societal institutions of more developed
modes of reason-

ing.

Attempts have been made to categorize
the manifold
ways in which the term is used.
Argyris and Schon categorize theories of organizational
learning according to whether
the organization is primarily viewed
as a group, an agent,
a structure, a system, a culture,
or as a political entity
(1978, pp. 319-331).

Shrivastava discerns four uses of

"organizational learning":

1)

as adaptation to the environ-

ment by adjustment of organizational rules,
in shared assumptions and theories,

3

)

2)

as changes

as development of

knowledge about action-outcome relations, and

4)

as the

institutionalization of experience for better decisionmaking.

Another way to categorize models and their usage
would be to see how they answer the following questions:
1.

What is the intent of the model?

2.

What sort of thing is a social system that it may

engender collective learning?
3.

What does collective learning change?

4.

How is collective learning distinguishable from individual learning.

5.

Who or what evokes that change?

6.

By what process?

7.

When is a given case of the process said to be complete?

8.

By what criteria?
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9.

10.

What energizes it, and toward what ends does it
strive?
In what sense is this really learning, or is it merely
a metaphor.
Obviously, different models would answer the questions

differently.

But an eventual general model will need to

address these questions in a way that is compelling for a

variety of perspectives.

As one step in that direction,

I

will offer my own current provisional responses to each in
turn.

What is the intent of the model?
While

I

have barely begun to describe collective

learning, much less explain or predict it,

I

am clear about

my own goals for an eventual model: that it aid people in
social systems from the smallest to the largest to learn

how to learn together to address the complex and lethal
problems we confront.

What sort of thing is a social system that
it may engender learning?
If a social system were unpeopled, "it" would not
learn.

Nor could a system of lobotomized and comatose

bodies learn.
minds.

A learning system requires the action of

Even computerized "artificial intelligence" systems

have the seeds of mind planted in them in the form of
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programs conceived by human minds in order
to perform the
initial intelligent functions for the system.

Real social

systems are composed of real people who have
minds and who
learn.
It is they who perceive environments,
sense problems
and invent solutions. A social system, however,
is
not a

mere congery of learners

{

it is a system of learners who

organize their learning and actions in order to satisfy
needs not satisfiable in isolation.

They share a

co-ordering lesson set which frames their purposes and
interactions.

In particular, they have common modes of co-

learning by which they share each others accessible lessons,

broadening the range of understanding beyond that possible
alone.

Through the modes of co-learning they are able to

alloy their lessons into synergistic structures more powerful than their own.

And through the modes of co-learning

they are able to reflect on their co-ordering lesson set,

and to agree to more satisfying modifications.
A social system thus engenders its own form of

learning.

It provides the structures, incentives and

rewards by which individual learners turn their capacity
for learning toward collective learning tasks.

What does collective learning change?

Collective learning changes the collective lesson set.

At one level, it may change the aggregate available lesson
set.

At another, it may change the co-ordering lesson set.
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Such change in the collective lesson
set is preceded
by changes in individual lesson sets.
These may become
part of the aggregate accessible set, and
may eventually
work themselves into the co-ordering set.
At that point
they will be part of the socialization
of members.
By
definition, the lessons of the co-ordering
set influence
all members and are held by most of them.
Thus a change
in the collective lesson set is concommitant
with changes

in individual lesson sets.
Further, changes in the collective lesson set may

cause secondary changes.

They may cause changes in the

physical and social environments.

They will change the

learning field, discharging certain dissonances and creating others.

And as noted earlier, they may act back on

individual learners, socializing them to a new lesson set.
However, the primary focus of change in collective

learning is the collective lesson set.

How is collective learning distinguishable
from individual learning?
Individual learning changes the individual lesson set;

collective learning changes the raore-than-individual collective lesson set.

It is critical here to recall the discus-

sion earlier about the "meta-individual" qualities of the
collective lesson set.

There

I

argued that when a lesson

becomes part of the aggregate accessible set it takes
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on qualities different from it as an
individual’s learning.
It becomes public property.
It takes on a certain dynamic
of its own.
It may outlive the original learner.
It gets
mixed, analyzed, and reconfigured with other
lessons by

countless other learners.

And if it becomes part of the

co-ordering lesson set, it takes on even stronger metaindividual qualities.
on member learners.

little choice.

It has the force of law or custom

New members are socialized to it, with

It prods, channels, and limits the direction

of further learning.

However, this distinction between the individual and

meta-individual is a matter of some dispute among anthropologists.

Alfred Kroeber argued (first in 1917) that

"culture is superorganic and superindividual in that,

although carried, participated in, and produced by organic
individuals, it is acquired; and it is acquired by learning"
(19^8, p. 259)

•

In this view culture is transmitted, it

persists beyond and above individuals and their societies,
and largely determines their lives.

It is a

cumulative

and joint product "that is enormously bigger than any

individual man" (p.

2 55)

•

It is like a coral reef formed

over thousands of years by trillions of polyps secreting

calcium carbonate, whose lattice is the current home of

living polyps.
Homer Barnett had a different view:
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cultural facts are never anything else but ideas.
In dealing with culture we are inevitably dealing
with multi -individual ideas, that is, with ideas shared
by more than one person. But this sharing does not
take the ideas into a new plane.
It does not make them
supraindividual with an autonomy of their own. They
are no different from any other ideas.
They have the
same principles of thinking as idiosyncratic ideas.
They do not act with forces and features of their own,
and assuredly they do not behave like wind and stone.
(1953, p. 15)
.

•

.

..

•

•

.

The difference between Barnett and Kroeber persists

among anthropologists according to Roger Keesing in a

review of theories of culture (1974)*
But we are still left between the horns of a conceptual dilemma* on the one hand, of cognitive reductionism that misses the magic of shared symbols and the
only partial overlap between the psychological world of
the individual and the code of cultural meanings and
conventions; and on the other, of a spuriously autonomous and spuriously uniform world of cultural symbols
freed from the constraints of the mind and brain by
which cultures are created and learned and through
which they are realized,. *(p. 57)
This is a slippery issue not easy to resolve.

What

is clear is that if Barnett is entirely right, then there
is no important or valid distinction to be made between

individual and collective learning.

In this view, "col-

lective learning" would be sloppy verbal shorthand for what
is in reality learning occurring only in individual minds.
I

will try to address this issue by considering

the following two questions.

in the collective lesson set?

Who or what evokes a change

By what process?
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Who or what evokes a change in the
collective lesson set?

Perhaps some of the difficulty we have just discussed
can be resolved by examining the full nature of the entity

through which collective learning occurs, and the nature of
the process.

Consider someone sitting under an apple tree, eating
an apple.

If she asked, "What produced this apple?" she

might answer, "The tree."
ask,

But, after a bite, she might

"What produced the tree?" and answer, "An apple's

seed, growing in the soil under the rain and the sun,"

savoring the whole.
Similarly,

I

sense that we need to overcome partial

views and try to see the subject whole.

If we treat indiv-

idual learners as if they are not in intimate interaction

with their social systems, then we miss part of their life.
If we treat social systems as if they are not composed of

quirky learners, then we miss part of their life.
Barnett is only partly right.

He is right that ideas

reside in minds, but he forgets the social origins of minds.

Following George Herbert Mead,

I

view mind as arising from

intercourse.
the exchange of ideas in social, lingual
the
Lessons do not simply "reside" in minds; they build

residence.

Building does not happen in isolation; it

requires at least some social discourse.

Of course, a

her residence.
learner does spend time alone rearranging
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But many of the materials came
from town.
The very process of individual
learning usually

involves the influence of others and
their ideas, as I
tried to suggest above in figure
25.
A learner's process
has social dimensions.
So, yes,

system.

it is learners who learn for a social

It is they who perceive environing realities,

sense changes in the learning field, examine the
collective

lesson set and devise changes to it.
so as isolates.

But they do not do

They do so as social learners whose minds

and learnings are formed in social interchange.

The apple

grows on the tree.
But this is still only part of the answer to the

question.

We need to acknowledge the tree.

A social sys-

tem is not just an agglomeration of individuals; they are
joined in a more-than-individual organization to accomplish

purposes not attainable in isolation.

Their activity is

prodded and channeled by the co-ordering lesson set.

Their

power arises from their ability to access each other's
lessons via the modes of co-learning.

And these modes

format discussion, screening, and decision, leading to
changes in the collective lesson set.

These changes are

the product of more-than-individual things

— the

modes and

dynamics of the social system as a whole.
A social system does not exist in a vacuum, however,
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anymore than a tree exists without soil and air.

Changes

in environing realities may prompt learners to change

their collective lesson set.

Lessons learned from other

social systems may stimulate a change.
In short, the who or what which brings change to a

collective lesson set is a social whole.

It is a social

system composed of socialized and socializing learners,
operating under a more-than-individual co-ordering lesson
set, and responsive to the influence of data from environ-

ing realities and lessons from other social systems.

By what process is the collective
lesson set changed?
The dialectic .

The essential process required for

collective learning to proceed is a dialectic between

individual learners and their meta-individual collective

lesson set.
Without learners to reflect on the collective lesson
set,

collective learning would not be possible.

They sense

whether the lesson set satisfies, whether it is in harmony
with realities and with itself.
and recombining of lessons.

They do the dissociating

Together they decide on new

conf iguration of the collective lesson set.

But they are products of their social systems'
collective lesson sets.

They cannot learn without them.

Thus, there is a continual back and forth interplay.
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Individual learners and
meta-individual lesson sets are
products and producers of each
other.
We have seen many
examples of this in our prior
discussion and I need not
elaborate further here. What is
important is to recognize
that this dialectic is a
necessary part of collective
learning.
This dialectial view, in
conjunction with the wholistic view just discussed, may
provide a degree of resolution
to the dilemma presented by
Barnett’s position.

This view

acknowledges both the reality of individual
learning and
its influence, and the reality of
more-than-individual

for-

ces, dynamics, and structures.

The flow.

In this dialectic, the influence of

society on the individual may often seem much more
direct
and powerful than the influence of individuals
on

society.

The path can be a long one from the origination
of a lesson

by an individual to its incorporation in some form in
the

co-ordering lesson set.

Accurately describing the nature of that path and
process will be one of the major tasks for any eventual
model.

I

do not have the empirical material on which to

ground such a model.

However, it is possible to glean

from existing literature suggestions about what some of the

elements of an eventual general model of the process might
be.

In particular, the model of "public learning" offered

by Schon, the models of organizational learning offered by
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Argyris and Schon, and March and Olsen, the
model of
"revitalization movements" offered by Wallace

(1956), and

the model of "knowledge diffusion" offered by
Rogers and

Shoemaker (1971) are all grounded in extensive empirical
research.

From these

I

will draw elements for the follow-

ing provisional sketches of aspects of the process of

collective learning.

The sketches are offered to highlight

issues and possibilities.
The most basic outlines of the flow are clear, and

are summarized in figure 31»

A socialized and socializing

learner learns something new.

She does so in something

like the process shown earlier in figure

25

,

that is,

interaction with others and her environing realities.

Individual
Learning

Aggregate
Learning

^Individual lesson
1

I

>

added to
aggregate
accessible
lesson set

Co-order
Learning
made part of
>co-ordering
lessen set
,

1

»

•

1

*

'i'
!

4

Figure 31.

4

'

Overall flow of collective learning.
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If what she has learned is not private,
she may

convey it to others; it may become part
of her social
system’s aggregate accessible lesson set.
Her mode of

communicating with others about the lesson is
conditioned
by the social system's modes of accessing, storing,

framing,

channeling and distributing lessons.

If the lesson arises

primarily out of interchange with environing realities, it
adds, however slightly, to the depth and range of under-

standing of reality possible for the social system as a
whole.

Insofar as the lesson is unique, it is a goad to

a broader, more universal understanding.

If the lesson is

primarily about the collective lesson set, it is a prod to
self-understanding and integration for the social system.

Any new lesson adds to the possibilities for dissociation
and recombination and reconfiguration of the collective

lesson set.
learning.

And it enlarges the resources for individual
In all these ways, the addition of a lesson to

the aggregate accessible set is important for the social

system and its members.
"

aggregate learning

I

will call this addition

.

The aggregate accessible set may also be diminished.

For instance, members of an organization may be laid off,
die, or grow fearful and closed.
I

Records may be destroyed.

will call this "aggregate lesson loss."

When a lesson becomes part of the aggregate accessible
set, it may in certain circumstances become material for a
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reconfiguration of the co-ordering lesson set.

I

will call

such a change "co-ordering learning " to contrast it with

"aggregate learning."

Both aggregate learning and co-ordering learning are
the products of a collective process, but in varying

degrees.

Aggregate learning is a collective product in at

least two ways.

First, as

I

have argued earlier, a lesson

offered by an individual is not solely his own creation.
He could only use it by calling on the socially created

collective lesson set of the social system and of the culture at large.

Second, it can only be part of the aggreg-

ate accessible set if he is able to convey it to others.

But such conveyance depends on collectively created

language and collectively created modes of communication.

Aggregate learning is both an individual and collective
achievement.

Co-ordering learning is a collective product in much
more intense ways.

Like aggregate learning, it builds on

the prior collective lesson set and depends on collective

language and modes of communication.

ordering lesson set.

But it alters the co-

That affects all members of the social

system, not just a few.

And it may affect their fundamental

ways of understanding the world and ordering their relations.
As such, co-ordering learning is a much more wide-

spread and conflictual process than aggregate learning.
This is not just because some members and subgroups have
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interests in the maintenance of the status quo, which
is

usually true.

And it is not just because the re-ordering

may call for individuals to unlearn culture-wide habits

acquired from birth, though this too may be true.

It is

also because of the importance of order itself.

Without order humans feel what Berger and Luckmann
(1967) call "anomic terror."

During periods of chaos,

people in collectivities rush to "mobilize a system of

beliefs to reestablish social order"
This is consistent with the view

I

(

Smelser 1963 )

expressed earlier that

the central impulse for a learner is to establish a more

satisfying harmonization of his lesson set and his world.

Learners seek order.
But this presents a conflict for learners is a social
system.
set.

A major source of order is the co-ordering lesson

To question it is to threaten disorder.

But without

such questioning and disordering, it is not possible to re-

order a more satisfying lesson set.

Learners' needs for

order can be both a prod and barrier to co-ordering learning.

The method of dealing with that paradox is one of the

central determinants of the character of a given social

system's colllective learning.

It varies with the quality

of the modes of co-learning listed earlier, especially with
the modes of facing and resolving conflict.

A better under-

standing of these modes is likely to be one of the key
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contributors to an eventual general model.

Co-order learning can be seen to involve a
number
of phases, as sketched in figure 32.
The sketch relies
heavily on Wallace (1956) and Schon (1971). In each
of
these phases the tension is evident between keeping
the old

order and establishing a new one.
Co-order learning is preceded by individual learning

which leads to aggregate learning.

The lessons involved

are ones concerned with the co-ordering lesson set.

The

individuals who come up with important new ordering ideas
are often under great stress (Wallace 1956).

They may be

so intimately familiar with the old order that they are

painfully aware of its limits for satisfying the need for
order, as happens with scientists in paradigm crises

(Kuhn 1972).
The new lesson is communicated and gains acceptance

with a subgroup of the social system.

The members of the

subgroup are ones for whom the benefits of the new order

outweigh the risks of abandoning the old.

This may be

because they are young, alienated, or cosmopolitan.

By

being a group, they provide each other with the needed
sense of social order.

But the group seldom accepts a new lesson as is.
As a group they reconfigure the lesson, recombine it with
others, and adapt it for broader consumption, cohering and

extending their social order.

Function
Individual learner
learns new lesson
about co-ordering
It is added to the
aggregate accessible
lesson set

Sub group adopts
Sub group reconfigures

System wide crisis
or demand
Conflict between
sub groups

Conflict resolution
by force or discourse
Trial incorporation
into co-ordering
lesson set

Regularization and
socialization
TIME

Figure 32.

}

Phases in co-ordering learning.
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The innovation may remain only a
subgroup's unless
a crisis or demand arises which
forces most members of the
social system to question elements
of the existing
co-

ordering lesson set.

This may be of the same sort sensed

earlier by the innovators and subgroup.
The crisis engenders intergroup conflict.

Some

groups hold fast to the old order, others zealously
advance
their own. All are responding to the same threat
to order.

The stakes are high, and so is the level of conflict.

A

social system’s success in dealing with this phase in a

way that leads to a more satisfying order depends on its

modes of facing and resolving conflict.

deny conflict; others may air it.

Some modes may

Some modes may resolve

the conflict through power struggles; others may seek

creative blend solutions that dissociate superficially

conflicting goals from shared core goals and that reconfigure the lesson set to meet these core goals (Eiseman

1977).

After such conflict the co-ordering lesson set is

likely to be altered in at least some respects, possibly
incorporating substantial elements of the innovator subgroups' lessons.

A period of trial incorporation may

ensue, to confirm or disconfirm the worth of the new order.
If the configuration stands the test of time, it

becomes a regularized part of the co-ordering lesson set.
New members are socialized to it.

Order is reestablished.

Insofar as that order emerged from modes of co-learning
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which encourage learners to acknowledge
and test one
another's claims and to create commonly
satisfying
resolutions, to that extent the new order
is likely to have
a broader range of application and
satisfaction
than the

former.

The members will have achieved co-order
learning.

Modeling intersvstem influences

The pattern

.

I

describe is based on others' empirical studies and
proceeds
from the dynamic of a central human urge
more harmonizing order.

— the

urge for a

However, much work remains until

we have a general model demonstrated to hold for all kinds
of social systems.

If a general pattern were found, it might then be

nested in a way that could at once account for the learning
of a focal system, its subsystems, peer systems and supra-

systems.

In programming terms, the general routine could

be "called" when needed.

Further, the mode of linkage of

those routines would need to be specified.
I

At this point

can only note the need and possibility of such linkage.

A sketch of the interactions of collective learning by

different systems is given in figure 33* The intersecting
circles represent learners sharing a co-ordering lesson
set and aggregate accessible lessons.

The pattern shown

for the "focal" social system is a general pattern that
can be seen to be operating for the other social systems.

SUPRASYSTEM

FOCAL SYSTEM
SUBSYSTEM

t

SUBSYSTEM

M-

CD

Throughout the flow
and phases of collective learning shown
in figs. 31 and 32,
members of the focal
system accommodate
lessons from subsystems, peer systems,
and supra systems,
contributing to the
reconfiguration of the
aggregate set and the
co-ordering set.

Figure 33.

Inter-system lesson exchange
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When is a case of collective learning complete?
The process of collective learning is long and
complex.

Individuals and subgroups are learning lots of

things all the time, simultaneously.

Not all that activity

leads to a complete sequence of learning, but the partial

learnings engendered in individuals and subgroups may be

material for other learning.

Further, there is a gradient

of commitment and permanence in the collective adoption of

any new lesson.

For purposes of discussion,

I

will consider a case

of aggregate learning to be complete whenever something
one learner has learned is made accessible to others in the

social system.

This happens constantly.

Co-order learning is only complete when most members
of the social system are socialized to a new lesson.

By what criteria is learning to be assessed?

Any eventual model will need to be clear about what
sorts of changes are to be included as "learning."

Should

all changes to the collective lesson set be called "learning," or just some?

This is important because no model

can escape embodying a set of values, whether tacit or

explicit.
One approach would be to specify criteria which must

be met before a change in the collective lesson set may be
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called "learning.

Examples might be that a new
lesson
increase the range in time and
space of the environmental
realities accounted for in the
collective lesson set.
Another might be the increase in the
satisfaction and
happiness of members. Another might
be increased effectiveness in meeting goals. Another might
be whether the new
lesson set meets more universalizable
standards of
"

truth,

goodness and beauty.

Another might be the extent to which

the learning is the result of unconstrained
discourse and

reason.
The advantage of specifying criteria is that it makes

values explicit.

For instance, it would reject the adop-

^ion of Nazism by Germans as "learning" because it was evil,
A second approach would be to admit any change what-

soever to the collective lesson set as an example of learning and then apply standards of evaluation to the result.

In this approach the adoption of Nazism by Germany might be
seen as adaptation to defeat, and depression, but such
"learning" would then be evaluated as evil by obvious
criteria.

This approach need not imply any lesser commit-

ment to moral and intellectual values.

It simply disting-

uishes between the process of learning and the evaluation
of its results.
I

is.

am not sure what the best resolution of this issue

My current inclination is to accept any case
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Of a socialized change
in the co-ordering lesson
set as
a case of learning, and
then to apply criteria for

evaluation of it.

One reason is that, as

I

have argued,

all such changes result from
the cognitive activity of
learners, no matter how limited.
To that extent, the
result may be considered learning.
A second reason for
taking this approach may be clearer
after I have answered
the next question.

What energizes collective learning, and
what are its ends?
I

am assuming that all humans seek an optimal
level

of consonance.

of the world.

They seek order.
In the terms

I

They try to make sense

have used, learning seeks

a more satisfying harmonization of lesson
sets and

realities.

Collective learning is energized when charges
develop in the learning field.

These may be because of

changes in realities, differences of views between
learners, or dissonances noticed by a learner reflecting
on lesson sets.

In all these cases, learners seek to reestablish a

harmonized order.

But because the experience is social, it

prods learners to seek ordering concepts broader than they

might think of if not exposed to others' experience.
If the resolution of dissonance is denial or the
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imposition of a view by force, then the
level of learning
is very low.
But ray faith is that such resolutions
will
not last long.
They will be forced again and again to
confront opposing views, so long as there is
any
social

life.
I

am here confessing a faith that in the long sweep

of social history, progress toward broader and more
universal lesson sets is almost inevitable.

It is built into

who we are as people who compare experience and seek

harmonizing orders.
This faith is tested by short-term setbacks.

But

I

see most of those arising because the collective learning

process was constrained.

Nazis burned books, suppressed

dialogue, and confronted others' claims by slaughter.
It is for this reason that

I

sense an evaluation of

collective learning to be so vital to our predicament.
If we can reveal how to achieve the kind of inquiry based
on trust advocated by Argyris and Schon, and the uncon-

strained discourse advocated by Habermas, then perhaps we
will have fewer Hitlers.

Perhaps then we will advance more
Maybe then my faith

surely toward a more inclusive order.

would seem fact.

In what sense is this learning, and
in what degree metaphor?
It should be clear by now that

I

take the notion of
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collective learning seriously, as more than momentary
metaphor.

I

see it as learning because it arises from

learners and because it adjusts social wholes to realities.
I

see it as collective because member learners, their

collective lesson sets, and their environing realities are

mutually interacting participants in the process.

Next Steps

Modeling is iterative.

My discussion has been meant

as a provisional clarification of the kinds of issues which

any general model of collective learning must confront.
To achieve a valid general model, a collective learn-

ing process will be required.

Differing views from differ-

ing disciplines will need to be dissociated and recombined
into an order that satisfies the range of perspectives.

Specific propositions will need to be advanced and tested.
The rewards could be social systems

schools to nations to the human species

— from

— better

families to
able to

deal with their changing realities, more able to engage

with each other in open inquiry, and more able to establish
a satisfying order.
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